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Abstract
Since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the beginning of the war 
in Donbas, Eastern Europe has been facing a migration crisis. Several million 
Ukrainians are internally displaced or have fled the country and now face an 
uncertain future. At the same time, Western-imposed sanctions and the 
creation of the Eurasian Economic Union have affected Russia’s migration 
policies. These largely ignored processes have a potential to change the 
social landscape of the region for many years to come. The aim of this 
collection is to shed light on the forgotten migrant crisis at the European 
Union’s doorstep and make sense of the various migration processes in and 
out of Ukraine and Russia.
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1 Migration and the Ukraine Crisis
Introduction
AGNIESZKA PIKULICKA-WILCZEWSKA
In 2015, when the European Union was facing a rapid inflow of migrants from 
the Middle East and Africa, which culminated in what is often referred to as 
‘the migration crisis’, its Eastern neighbour was undergoing its own mass 
reshuffling of the population. With the fifth largest number of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) in the world, reaching nearly 1.8 million1, Ukraine 
has found it arduous to deal with the immense and long-term consequences 
of the war in its eastern region of Donbas. 
The rapid inflow of people from the east and south of Ukraine to other regions 
has not only seen an ad-hoc and poorly elaborated governmental response, 
but also led to a number of problems related to the integration of newcomers, 
unemployment, as well as prejudice, xenophobia and distrust towards the 
Other. However, it has also seen an unprecedented mobilisation of civil 
society in support of the displaced, reflected in a variety of selfless acts of 
human kindness. 
But the effects of the Ukraine crisis in terms of migration have been 
tremendous not only within Ukraine. Over the course of the conflict, the 
number of Ukrainian citizens in Russia has increased by 0.9 million, reaching 
2.6 million in March 2015. Many of the asylum seekers have been confronted 
with unwelcoming attitudes, distrust and fear. Moreover, the economic crisis, 
which began in Russia as a result of the western-imposed sanctions, and the 
subsequent creation of the Eurasian Economic Union, have further affected 
Russia’s policy towards migrants and migration into the country. Therefore, it 
can be argued that the indirect consequences of the Ukraine crisis for 
migration have been much wider and far-fetched than it may seem at first 
glance.
The aim of this collection is to shed light on the forgotten migrant crisis at the 
1  According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Social Policy, 1,785,740 internally displaced 
persons were registered as of 6 June 2016.
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European Union’s doorstep and make sense of the various migration 
processes in and out of Ukraine and Russia, which have been taking place at 
the time of the war in Donbas. Given the scarcity of research on the various 
aspects of the topic, the book by no means exhausts it, but seeks to provide 
an overview of the existing scholarship and a point of reference for future 
studies. 
The book is divided into two sections. The first section deals with migration 
processes that have taken place within Ukraine or have involved Ukrainian 
citizens’ migration out of the country, excluding Russia. The second section 
discusses how the situation has developed within Russia, the country’s 
response to the rapid inflow of migrants from Ukraine, its changing migration 
policies and their effect on migrants, as well as other processes related to the 
phenomenon over the course of the Ukraine crisis. 
Ukraine
In the opening chapter, Michael Gentile introduces the concept of geopolitical 
fault-line cities – places with a high potential for the spread of conflict, where 
contested and remote-controlled narratives come together polarising the 
population. Ukraine’s fault-line cities, Gentile argues, are of pivotal 
importance for the European integration project and the global geopolitical 
order. The truths presented by the information spaces of both sides of the war 
in Donbas widen the gap between the opposing factions and activate the 
fault-line between them. 
Second, Kateryna Ivashchenko-Stadnik analyses the attitudes of the host 
community towards the newcomers. As the survey data demonstrate, after 
the two years of conflict, the IDPs are still perceived as semi-fellows and 
semi-citizens, limited in their access to social life. The reframing of such 
attitudes, Ivashchenko-Stadnik argues, is crucial to avoid IDPs’ long-term 
exclusion.  
In the third chapter, Tania Bulakh discusses the changes in the social 
response to the internally displaced persons in Ukraine, in particular to those 
from the Donbas region. She argues that while, initially, all migrants were 
largely accepted by the wider population, over the past year regional 
belonging has become a marker of social stigmatisation. People from 
Donbas, Bulakh argues, have been portrayed less favourably than those who 
fled Crimea, which has translated into everyday discrimination. 
In the following chapter, the co-editor of the collection, Greta Uehling, 
presents the results of her two-year-long research on the experiences of the 
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internally displaced persons from Crimea. She concludes that one of the 
effects of displacement has been the development of a new civic identity 
within Ukraine. Moreover, there is a widespread feeling of being abandoned 
and betrayed by the government among the displaced, Uehling argues, and 
the main task ahead is to remove the barriers standing in the way of IDP 
integration. 
Further, Joanna Fomina analyses several aspects of economic migration from 
Ukraine to Poland, the most popular destination for Ukrainians, in the context 
of the military conflict in Donbas. While the war has increased migration flows 
into the country, especially among young men, Fomina argues that the 
motives of migrants have remained mostly economic. However, despite the 
primary goal being financial, the conflict has seen an unprecedented 
mobilisation of Polish-based Ukrainians as well as greater institutionalisation 
of Ukrainian civil society in the country. 
In the last piece of the section, Olga Oleinikova analyses the structural 
variables that have shaped Ukrainian migration to Australia and lays out three 
profiles of Ukrainian migrants based on the period of migration, from 1991 to 
2016. She argues that the post-Euromaidan events impacted life trajectories 
of Ukrainian citizens which has translated into the increase in the number of 
asylum applications submitted in Australia and a shift towards survival-based 
migration. 
Russia
The second section begins with a chapter by Vladimir Mukomel discussing 
the migration of Ukrainians to Russia following the war in Donbas. It also 
presents the dominant attitudes towards Ukrainians in the country, including 
asylum seekers, in the country. Mukomel argues that the recent geopolitical 
changes have had a negative impact on Russians’ attitude towards migrants 
from Ukraine. The shift in public opinion, he asserts, can lead to serious 
social problems if the tensions between refugees and local population, 
resulting from migrants’ low integration level, continue.
In the following chapter, Viacheslav Morozov analyses how the Russian 
society reacted to the conflict in Ukraine. He argues that while it is true that 
President Putin has enjoyed wide support from the population, the 
phenomenon cannot be attributed to propaganda only, but has strong roots in 
nationalism, national identity and the fear of Western expansionism.  
Further, Mikhail Denisenko seeks to address the question of how the volume 
and structure of migration flows into Russia have changed since the 
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beginning of the recession – a result of the fall in oil prices and the imposition 
of Western sanctions. He also discusses how the crisis has affected the level 
of remittances received by the countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). He concludes that the current crisis has 
contributed to the fall in the inflow of migrant workers to Russia as well as the 
decrease in remittances sent to CIS countries. 
Further, Irina Kuznetsova analyses the formation process of the myth of a 
‘dangerous migrant’ in relation to nationals of CIS countries through politics 
and media discourse. She also looks at the impact of the recent migration 
legislation restrictions on migrants. While the Russian state and society have 
made a lot of effort to support refugees from Eastern Ukraine by creating 
special employment conditions for the group, foreigners with non-Slavic 
appearance often fall victim to racist attacks. Moreover, due to their frequent 
participation in the informal economy, migrants often face issues related to 
access to health care and work safety. 
Subsequently, Caress Schenk looks at the gap between the obligations put 
forward in the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) treaty and the existing 
domestic immigration laws and procedures in Russia and Kazakhstan. In the 
highly politicised aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, Schenk argues, migration 
can be seen as a vital issue of sovereignty and states might not like a 
supranational organisation to regulate it. Therefore, if new members are being 
attracted to EEU membership due to the promise of an open labour market, 
the reality of migrant experience on the ground is likely to be disappointing.
Finally, in the last chapter, Marina A. Kingsbury explains how complex 
historical, political and social events shape the patterns of xenophobia and 
how it is used as a political legitimation tool by the Kremlin. By demonising 
migrants, Kingsbury argues, the government re-directed public dissatisfaction 
to the visible and powerless migrant. However, as the Russian economy 
suffered from the sanctions imposed by the West in response to the conflict in 
Ukraine, the immigrants were no longer the prime enemy of the state and 
animosity shifted towards the external enemy: the United States and the 
European Union.
In conclusion, Greta Uehling summarises the arguments of the authors and 
discusses what new approaches and questions they have presented. She 
also analyses the policy relevance of individual contributions.
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1
Geopolitical Fault-Line Cities
MICHAEL GENTILE
Introduction
On 22 June 2016, people across most of the former Soviet Union were united 
in their remembrance of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War (GPW)2. This 
temporary appearance of unity comes against a background of political and 
ideological divisions largely centred on the question of how to interpret the 
Soviet past and its problematic legacies. Having experienced decades of 
suppression of historical facts, such as the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact’s secret 
protocol,3 the Ukrainian population, like that of the entire Soviet Union, was 
confronted with a wide range of uncomfortable or unexpected new truths 
about the violent and coercive nature of Soviet power. In the western regions 
of contemporary Ukraine, which had been invaded by the USSR in 1939, 
these truths were largely known already. Elsewhere in the country, where the 
original invader was Nazi Germany, they were harder to believe and accept 
(Zhurzhenko 2007, Portnov 2011, Osipian 2015), and consensus on the 
country’s post-totalitarian politics of memory did not emerge because 
independent Ukraine started off as a society divided into three very different 
political factions (Shevel 2011, 148-149). In the absence of a concerted, 
sustained, consequent and decisive effort on behalf of the central authority in 
Kyiv to de-Sovietise the country’s historical memory (as was done in most of 
2  The Great Patriotic War (GPW) is the Soviet and later Russian name for the Second 
World War. However, unlike the Second World War, the GPW only started when Nazi 
Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941. The Soviet propaganda machine 
effectively silenced or misrepresented most of what happened before this date, 
including the Soviet occupation of parts of Poland and of the Baltics, as well as the war 
on Finland (see Portnov 2011 for an insightful discussion on the official memory of the 
GPW in Ukraine and Belarus since 1991).
3  The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was a non-aggression pact signed by Germany and 
the Soviet Union in August 1939. It included a secret protocol that agreed upon and 
specified the areas and extent of the countries’ respective spheres of influence.
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Central Europe and in the Baltic states, see Czepczyński and Sooväli-
Sepping 2016), this context enabled the preservation and development of 
powerful alternative narratives manufactured during the years of the Soviet 
monopoly on historical truth, and inventively revised in Russia under Vladimir 
Putin. The most powerful of them all surrounds the GPW, which, as 
Zhurzhenko (2007, 4) notes, is the ‘founding myth of the new Russia’.
Geopolitical fault-line cities are places where such contested remote-
controlled narratives come together in space, trumping local issues of greater 
day-to-day relevance, and polarising the population on issues that differ 
substantially from the matters that typically split the residents of classic 
divided cities such as Belfast or Johannesburg. Inspired by the author’s 
extensive experience of fieldwork in the Donbas until late 2013, and by 
observations made during subsequent shorter visits to Kharkiv and Odessa, 
this chapter aims at opening up a theoretical discussion on the conditions and 
challenges present in such cities. It proceeds with a general discussion of the 
idea of the fault-line within geopolitical discourse, followed by a more focused 
section on fault-line cities, which discusses three separate, but related, 
issues: (1) the overlapping of contradictory information spaces, (2) the 
meaning of border and frontline location, and (3) memory, identity politics and 
political confrontation. 
Fault-line and Borderland Narratives
The idea of the fault-line evokes powerful imageries and associations, and is 
well established in geopolitical discourse. Nevertheless, a quick Google 
Ngram viewer search indicates that the term’s usage outside of the field of 
plate tectonics is relatively recent. In combination with ‘geopolitical’, the 
concept appeared around 1970, but it did not take off until the early 1990s, 
paradoxically at a time when the end of the Cold War should have made it 
sound somewhat obsolete. It peaked in the late 1990s, and then stabilised at 
a somewhat lower level since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Meanwhile, the less 
frequently used but more recently introduced ‘civilisational fault-line’ surged 
twice: first, following the publication of Samuel Huntington’s (1993) notorious 
Clash of Civilizations thesis, and then again after 9/11, when many observers 
interpreted the attacks as evidence in support of it. 
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Huntington’s (1993, 1996) outline of the future 
of planetary international relations – one in which seven or eight civilizations 
will be confronting each other and in which the primary division will be 
between the West and the Rest – has been widely revisited, revalued and re-
critiqued. The argument, as it goes, is that the death of the ideological 
battleground of the Cold War, elsewhere known as ‘the end of history’ 
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(Fukuyama 1989), re-activates humanity’s traditional conflict tendencies, most 
notably those stemming from the cultural incompatibilities between 
civilisations. Some countries, including Russia and Ukraine, must face the 
difficult task of hosting and managing one or more boundaries between 
different civilizations, and are therefore seen as ‘torn’ countries. On this basis, 
Huntington suggested that Ukraine could split along civilizational lines at 
some point in the future (see Bassin 2007, 361). While this may sound 
superficially prophetic given the recent Russian annexation of Crimea and the 
establishment of two Soviet-nostalgic ‘People’s Republics’, these 
developments clearly lack the ethnic, religious or cultural underpinnings that 
would characterize a civilisational fault-line conflict.
Because geopolitical preferences and allegiances may be more susceptible to 
manipulation than ethnic, national and religious identities, they are arguably 
easier to mobilise too (O’Loughlin et al. 2006, Gentile 2015, Wilson 2016), 
particularly when societies reach critical junctures or transitional moments, 
during which the competition for hegemony between opposing geopolitical 
narratives intensifies (Mamadouh and Dijkink 2006, 358). However, a power 
that intends to rely on geopolitically rooted identities will have to come to 
terms with the fact that the pendulum may swing back rapidly, which was 
nicely illustrated by the rapid rise and fall of the geopolitical conception of 
Novorossiya (Laruelle 2015, O’Loughlin et al. 2016). Hence, stable identity-
building work may require crafting or grafting stickier forms of identification – 
national, religious, cultural, or whatever – onto the geopolitical identity 
framework. This is where the early 1990s’ separatist movement in Crimea 
failed (Dawson 1997).
With an appropriate treatment by political technology, and corroborated by the 
onset of armed conflict, geopolitical identities can rapidly morph into more 
resistant, if artificial, national or regional identities. The Donbas offers a case 
in point: long lacking any clear sense of national identity, the least blurred 
aspect uniting its population was its fervent opposition to the imagined 
Atlantic geopolitical Other, epitomised globally by NATO (Kubicek 2000, 
Barkanov 2015, Gentile 2015) and locally by the ‘Fascist-Banderite’ myth 
projected upon western Ukraine (Osipian 2015). Yet, such opposition is not 
sufficient to explain the current hostilities. For the outbreak of war to 
materialise, vapid geopolitical differences demanded heavy exaggeration and 
to some extent re-framing as civilisational differences (see Laruelle 2015, 
Jekaterynczuk 2016), and direct military involvement from Moscow was 
indispensable. In Huntington’s words, this would have implied a transition 
from a fluid and predominantly ‘which side are you on?’ based identity 
towards an identity centred on the more inelastic ‘what are you?’ (see 
Huntington 1993, 27). Finally, without the support of the local elites – the 
klepto-kakistocrats (incompetent thieves) of the Party of Regions and their 
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oligarch associates – this shift would have been far less likely (Zhurzhenko 
2014, Kuzio 2015, Osipian 2015, Portnov 2015, Wilson 2016).
By contrast, beyond the occupied territories of the Donbas and Crimea, the 
Russian aggression has strongly contributed to the formation and 
consolidation of Ukrainian national identity in those regions where it was 
traditionally considered weak, i.e. across the south and east of the country 
(Härtel 2016, Kulyk 2016). However, this does not appear to have altered the 
Ukrainian population’s positive view of the Russian ethnic Other significantly 
(Barrington 2002, Armandon 2013, Onuch 2015), nor has ethnicity or 
language status been politicised in mainstream politics (the incendiary 
rhetoric of the far right parties Svoboda and Pravyi Sektor enjoy scant popular 
support). This is not the kind of context that would favour the development of 
inter-ethnic hostilities, let alone the outbreak of war: for this to happen, 
foreign (Russian) intervention would appear to be indispensable. Yet, such an 
intervention would have to exploit actually existing divisions, and because 
cultural, ethno-national or linguistic divisions have little to offer in this sense, 
geopolitical orientations are the only viable alternative.
Fault-line Cities
Fault-line cities are cities located where two or more ethno-cultural 
(‘civilisational’), ethno-national, economic or geopolitical realms intersect or 
overlap, and where this condition may, under certain circumstances, express 
itself through heightened conflict, violence or outright warfare. Some fault-line 
cities are therefore characterised as contested, polarised and/or divided – 
often literally so, by walls, fences, gates, and exclusionary turfs, as in Nicosia 
or Jerusalem – but far from all fault-line cities are contested and not all 
contested cities are on fault-lines. 
For the emergence of conflict, the politicisation of local differences is 
essential (Dawson 1997, Anderson 2008, Silver 2010). However, the recent 
Russian land grab of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and of Sevastopol, 
as well as the conflict in the Donbas, come against a local background of 
moderate and shrinking tensions within these regions, despite the heightened 
tensions stemming from Russia’s mounting geopolitical assertiveness on the 
international arena (Dawson 1997, Armandon 2013). This has prompted an 
increase in research on seemingly peaceful, or at least pacified, fault-line 
regions, including northern Kazakhstan (Diener 2015) and Estonia (Trimbach 
and O’Lear 2015), where inter-ethnic divisions are increasingly subordinate to 
geopolitics.
Like much of contemporary urban theory, the literature on contested or 
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divided cities is skewed towards a limited set of paradigmatic cities, towards a 
handful of iconic sites characterised by deeply rooted ethno-national, religious 
and political conflict (Allegra et al. 2012). These cities – places such as Beirut 
or Sarajevo – are indeed typically located on the geographical margins of 
Huntington’s civilisations, yet they exist amidst scores of peaceful 
civilisational fault-line cities (Anderson 2008, 20). Interestingly, while noting 
that divided cities are usually found at the edge of (former) empires, and that 
conflict is particularly likely to emerge when the empire reaches its endgame, 
Anderson nevertheless understands divisions in the light of assumed ethno-
national(ist) causes, even when these overlap with regional or global 
geopolitical interests. Following this – largely implicit – logic, conflict in 
civilisational or ethno-national fault-line cities may be instrumentalised by 
distant geopolitical agents, but it remains primarily embedded in the local 
ethno-national rift. Thus, this line of thought suggests that ethno-national 
divisions are the key issue, and that, given the right circumstances, these 
may be used by remote powers to forward their own interests. Indeed, this 
was the case in Estonia during the 1990s (Merritt 2000).
Yet, there exist cities that are located on the interfaces of different global-
scaled geopolitical spheres of interest, cities where ethno-national divisions 
are either absent or subordinate to the power of clashing geopolitical 
imaginaries, and in which potent but irreconcilable historical and geopolitical 
narratives and discourses overlap, dividing the population into opposing 
factions. Essentially, these are geopolitical fault-line cities, cities whose 
inhabitants may use the same language, but not the same vocabulary, in their 
approach to contentious issues such as historical memory, foreign policy 
preferences and geopolitical alignment. In a geopolitical fault-line city, 
membership in NATO is more likely to lead to hard feelings than the decision 
to divert funds from schools towards the construction of an underfunded ring 
road. Moreover, whereas residential segregation (by religion, ethnicity, 
wealth, etc.) is one of the most salient features in most divided/contested 
cities (Allegra et al. 2012), this is not the case in geopolitical fault-line cities: 
there are no NATO-supporter ghettos, other than where NATO support 
correlates with other population characteristics.
Geopolitical fault-line cities are also cities where the production and 
consumption of geopolitical meaning are exceptionally multi-sited (cf. 
Fregonese 2009), cities in which multiple, opposing, sometimes abruptly 
emerging, and frequently ephemeral geopolitical narratives of both local and 
non-local origin come into conversation with different parts of local society 
and with the built environment. When the salience of the overlapping 
geopolitical narratives suddenly increases, e.g. as a result of significant 
external impulses or during critical junctures (as was the case during and 
after the Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine), the probability of violent conflict 
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increases. Yet, the roots of such conflict, as well as its prospective solutions, 
are rather to be sought outside of the city than within it. In this sense, the 
geopolitical fault-line city is an empty canvas upon which struggles on matters 
that are of little concern to the daily running of city life are projected, meaning 
that there is ultimately little to fight about. And because there is little to fight 
about, the dynamics of conflict in geopolitical fault-line cities are far more 
volatile than in ethno-nationally divided cities, where conflict tends to evolve 
more predictably and in relation to universal concerns such as ethno-politics, 
security, policing and discrimination (Calame and Charlesworth 2009, 7).
Information Fault-lines in the City
A crucial aspect characterising geopolitical fault-line cities is their exposure to 
overlapping, but contradictory, spaces of information which, in today’s 
globalised media landscape, does not necessarily command a border(land) 
physical location. Moreover, while global geopolitical imaginaries may well be 
coloured by religious or ethno-national differences, they orbit around a core of 
vague concepts such as polarity (uni-, bi-, multi-) and global status, 
democracy (or not), military power, and political ideology. Cultural differences 
may become part of the equation too, but unlike the case along Huntington’s 
civilisational fault-lines, rather than being ‘not only real [but] basic’ 
(Huntington 1993, 25), they may be very artificial. The recent Kremlin-
supported talk of a civilisational rift between a value-conservative Russia and 
the allegedly decadent West is a case in point (see Hutchings and Szostek 
2015).
The collapse of the Iron Curtain and the rise of the internet took place almost 
simultaneously. If the previous global order was one of insulated regional 
spaces of information, only at times broken by e.g. samizdat publications or 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty broadcasts within the Soviet sphere, the 
circulation of information since 1991 has been almost boundless, despite 
some authoritarian governments’ unrelenting efforts to contain it. People’s 
ability to assimilate this information, however, has changed far less, 
depending on foreign language skills and on the heavily socialising legacy of 
the informational past. One may thus expect the population of geopolitical 
fault-line cities to be divided on prominent issues by age, education, socio-
economic status and language skills; indeed, my own research in Luhansk, 
which was conducted during the months preceding the Euromaidan, 
suggested that this was the case in relation to both NATO and, especially, EU 
support (Gentile 2015), squaring in with findings from earlier research 
conducted in Ukraine on this and on other related topics (Katchanovski 2006, 
Munro 2007, Armandon 2013).1 Moreover, Charnysh (2013, 7) noted that 
1  It should be noted that the diversity in popular opinions on geopolitical matters is 
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Ukrainians and Russians increasingly consume different media, causing a 
polarisation of opinions on political matters, and similar observations have 
been made by Koort (2014) in relation to Estonia and its Russian minority, 
and by Birka (2016) for Latvia. The major difference between Ukraine and 
Estonia, in this respect, is the fact that almost the entire population of Ukraine 
is a potential consumer of Russian-language media products, whereas this 
certainly is not the case in Estonia. Following the Russian news broadcasts in 
Narva is less of a matter of choice than in Kyiv, where Russian nevertheless 
remains widely spoken among its residents, Ukrainian and Russian alike.
The Meaning of Border and/or Military Frontline Location
Geopolitical fault-line cities are frequently located in proximity of borders 
between states with differing geopolitical interests or ambitions, irrespective 
of the degree of confrontation between them. Most cities in eastern Ukraine 
belong to this group, including prominent metropolises such as Kharkiv, 
Donetsk and Dnipro.2 The borderland location has several implications. First, 
close proximity to the border is likely to increase the quantity and quality of 
cross-border economic, social, cultural, and even kinship ties. Second, it 
entails an enhanced exposure to the informational spaces of the neighbouring 
country, especially in the absence of a significant language barrier. 
Consequentially, third, it implies relatively weak connections to the national 
centre of power, unless the borderland fault-line city is the centre of power. 
Instead, stronger cross-border connections may be expected, including 
not a characteristic that is limited to geopolitical fault-line cities. During the early 2000s, 
when the Russian media landscape was not quite as unidirectional as it is today, 
popular views and imaginations of Russia’s role in the international arena were far more 
diverse than they are today (O’Loughlin et al. 2005). However, more recently, and 
especially since about 2012, popular views on foreign policy have converged; e.g. the 
annexation (‘re-unification’) of Crimea and the country’s policy towards Ukraine 
(however contradictory) enjoy widespread support (Morozov, this collection).
2  Other borderland geopolitical fault-line cities include Daugavpils (Latvia), Narva 
(Estonia) and Chişinău (Moldova). While it may be tempting to interpret these cities as 
ethno-nationally divided and straddling a ‘civilisational fault-line’ – for example a ‘Slavic/
Finno-Ugrian fault-line’ (Anderson 2008, 9) running across Estonia – inter-ethnic 
tensions are in fact negligible in these cities, despite the recent rise of a more distinct 
form of Russian-speaker identity in the region (Cheskin 2015, 16, see also Birka 2016). 
Like in Ukraine, tensions run stronger in relation to foreign policy preferences and 
geopolitical alignment. Until relatively recently, formal citizenship was also a major 
grievance among Russian speakers in these cities, but the problem has been greatly 
reduced over recent years, not least because ‘non-citizen’ status has its perks in the 
form of visa-free travel from Lisbon all the way to Vladivostok (Selga 2016). At the 
same time, however, the relative attractiveness of non-citizenship may exacerbate 
some of the geopolitical fault-line characteristics of the cities where non-citizens are 
most numerous. 
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enhanced migration flows, particularly in the presence of large real wage 
differentials. Fourth, residents of borderland fault-line cities are prone to 
identity hybridity or blurring, creating a sense of relative detachment from the 
core and strengthening the sense of a unique local or regional identity (cf. 
Trimbach and O’Lear 2015 for northeast Estonia, Zhurzhenko 2011 for 
Kharkiv, Pirie 1996 and Kubicek 2000 for the Donbas).
Today all cities in eastern Ukraine are geopolitical fault-line cities, and many 
are located near the country’s external borders. Moreover, many are 
dangerously close to the military frontline, adding an additional layer of 
complications. The most evident complications stem from what it means to be 
located near a military frontline in the first place. First, this means that there 
is a real and constant threat of invasion, yet the perceptions of this threat are 
far from uniform, as are the feelings towards the potential invader. Second, 
this context may embolden the faultline-frontline cities’ ‘risk entrepreneurs’, 
actors who may seek opportunities to cooperate with the potentially invading 
state’s authorities for personal, economic or political gain. Third, being 
perceived as high-risk sites means that such cities inevitably deflect 
investment, contributing to increased economic hardship and dependency on 
external support. Finally, there are the flows of internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) and refugees generated by the conflict. Such flows are usually initially 
directed towards safe areas within short distances from the areas of armed 
conflict, confronting the local authorities with an immediate requirement to 
provide shelter, while simultaneously increasing housing demand and the 
burden on public services such as healthcare and schooling.
Because it is common for IDPs and refugees to experience social, economic 
and psychological distress, it is crucial for frontline-faultline cities to work for 
their correct and rapid integration. Moreover, in the Donbas there are cities 
that have experienced temporary Russian proxy occupation by the ‘People’s 
Republics’, cities such as Slovyansk or Kostyantynivka, which are now net 
IDP/refugee-importers after having been net exporters during the four months 
of ‘people’s occupation’. Former IDPs who have had to spend time elsewhere 
in Ukraine have now returned to cities where they must re-encounter 
neighbours who had chosen to escape to Russia. Presumably, these two 
groups of returnees have been exposed to very different conditions and 
narratives, and this may have influenced their national/ethnic/civic self-
identification in potentially conflictual ways. Geopolitical faultline-frontline 
cities must thus also contend with the task of mending the relations between 
groups with opposing experiences of the war, particularly among IDPs and 
returnees, but also among those who chose not to leave. Also, recent 
research on the twin faultline-frontline cities of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk 
suggests that opinions tend to be divided between those who have been 
directly victimised by the conflict and those who have not, with the former 
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tending to exhibit a stronger pro-West position than the latter (Coupé and 
Obrizan 2016).
Memory, Identity Politics and Political Confrontation
Geopolitical fault-line cities are sites of heightened political confrontation, 
places where irreconcilable narratives tensely coexist, and where 
fundamental aspects of historical memory collide. With the partial and 
anachronistic exception of Belarus, Moscow’s role as ideological axis mundi 
was rapidly disposed of throughout Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), 
prompting a return to narratives centred on the historical homeland and the 
search for a new role within the Western world, signifying a Return to Europe 
(Czepczyński and Sooväli-Sepping 2016). Concordantly, identity politics in 
CEE heavily relies on the othering of the alien ideology of Communism (Light 
and Young 2010, 946), which, like a zombie, re-surfaces time and time again 
to scare off any attempt at challenging the main tenets of the new (neoliberal) 
order (Chelcea and Druţa 2016, see also Etkind 2009). During the 1990s, 
both Russia and Ukraine followed this path, albeit with hesitation, but neither 
country ever succeeded in making a clean break with its past (Burant 1995, 
Pipes 1997). In Moscow, the voices of the Soviet hardliners backed by the 
security services and by the military were never fully suppressed; Kyiv, for its 
part, struggled with regional differences in political support ‘so acute that 
more polarisation would be difficult to imagine’ (Kubicek 2000, 290). 
While the ideology of Communism may have suffered a fatal blow around 
1990, from which it was never to recover, it is still notable that ‘the ‘subjects’ 
of post-socialist transformation will retain a memory of the past which, in its 
inevitably incomplete and remoulded shape, continues to influence 
evaluations of the present’ (Hörschelmann 2002, 63). In other words, while 
Communism may well be dead, memories of the Communist past are not, but 
these memories are fragmented, open to manipulation and, above all, highly 
contested. In Ukraine, and to some extent in Russia and Kazakhstan, one 
such crucial element of historical memory refers to the Holodomor – the mass 
famine orchestrated by Joseph Stalin in 1932–1933 – which has come to 
epitomise the tensions existing between pro-Russia/pro-Soviet and pro-
Ukrainian factions in Kharkiv. At the centre of this process is the status of the 
Holodomor as genocide aimed specifically at Ukrainians (as decreed by law 
under President Yushchenko), or as a tragedy victimising all, irrespective of 
ethnicity. In practice, the local elites handled the matter by looking for some 
kind of compromise, e.g. in relation to the location and characteristics of new 
monuments commemorating the victims of the Holodomor, yet this 
compromise only confirmed Kharkiv’s hybrid borderland identity status, rather 
than promoting the city’s new status as Ukrainian (Zhurzhenko 2011, 608). 
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Therefore, Zhurzhenko (2011, 619) concludes, ‘[…] the new memory regime 
is contested, renegotiated, and modified at the local level, resulting in 
decentralisation and fragmentation of the official narrative of the Holodomor 
as genocide’. 
Thus, in geopolitical fault-line cities, like in ethno-nationally divided cities, 
‘truth has to be negotiated’ (Brand 2009, 49), and memory politics are rife. 
However, as Zhurzhenko (2007) explains, ‘memory politics [in Ukraine] is less 
about the communist past than about the future political and economic 
hegemony on the European continent, […] it is always the geopolitics of 
memory’ (original emphasis). Hence, the monument commemorating the 21 
Luhansk natives that fell victim to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (OUN-UPA), 
which was uncovered in Luhansk as late as in 2010, is far more eye-catching 
than the stone raised two years earlier in remembrance of the thousands of 
local victims of the Holodomor.
While the Holodomor is one of the major enjeux in the geopolitics of memory 
– both within Ukraine and beyond its borders – it is by far not the only one. 
Geopolitical fault-line cities such as Kharkiv or Luhansk persistently 
experience conflict over antagonistic symbols, and while Soviet and Soviet-
inspired monuments and street-names dominate their cityscapes (or at least, 
they did until the implementation of the recent laws on de-communisation3), 
they offer resistance to the dominant anti-Soviet counter-narrative stemming 
from Kyiv. The political controversies and polarised opinions surrounding the 
ubiquitous Lenin statues in eastern Ukraine are ultimately about ‘empty 
signifiers’ (Zhurzhenko 2014 and 2015), symbols that have come to represent 
something that is separate from the person/thing they represent. Except for a 
small number of true Communist believers, Lenin has become more a symbol 
of resistance against nationalist Kyiv-Ukraine, rather than of the very ideology 
he championed (Zhurzhenko 2015). Thus, unlike in ethno-nationally divided 
cities, where tailored myths are artificially projected onto specific sites and 
into the overall aesthetics of the city (Bakshi 2014, 189), geopolitical fault-line 
cities experience a more thorough decoupling between place and meaning. In 
3  The decommunisation laws entered into force in May 2015. They require the 
effacement of all communist symbols, monuments and toponyms present on Ukrainian 
soil, with the exception of those commemorating the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany 
in the Second World War. A recent high profile city renaming is that of former 
Dnipropetrovsk, now Dnipro. Initially thought to be controversial, evidence suggests 
that the laws have not been met with much resistance on ideological grounds (Shevel 
2016). Importantly, the renaming of cities has not left the occupied territories 
untouched: for example, the city of Stakhanov in Luhansk oblast’ was recently returned 
its old name Kadiivka, but this is not reflected in the city’s current official website 
(Stahanov.info, accessed 27 July 2016), as the self-proclaimed Luhansk People’s 
Republic does not intend to implement the Ukrainian decommunisation laws.
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other words, there is more ambiguity in the air, there is a multitude of 
narratives and counter-narratives, but also plenty of symbolic capital up for 
grabs by local elites and political entrepreneurs (cf. Forest and Johnson 
2002). In Kharkiv, the Party of Regions ultimately consigned interpretations of 
history that were alternative to those dominating in the city to discursive and 
visual marginality and insignificance, and the attention was shifted towards 
smaller monuments (Zhurzhenko 2015). However, as Bakshi (2014, 208) 
notes, conflict and disruption alter the bond between place and memory at its 
core. Accordingly, following the Euromaidan and the subsequent wave of 
successful and unsuccessful attempts at establishing ‘people’s republics’ 
(notable failed attempts took place Kharkiv and Odessa) and Anti-Maidan 
movements throughout southeast Ukraine, tensions run higher than ever, and 
small explosions and bomb threats have ostensibly supplanted the battle of 
signs and symbols that had been characterising Kharkiv. Conflict has now 
reached the grassroots, with the population having become extremely 
polarised in regard to the city’s largely unreformed landscape of signs and 
symbols – empty signifiers that have been activated as a result of the 
intensification of the discourses surrounding them (Zhurzhenko 2015). 
In June 2015, when I last visited Kharkiv, the city’s walls were virtually free 
from any graffiti in favour of or against the Ukrainian state, the Security 
Service (SBU), Putin, NATO, the EU, or the ‘Kharkov People’s Republic’4. 
Likewise, unlike in Kyiv, where the colours of the Ukrainian flag are 
ubiquitous, the celebration of Ukrainian Kharkiv was at best timid. Almost 
complete semiotic silence enveloped the city’s public spaces, yet, behind the 
facades, in the inner courtyards, and away from the bustling life of the city 
centre, the walls still revealed the fading voices of the most active period of 
conflict between separatists and supporters of Ukrainian unity. The local 
administration, it seems, had silenced the elephant in the living room.5 
Meanwhile, Lenin’s right boot was all that was left on the pedestal located in 
the middle of Freedom Square. Swimming with the tide, Hennadyi Kernes, the 
city’s scandalous mayor, has opportunistically announced that the entire area 
will be given a European appearance in the future (Radio Svoboda 2015). 
Ironically, this was not long after he declared that he would have defended 
the Lenin monument at any cost (Bershidsky 2014). In Kharkiv, like elsewhere 
in CEE, both Europe and Lenin may well be empty signifiers, but they remain 
each other’s antonyms.
4  The Kharkov People’s Republic was an early attempt at establishing separatist rule 
in the city in March-April 2014. Unlike similar efforts in the Donbas, it did not succeed. 
‘Kharkov’ is the Russian-language version of Kharkiv.
5  Interestingly, the authorities in Odessa appear to have adopted a lightly more 
laissez faire strategy. Unlike in Kharkiv, as of October 2015, Odessa’s walls offered a 
visual archive of the tense atmosphere that prevailed in the city following the 
Euromaidan and, especially, after the 2 May 2014 Trade Unions Building fire. 
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Conclusion
This chapter cautiously theorised the geopolitical fault-line city, attempting to 
extract it as a useful concept from the heterogeneous club of cities that are 
spoken of as divided, contested, polarised or dual. Any comprehensive 
analysis of geopolitical fault-line cities – or of any city for that matter – would 
necessitate deep engagement, possibly including ethnographic fieldwork, with 
the characteristics and sources of the conflicts taking place in them (cf. 
Allegra et al. 2012), revealing complex entanglements of local, national and 
transnational identities with a diverse set of geopolitical commitments. For 
this reason, as Véron (2016) sensibly suggests in relation to the closely 
related literature on divided cities, it is important to listen to the multiple 
voices present in the city, not just to the hegemonic storylines that tend to 
essentialise, and perhaps even contribute to, the sources of conflict (see also 
Nagle 2016). Yet, key dissonances between views on historical memory, 
foreign policy, geopolitical alignment and geopolitical identity are among the 
most important sources of conflict in geopolitical fault-line cities; locally, these 
dissonances translate into heated battles over ‘empty signifiers’ such as the 
many Lenins and Dzerzhinskiys scattered across south-eastern Ukraine that 
still stand vigilant against the imminent threat of a ‘Fascist-Banderite 
invasion’. In this sense, conflict in geopolitical fault-line cities is truly ‘glocal’. 
Ukraine’s geopolitical fault-line cities are for the global geopolitical order what 
the voters of Ohio are for the United States presidential elections: their 
swinging status, and their future socio-political trajectories and alignment are 
of pivotal importance, not only to the regions and countries within which they 
are located, but also for the entire European integration project (and 
conversely, for the corresponding Eurasian project led by Vladimir Putin). 
A crucial aspect distinguishing the geopolitical fault-line city from other 
divided cities relates to the potential for the spread of conflict. If conflict in 
classic fault-line cities tends to remain localised – because it mostly relates to 
localised concrete concerns held by opposing groups – conflict in geopolitical 
fault-line cities tends to be very abstract and, therefore, easier to manipulate 
and export. Therefore, the Donbas war and the furtive Russian annexation of 
Crimea have revamped the confrontational attitudes present between parts of 
the Russian-speaking community and the non-Russian majority elsewhere, 
especially in Latvia, projecting cities such as Riga and Daugavpils into the 
frontlines of the current geopolitical struggle over the minds and allegiances 
of their populations. Yet Riga and Daugavpils are fundamentally different: 
while Daugavpils is an almost entirely Russian-speaking borderland city, Riga 
is a multi-lingual geopolitical fault-line capital where a growing geopolitical 
identity schism (Birka 2016) overlaps with the unsettling characteristics of 
classic divided cities, particularly ethnic residential segregation.  This may 
exacerbate the potential for conflict in this city.
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Summing up, contested memories and conflicting identities come together in 
geopolitical fault-line cities, diverting the population’s attention from issues 
concerning the more mundane aspects of urban life. Geopolitical imaginaries 
and controversies over empty signifiers hijack and polarise the political 
debate and population alike. Because the disputed issues are only partially 
rooted in the local conditions, the situation in geopolitical fault-line cities is 
potentially more volatile, and the unfolding of conflict less predictable. Until 
two or three years ago, Odessa, Dnipro, Kharkiv and Donetsk were generally 
assumed to be similar in terms of the political orientations and geopolitical 
preferences of their residents. Previously underestimated differences 
between these cities and, above all, physical distance from the Russian 
Federation, have rapidly tilted the balance in favour of the one or of the other 
side. However, in the meantime, the widening gap between the truths 
portrayed within the Russian and non-Russian informational spaces activates 
the fault-line between opposing factions in these cities. New earthquakes 
cannot be excluded.
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The Social Challenge of Internal 
Displacement in Ukraine: The 
Host Community’s Perspective
KATERYNA IVASHCHENKO-STADNIK
Unknown saints arrived in the city.
They used stones for saying prayers and carpets for spending the nights. 
How to reach God now, when the coverage isn’t good enough?
Just draw crosses on the houses you need. 
You anyway won’t be happy there, where no one expected you to come.
Exile always turns to one’s silent lips6. 
Serhiy Zhadan, The Templars (2016)
The Phenomenon of IDPs in Ukraine: Gone with the War? 
With Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Russian-backed offensive in 
Donbas, the forced destabilisation of Ukraine, one of Europe’s largest 
countries, has had devastating security consequences, both internationally 
6  (Ukr.) В місті з’явилися невідомі святі,
молились камінню й спали на килимах.
Який зв’язок із Господом при такому покритті?
Малюй хрести на потрібних тобі домах.
…ви все одно не зможете бути щасливими там, де вас ніхто не чекав.
Вигнання завжди обертається тишею на вустах. 
Sergyi Zhadan (born in 1974 in Starobelsk, Luhansk region) is a famous Ukrainian poet 
and civil activist who writes extensively on the issues related to the population in 
Ukraine’s east — before, during and after the conflict. The Templars, his latest poem, is 
devoted to the undeclared war and raises the question of reconciliation, love and hope. 
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and domestically. According to the UN estimates the potential pool of those 
who have been affected by the conflict and need humanitarian assistance can 
be as high as five million individuals, as of October 2015 (USAID, 2016). 
Having, thus far, a relatively stable migration history, Ukraine has seen an 
unprecedented exodus of civilians from the conflict-affected territories. Unlike 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) who can remain unregistered, the 
estimations on the number of people seeking asylum or other forms of stay 
abroad are more reliable due to the rather strict cross-border regulations 
(although, there is no way to verify how many of those left Ukraine as a result 
of the conflict). 
As of August 2015, the number of Ukrainians seeking asylum in neighboring 
countries was 388,800, other forms of stay — 732,000 (UNHCR, 2015). As 
Eurostat reports, for the last 12 months (as of the first quarter of 2016) the 
number of Ukrainians seeking asylum in the European Union reached 19,000 
individuals (with a tendency to decrease). It should be noted that most 
asylum-seekers from Ukraine are refused refugee status because a life-
threatening situation is present only in some parts of the country (EUROSTAT, 
2016). Most displaced move internally: as of June 2016, 1,783,900 IDPs from 
Crimea and Donbas have been officially registered (in August 2015 the figure 
was 1,438,000) (Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, 2016). However, experts 
estimate that the real number of uprooted within Ukraine, including those who 
do not apply for registration, is considerably higher. 
Accuracy aside, one can estimate that no less than four per cent of Ukraine’s 
42.5 million citizens have been internally displaced due to conflict (something 
the country had never experienced before1). If one takes a global look, in 
2015 Ukraine found itself among the five countries in the world with the 
highest number of IDPs associated with conflict and violence (after Yemen, 
Syria, Iraq and Nigeria) and ranks first in Europe (GRID 2016). As Ukraine 
has had little experience of dealing with IDPs, experts argue that it should 
follow the United Nations principles as regards forced displacement and, 
specifically, the standards developed during conflicts in the former socialist 
countries such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Yugoslavia. Still, each 
individual case creates a unique cluster of problems and each requires 
sensible policies that can facilitate better strategies. 
Contemporary literature on displacement pays a growing attention to the 
1  As a Soviet Republic, Ukraine experienced a mass displacement in 1986, when the 
Chornobyl nuclear accident resulted in the displacement of the affected population 
(including 116,000 inhabitants from 188 settlements). See Meynatyan S. (2014) Nuclear 
disasters and displacement Forced Migration Review, No.45, February 2014. Available 
at: http://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/crisis/meybatyan.pdf 
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social dimension of the forced movement, in particular to its conflict-driven 
patterns. Caused by the ‘inability to return readily and freely’ to their homes 
(Brettel 2015, 148-153), it complicates the trauma of one’s ‘conflict-induced 
eviction’ from the habitual environment, a sudden ‘break-up of families, loss of 
belonging, status and identity’ (Rajput 2013, 4-6), something that profoundly 
distinguishes IDPs from the local population. The arrival of the displaced 
people into host communities involves a complex intergroup dynamics, often 
marked by prejudice, stereotyping, discrimination, and power relations 
(Bradley 2015, Rajput 2015). Experts argue that under poor socioeconomic 
conditions as well as deteriorating political and security situation, IDPs can 
fall victim of the host community’s intolerance (Haider 2014) which might lead 
to further clashes (Bohnet et al. 2013, Shlapentokh at al. 2016). 
An analysis of contemporary conflicts shows that in a state-sponsored war, 
civilians living in the enemy camp, even if they are not engaged in hostilities, 
are conceived by the other side as ‘failed citizens’ (Diken & Laustsen 2005), 
as ‘neither a friend nor a foe’ (Korostelina and Cherkaoui 2012). As previous 
findings on the contemporary conflicts have shown, when the strategic goal of 
the targeted violence is to destroy a community’s or territory’s integrity, 
intergroup conflicts cannot be described as clear instances of ethnic, religious 
or other differences (Spini et al. 2014). In that respect, Ukraine constitutes a 
typical, but at the same time a profoundly difficult, case of displacement. 
First, not only the public perception of the displacement’s root causes 
provokes considerable public discontent, but officially, too, the external 
aggression has not been acknowledged in Ukraine (Batrin 2015). The 
misleading term ‘civil war in Ukraine’ widely used by the top Russian officials 
and, occasionally, by the international community (including the UN high 
representatives, politicians and foreign observers) infiltrates public discourse 
through the media channels in a harmful way. The term hybrid war, a different 
way of defining the conflict in Ukraine that parts of the local and international 
community use, makes it even more complicated to the wide public2. From 
the host society’s perspective, as long as the war remains undeclared but 
Russian weapons and paramilitary forces are used against Ukraine in the 
east of the country, the role of the local population in Donbas, be it active or 
passive, will be perceived as hostile. Although the Ukrainian society in 
different regions shares ambiguous views of the war, the majority still 
perceive it as an external aggression with a considerable role of the locals 
2  The rather new concept was formed at the end of the Cold War with reference to 
multi-faceted conflicts consisting of conventional war tactics through both paramilitary 
and military detachments, cyberwar activities and widely used mass communication 
channels. See: Hybrid war and the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Science Daily, 
3 October 2016. Available at: https://www.sciencedaily.com/
releases/2016/10/161003092438.htm 
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financed and coordinated by the Russian Federation (Ukrainian society 2015, 
627-630). With a mass military call-up for the country’s conflict in Donbas, 
local people’s escape from the conflict zone often provokes moral stigma. In a 
sense, they are seen as both victims and perpetrators3. 
Second, Ukraine’s IDPs by and large are not a socially, ethnically, religiously 
or ideologically homogeneous group. They reflect the country’s cultural 
diversity, represent different social strata and have different political views 
(from a fundamentally pro-Soviet to radically pro-European). In addition, 
some of the registered displaced persons have not been resettled: they 
applied for IDP status to claim their social welfare payments in Ukraine 
(specifically pensions and childcare subsidies), but have been either unable 
to rent accommodation or unwilling to abandon their dwellings in the occupied 
territories. As a result, they move back and forth with no endeavour to 
integrate into a new community. Before a more rigid system of control over 
payments was launched, many of the ‘shuttling IDPs’ used their ambivalent 
status of being-here-and-there to receive double social payments both from 
the Ukrainian state and from the Donbas self-proclaimed republics4. Others 
have not registered at all (a pattern widespread among the young employed, 
reluctant to waste time on exhaustive bureaucratic procedures), but were 
eager to use the opportunity of settling in other parts of Ukraine for good with 
no will to return, even if the conflict is over. 
The phenomenon of ‘hybrid IDPs’ (having an official status but not being 
displaced or being displaced without gaining an official status) can be viewed 
as a consequence of the complexity of the Ukraine crisis and is worth 
analysing in further studies. What is important for us, is the fact that, without 
questioning the main role of the Russian authorities in unleashing and 
maintaining the conflict, the Ukrainian central and regional elites (a firm alloy 
of oligarchs and people in power) have done everything they could to keep 
the legal contours of the conflict within the safe margins in order to secure 
their businesses and status (Pietsukh 2016). Not surprisingly therefore, the 
public perception of the war and its spinoffs, including the displaced 
3  The database created by the National Museum of War and History of Ukraine 
shows war casualties across the regions. As of 1 March 2016, 2860 Ukrainian soldiers 
died in Donbas, with four regions recording the highest numbers of deaths (Dnipro — 
359, Lviv — 180, Zhytomyr — 177 and Volyn — 150). Although Ukrainian soldiers from 
Donbas have also taken part in the anti-terrorist operation (Donetsk has lost 79 and 
Luhansk 48 lives), it is commonly understood that the majority of young men from the 
occupied territories avoid mass conscription.
4  Formally, one is not eligible to any social payments from the Ukrainian state if they 
reside in the occupied territories. However, as my informal talks with the Donbas 
informants prove, a considerable number of people paid bribes to get their social 
payments from Ukraine without leaving their place of residence in the occupied area.
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population from the east hit by the conflict, remains hybrid too (Samayeva 
2016), and we shall see how this is reflected in the survey data.         
Although considerably diverse as a group (registered and unregistered, 
economically active and inactive, pro-Ukrainian, rationally neutral and covertly 
anti-Ukrainian), IDPs are united in their will to secure their status and gain 
credibility (Baron and Gatrell 2004, 5). Given the IDPs’ uneven distribution 
across the regions, with the largest concentration in Kyiv, the surrounding 
Kyiv area and the neighbouring eastern regions (the peaceful parts of Donbas 
under Ukraine’s control as well as Kharkov and Dnipropetrovsk regions), 
internal displacement can be seen as a process of tremendous change for 
those who have been ‘on the move’ or resettled and an unparalleled 
challenge for those who remain rooted in the host communities.  
New NIMBIES5: Are IDPs a Problem to Host Neighborhoods? 
In social analyses of migration processes, three perspectives usually capture 
the primary interest of researchers: people who move, people who stay 
behind and people who form host communities (Collier 2013, 22-24). This 
paper seeks to analyse the last group, to which less attention is usually paid. 
As the uprooted come to new places to become part of the host landscape, 
the consequences of this inflowing largely depend on how they are related to 
by the locals. As my conversations with NGO activists demonstrate, the IDPs, 
scattered across the country, are limited in exercising their rights to political 
participation6 and have problems with raising their collective voice at the top-
level domains through the available agencies7. In addition, having a 
5  Acronym for ‘Not in My Back Yard’ which is used to label an attitude of individuals 
who oppose a given project in their neighborhood but not somewhere else (see: 
Aeschbacher 2006). It is used in literature about facility siting. See: http://www.uns.
ethz.ch/pub/publications/pdf/1518.pdf. It also refers to the attitudes of host community 
who might advocate in favour of a given idea, but oppose implementing it in a way that 
would affect their lives or require any contribution on their part.
6  In particular, limitations refer to voting rights as Ukraine’s electoral regulations link it 
to the place of residence.
7  In the first year of the conflict, the cooperation between NGOs helping IDPs and the 
Ukrainian state was rather formal and often lacked common sense. Ukrainian 
authorities ‘require a lot but are not ready to offer help’ (at the beginning of the conflict, 
they did not keep record of IDPs and referred to NGOs to get the data; then they used 
these statistics at their websites with no references to the NGOs). ‘The President 
should admit that they have difficulties with defining the ATO zone and controlling the 
surrounding area. It is rather clear that they are unable to solve lots of problems any 
time soon, and more cooperation with other agents is needed’, one activist said. ‘The 
responsible ministries do not even admit the existing problems. It seems as if we lived 
in parallel worlds, so it is very hard to cooperate with them when they are not 
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dependent status (IDPs from Donbas and Crimea are seen by respondents 
as the least influential agents in the national social pyramid8) (Ukrainian 
society 2015, 620), they remain subordinated to the public (set by the state) 
and private (formed by host individuals, groups, networks) regulations. 
Ukrainian public institutions seem to be designed to sustain the basic 
displacement management: since the active mechanisms to process IDP 
applications have been elaborated, it is difficult but still possible to get the 
payable social package9 from the state. The available resources are enough 
to prevent mass IDPs’ street begging, yet they are insufficient to stop 
deprivation among the most vulnerable groups and facilitate a good start for 
those who are able to become self-sufficient. To survive, move on and, 
possibly, help those who stayed behind (a common situation of many IDPs 
who have elderly relatives or other dependants unable to resettle), IDPs need 
more support from the host community. In order to get access to more 
resources, they need credibility to be accepted by the locals. In that respect, 
host communities cannot be underestimated as potentially powerful agents of 
change in IDPs’ new lives. Are they ready for such a role? 
It should be noted that internal migration (including intra- and inter-regional 
circular movements) has been traditionally prevalent over external 
movements both in the Soviet Ukraine and during the period of 
independence. In the last decade internal migration amounted to 96 per cent 
of all movements (about 60 per cent of those were intra-regional movements 
related to seasonal or long-term labour migration from rural areas and small 
towns to cities where wages have been traditionally higher than the national 
average) (Pribytkova 2009, 58-59). Before the crisis — as the freedom of 
movement was constitutionally guaranteed, and as propiska, a rigid scheme 
straightforward. The main weakness of state authorities is that they do not speak out’. 
My interview with Aleksandra Dvoretskaya, a human right activist of the VOSTOK-SOS, 
(one of the most active NGOs advocating for IDPs’ rights), 14 November 2014. 
Although the situation has been slowly changing, many of the drawbacks are still in 
place.
8  As the data from 2015 demonstrate, oligarchs are considered the most influential 
group in the Ukrainian society (by 44.6 per cent of the respondents). They are followed 
by workers (34.6 per cent), businessmen (33.3), leaders of political parties (27.2), 
peasants and military men (25.4-25.2). Migrants, including Ukrainian diaspora (9.2), 
Ukrainian labour migrants (7.5) and foreigners of non-Ukrainian origin (6.4) are among 
the bottom five groups in terms of influence (together with pensioners - 5.7 and IDPs 
- 3.4). 
9  Ukraine’s IDPs monthly allowance is 441 UAH (nearly 18 USD based on July 2016 
exchange rate) for those able to work and 882 UAH (nearly 36 USD) for disabled. The 
minimum wage in Ukraine is defined as follows: 1450 UAH (59 USD) for those able to 
work and 1130 UAH (46 USD) for disabled. Regardless of the official income data, the 
costs of living in Ukraine remain high. See: http://www.numbeo.com/cost-of-living/
country_result.jsp?country=Ukraine 
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of state control over migration, was replaced by a more flexible notification 
system for registering a place of residence — voluntary movement to a 
location within the country that promises better jobs, education, environment 
or housing opportunities was considered to be common (between 20 and 30 
per cent of respondents in national surveys report on working outside of their 
permanent place of residence) (Ukrainian society 2015, 573; Social Impact 
2012, 9). 
Overall, a person who moved into a given location in order to improve her 
standards of living was considered ‘one of us’ (national of the same country), 
usually making the social space more competitive and bringing little or no 
risks of destabilisation to the host community. With the forced movements in 
place, the issue of registration has been brought to focus again: now it is not 
only controlled by the state but also watched by the host community in a 
range of situations related to housing, employment, social care, etc. 
(Mikheeva, Sereda 2015, 29-33). In the public discourse, a displaced person 
is usually seen as a representative of a victimised group with a descending 
social mobility associated with lost status, who demonstrates desperate 
patterns of behaviour and brings high risk of instability to the host 
neighbourhood10. At the same time, in the society struggling with a multi-
faceted crisis, those who demonstrate different, successful, social patterns, 
might cause distrust and provoke discontent, too11 (CRIMEA SOS 2015).
The data of the recent survey indicate that mass forced displacement has 
become an established troublesome spot on the social landscape: 
10  Arsen Avakov, Ukraine’s Interior Minister, argued in September 2016 that the inflow 
of IDPs to Kyiv (800,000 according to the Ministry’s estimations) has been one of the 
key factors which contributed to the rise in crime (together with three other factors, such 
as the current economic crisis, continuing war in the East and painful police reform).  
See: http://nv.ua/ukr/ukraine/events/avakov-nazvav-tri-kljuchovi-prichini-rostu-
kriminogennosti-v-ukrajini-227444.html. The IDPs are often depicted in the media as 
passive recipients of assistance and a cause of price increases, unemployment and 
lack of social protection services. As CRIMEA SOS’s report stated in 2015, criminal 
news is usually reported with a focus on the place of residence of suspects or victims. 
See: Relationships between host communities and IDPs in Ukraine. Overcoming the 
negative effects of stigma (2015), CRIMEA SOS, UNHRC, Embassy of Canada in 
Ukraine. Available at: http://krymsos.com/files/5/9/59137aa--------------------------------------
---eng.pdf 
11  For example, in big Ukrainian cities luxury cars with Donetsk and Luhansk plates 
are usually referred to by the locals as a typical example of aggressive and rude driving 
behavior. As the CRIMEA SOS’s report suggested, ‘the deterioration of the political 
situation, aggravation of the economic crisis along with reduction/non-allocation of 
additional resources for IDPs, escalation of armed conflict, increase of IDP population, 
and degradation of living standards due to the ongoing armed conflict’ might have 
reinforced the negative stereotypes about IDPs.
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respondents see the influx of IDPs and other newcomers as a growing fear 
(with the highest number of such responses in Kyiv — 27 per cent, and the 
lowest in non-occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions — three per 
cent in 201512). Still, facing other pressing issues such as rising prices, 
unemployment, non-payment of salaries and pensions and external 
aggression against Ukraine (Ukrainian Society 2015, 564), host populations 
outside of the capital do not rank IDPs in the top ten fears (see Table 1). 
Table 1: In your view, what do people fear most of all nowadays?
(all regions, by percentage)
1992 2004 2015 2016
Rise in prices 66.4 75.2 75.4 81.1
Unemployment 60.3 67.9 70.3 72.6
Non-payment of salaries, pensions, etc. n/a 56.5 68.5 61.1
External aggression against Ukraine 14.2 10.5 51.8 42.8
Rise in crime 68.0 54.9 41.3 51.4
Famine 50.3 45.5 39.0 38.8
Shutdown of enterprises 13.2 35.3 38.7 37.8
Disintegration of the Ukrainian state 17.2 10.8 29.3 32.5
Street riots 21.2 16.1 26.2 28.1
Lack of heating in the house 17.2 30.7 25.6 29.4
Life-threatening infections (tuberculosis, HIV, 
etc.)
n/a 43.0 19.6 23.7
Establishment of a dictatorship in Ukraine 11.6 10.2 17.4 20.3
Flow of refugees, IDPs and other newcomers n/a 7.4 15.1 20.4
Consequences of the Chornobyl disaster 46.5 24.9 12.2 11.9
Return to the old system associated with the 
era of stagnation 
13.2 5.2 13.1 10.9
Interethnic conflicts 48.9 12.8  7.8 24.9
Interreligious conflicts n/a  6.4  7.8 11.2
Source: Українське суспільство 1992-2012. Стан та динаміка змін. Соціологічний 
моніторинг. (під ред. Ворони В., Шульги М.) Київ: Інститут соціології НАНУ, 2012. 
[Ukrainian Society: 1992-2012: current status and dynamics of change. Monitoring study] 
[in Ukrainian] and unpublished data of the 2016 Institute of Sociology’s survey.  
12  The distribution of answers changes over time with a tendency to become more 
balanced; in 2016 in Donbas 13.3 per cent of respondents thought that people fear the 
influx of newcomers, in Kyiv — 21.4. 
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The unprecedented intensity and mass character of the forced movement in 
Ukraine explains a high level of personal awareness about the problem 
among the host population: more than half of respondents in Luhansk and 
Donetsk regions and more than one fifth in Kyiv have IDPs among people 
they know, including relatives and friends (see Table 2). However, it does not 
directly influence the level of personal involvement in supporting the 
displaced: in 2015 overall less than eight per cent of respondents 
acknowledged voluntarily helping the IDPs (compare that to 28.3 who helped 
the Ukrainian army) (Ukrainian society 2015, 640-641). Most claimed that 
they are either unable to help (from 11.5 per cent in Kyiv to 22.9 in Donetsk 
and Luhansk) or think that it is the state that should be responsible for such 
assistance (from 12.8 per cent in the west to 33.7 in Donbas). 
The ambivalent response of the host community is also illustrated by the 
views on state policies towards the disputed territories, those who stayed 
behind and those who moved. In spring and summer of 2015 nearly a third of 
respondents found it difficult to decide what Ukraine should do in relation to 
the parts of Donbas currently out of its control; 38 per cent thought that 
Ukraine should wait until the economic situation in Donbas further 
deteriorates and recovers in Ukraine to restore the integrity of the state; 18.9 
per cent would have supported a military action to return the lost territories; 
and 12.4 per cent said that Ukraine should abandon Donbas as a ballast 
hindering the country’s development (Ukrainian society 2015, 631). Only one 
third supported the idea of Ukraine’s financial support for the territories 
outside of its control because citizens of Ukraine live there; 32 per cent were 
in favour of the self-proclaimed bodies taking care of the own budgets; 19 per 
cent — in favour of Russia taking care of Donbas. Finally, nearly 18 per cent 
found it difficult to answer what the state policy towards the IDPs should be, 
5.2 per cent were against any state support for the displaced; 34.2 were in 
favor of the regular social support for the IDPs from the state; 21.9 per cent 
thought the state should reimburse them their lost property; and 46.2 per cent 
argued that certain amendments should be made to national laws to enable 
IDPs’ entrepreneurship and further integration into their new environment13 
(Ukrainian society 2015, 631). 
13  That was a multiple-option question in the questionnaire.
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Table 2: Having IDPs from Donbas and Crimea among family members, 
friends or other people you know personally (if DO HAVE, where they 
are now) 
(selected regions, by percentage) 
Non-occupied 
parts of 
Donbas
East Kyiv West All 
Ukraine
Stay in the same place/region 
where I live 
21.7 12.5 12.2 11.8 11.5
Stay in a different region 
(other than where I live) 
32.5 14.3 5.8 11.7 12.9
Stay in Russia 38.6 10.8 6.5 3.2 9.5
Stay abroad 4.2 3.4 5.1 2.9 3.5
Don’t have IDPs among 
people I know
37.3 57.7 66.9 66.4 64.9
No response 9.0 8.6 9.4 11.2 7.8
Voluntary helping the IDPs 13.9 9.8 15.1 2.4 7.9
Source: Іващенко К., Стегній О. (2015) Між близькістю та відчуженням: ставлення 
населення України до вимушених переселенців з Криму та Донбасу (проблеми, 
тенденції та рекомендації) Українське суспільство: моніторинг соціальних змін (під 
ред. Ворони В., Шульги М.). Київ: Інститут соціології НАНУ, с.295. [Between closeness 
and alienation: the attitudes of the Ukraine’s population towards IDPs from Crimea and 
Donbas: problems, tendencies and policy recommendation] [in Ukrainian].
A reference to the NIMBY (‘Not in My Back Yard’) concept seems applicable 
here as long as the Ukrainian society finds itself in the trap of ambiguous 
loyalties. Traditionally, people tolerate newcomers of the same culture and 
ethnicity (Panina 2005, Pribytkova 2006). Nowadays, when, in light of its 
ambitions to join the European Union, Ukraine has to adhere to the European 
standards of tolerance, this attitude is also widely supported by the 
mainstream. Yet, during the conflict and hardship, the society has not avoided 
radicalisation and often loose neutrality, particularly when the stakes are high. 
Independence, reforms and growth do not necessarily require one shared 
national language, ethnicity and undisputed attitudes to the country’s 
historical past (Hrytsak 2016, Milakovsky 2016), but common values and 
shared goals seem indispensable to move ahead. Whatever side of the 
ideological divide one is on, all levels of interaction — private 
(communicating with family, friends, neighbours), professional (co-working) 
and civil (co-existing as citizens) inevitably entail the issues of trust and 
mutual responsibility. Sometimes, working together and living nearby IDPs in 
one’s own neighbourhood now might be a more challenging task than 
advocating for the vague, as yet, imaginary plan of Donbas’ reintegration into 
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Ukraine after the war14.
Alienation vs Cooperation
Although a recent study by the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) 
shows that after the two years of conflict more than 80 per cent of 
respondents declared to be positive or neutral towards IDPs (UNHCR, 2016), 
placing the research focus on the displaced itself indicates a high public 
concern over the issue. Media and NGOs’ reports indicate a growing anxiety 
over social marginalisation of this group in Ukraine and make it emblematic 
as a potential threat to the established community’s tolerance in relation to 
the displaced from the east, particularly, as the conflict in Donbas escalates 
(CRIMEA SOS 2015). The lack of appropriate approaches leads to the 
situation which is described by experts in terms of causes and consequences: 
being triggered by conflicts, they can ‘directly or indirectly be involved in the 
conflict diffusion process’ (Bohnet et al. 2013). We will see if playing on these 
fears resonates with the data.  
In this study, using a modification of the Emory Bogardus Social Distance 
scale which measures secure interpretations of the varying degrees and 
grades of feeling that exist in a range of social situations (Bogardus 1925, 
299), further work has been carried out on adjusting and updating 
questionnaire tools to compare ‘levels of acceptance’ defined by the host 
population in relation to different migration-based groups in the three general 
domains of social relations: private, professional, and civil15. It is suggested 
that ‘the practice of allowing or permitting’ others, which is possible only if 
one is in a position to allow or disallow, reflects toleration (Raphael 1988, 
139) and helps to understand how far one group of people think to differ from 
another group ‘in their intentions, powers and values’ (Rummel 1975).
The core of primary data on which this paper is based was obtained from the 
representative national survey of Ukrainian society (N = 1802 aged 18 and 
above) conducted by the Institute of Sociology (Kyiv, Ukraine). The fieldwork 
was conducted in July 2015 in all regions of the country 
14  See Vice-Minister for Occupied Territories’ comment on Ukraine’s plan to 
Reintegrate Donbas (24 July 2016). Available at: http://podrobnosti.ua/2122350-tuka-
objasnil-razlichija-mezhdu-interesami-kieva-i-kremlja.html. What if Donbas is ours 
tomorrow? Novoje vremia, 9 February 2016. Available at: http://nv.ua/ukr/project/
Donbas-nash.html 
15  For more details on the research methodology, see: Ivashchenko-Stadnik K. (2016) 
Too close or too far: contemporary challenges and opportunities of the ‘Near Diasporas’ 
from a country of origin perspective (warning on migrants-stayers nexus), Wien, ERSTE 
Foundation Working Paper Series (forthcoming). 
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(excluding the annexed Crimea and occupied parts of Donbas). The randomly 
selected respondents were asked to complete self-administered 
questionnaires, which, among other thematic sections covering a broad range 
of topics related to socio-economic and political issues, included an ad-hoc 
set of questions on attitudes towards IDPs. 
Private Level: Neighbours versus Friends 
Forced migration is usually a rapid movement that puts at risk personal ties 
and networks. Once the established connections are left behind, one has to 
engage with other people. For most IDPs the initial level of being introduced 
to the host environment is often connected with a purely formal (vertical, rigid, 
based on collectivity, and fixed by agreements such as the available IDPs-
related legislation) process of applying to state institutions for necessary 
documents to confirm their displaced status (required in order to receive basic 
social benefits). In rare cases, state agencies are able to provide adequate 
assistance in finding jobs and making housing arrangements. Nevertheless, 
the majority of IDPs use the informal (horizontal, less rigid, either based on 
personality or narrow groups, not based on contracts) social networks to get 
fundamental needs met. It is the host population that is in a position to decide 
if a newcomer can be accepted as a member of the informal local network, 
and if one’s engagement is successful. As the economist Paul Collier acutely 
notes, ‘in a modern economy well-being is greatly enhanced by mutual 
regard’ that is ‘something stronger than mutual respect (fulfilled by keeping a 
respectful distance from others’ in the “Don’t dis me” society)’; mutual respect 
is ‘akin to sympathy or being fellow-feeling’ (Collier 2013, 61). Sympathy is 
also connected to loyalty and solidarity with those fellow members who are 
less fortunate (Collier 2013, 62). 
The data obtained in 2015 show that the degrees of closest possible 
acceptance of the displaced people are different across the two groups: the 
IDPs from Crimea are generally a little more welcome than those from 
Donbas (although in most cases the difference remains fairly within the 
margin of sampling error, it is still stable on all levels, from private to civil). 
The data present interesting observations across regions: the difference in 
attitudes of the respondents from the east and the respondents from the non-
occupied Donbas is much bigger than if we take east-west or east-Kyiv 
perspectives16. It is revealed that on the private level accepting IDPs as 
‘neighbours’ would be the most comfortable option for a majority of the 
respondents in all regions. The figure indicates that private level acceptance 
for the displaced drops when it requires ‘fellow-feelings’ (family members, 
16  As other recent data confirm, east-Kyiv-west form a new line of the national identity 
in Ukraine.
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friends) — see Figure 1. This tendency is also confirmed by the qualitative 
data collected by other researchers: the IDPs, in particular those from 
Donbas, are often perceived by the locals in the majority of Ukraine’s host 
regions as bearers of different (non-fellow) values, that is why they usually 
prefer ‘not to speak up in public’ as it might reveal their ‘otherness’ (Mikheeva, 
Sereda 2015, 26-27).  
Figure 1: Views on accepting IDPs on the private level by percentage 
across regions
* Donbas here and onwards in the tables includes only territories under Ukraine’s control. 
Professional level: co-workers versus ‘employer-employee’ 
There is statistical evidence that the flow of newcomers might have different 
economic effects on host communities. One of the possible scenarios in low-
income countries like Ukraine is that the wages of lower skill workers drop, 
the pressure on housing increases and the number of dependants per person 
of working age rises (Collier 2013, 111-117, 123). Indeed, the recent 
International Organisation for Migration’s report confirms such trends and 
points out that the influx of IDPs into regional communities has been a strain 
on local budgets and local social infrastructure (IOM 2016). However, the 
focused study of IDPs proves that only 11 per cent of them are people of 
retirement age and people with special needs, while 35 per cent are children. 
The remaining majority are people of working age. At the same time, the IOM 
survey series on IDPs integration reveals that only slightly more than a half of 
those employed before displacement managed to find a job at a new place 
(IOM 2016). 
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The real statistics are made of thousands of individual stories of succeeding 
and falling behind in the Ukrainian chaotic, rarely competitive and often non-
competitive (largely based on networks and personal connections) labour 
market. Apart from the confused rules and requirements on the part of 
employers, another important factor of low employment rate among the IDPs 
is the lack of motivation for re-entering labour marker in the new place: less 
than one-tenth of the surveyed registered displaced persons reported their 
need for employment (Kharchenko, Panioto 2015). The main reason is 
usually a manifested intention to return (eight per cent among the surveyed 
Crimean IDPs, nearly 50 per cent among the Donetsk IDPs and nearly 40 per 
cent among the Luhansk IDPs confirmed in 2015 their plans to go back 
home). Still, a majority of the displaced either have no clear visions of their 
future or have decided that the return is not possible at all (IOM 2015, 12). 
Obviously, they need more integration to the local labour market and should 
look for network connections with the host population. 
The figure below demonstrates the models of ‘office hierarchy’ the 
respondents representing the host community would assign to IDPs: most 
would choose co-workers rather than ‘employer-employee’ type of 
relationships. The levels of acceptance are almost identical for the displaced 
from Donbas and Crimea and follow similar models in all regions, except for a 
slightly higher acceptance in favour of IDPs in a supervisory role in Donbas 
and, surprisingly, in the west (considering a particularly low level of real 
employment rate among IDPs in the western region in 2014-2015 – see 
Migration during crisis, 2015. The latter might reflect some encouraging 
tolerance for IDPs to enter the local labour market)17. However, a generally 
modest acceptance of the IDPs as potential employees in all regions not only 
reflects many problems related to the widespread prejudices about the 
displaced as unreliable workers (ready to quit any time, particularly if hot 
conflict in their location is over), heavy-industry-oriented type of labour force 
(which is partly true) etc., but also indicates that the national labour market is 
in trouble (a growing gap between the number of people looking for a job and 
the number of vacancies, low wages, unstable career of local workers in 
unstable economy). 
17  Such subjective reinforcement, together with the effective local policies, seems to 
have produced some results. Recent reports of 2016 argue that IDPs resettled in the 
west, although not very numerous as compared to the east, are increasingly proactive 
in seeking employment (the number of those who have applied to the employment 
service is significantly higher than in the east of Ukraine, as of June 2016) (Smal 2016). 
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Figure 2: Views on accepting IDPs on the professional level by 
percentage across region
Civil Level: Semi-citizens with a Limited Access to the Top? 
The economic and humanitarian consequences of displacement usually draw 
the biggest attention of experts who study IDPs. However, as successful 
institutions and inclusive practices are crucial for economic and social well-
being, the political/civic concerns should not be ignored. Displacement should 
be seen not only as a burden to the local budgets, but also as a factor that 
generates pressure for better governance and reforms (Collier 2013, 180). 
Different domains of citizenship refer to the rights of an individual to 
participate in civil, political, socio-economic and cultural spaces (Hébert, 
Sears 2001). Our study focused on the two key domains: political – involving 
the right to vote and to possess political power, and economic – implying the 
access to benefits. 
The post-Euromaidan Ukraine remains a country hobbled by ill political 
practices which are often mistakenly explained as post-Soviet legacies. 
Corruption, the lack of transparency, low competitiveness and a high degree 
of nepotism in the national decision-making at all levels are rigorously 
preserved by the Ukrainian crisis-driven elite (often raised after the Soviet 
period), as strongholds of their power positions. Whether the current crisis in 
Crimea and Donbas is the local citizens’ fault, or the central and local elite 
proved unable or unwilling to protect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty, remain the big questions for further discussions and, hopefully, 
impartial investigations. Whatever the answer is, the issues of inclusive 
citizenship, both for the displaced and the host communities, are crucial for 
Ukraine’s future development. 
The figure below shows what the host community views as acceptable 
empowerment of IDPs in terms of their participation in public bodies 
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(including participation in local and central authorities). In all regions, the 
lower the level of power, the higher the acceptance — see Figure 3.1. 
Although the displaced as potential people in charge of local bodies would be 
seen more favourably in Donbas than in the rest of the regions, the subjective 
demand for IDPs’ participation in local and central authorities is low 
everywhere. It should be mentioned that people from the Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions dominated the most influential spheres of the national 
economy and public administration for more than a decade before the crisis 
and often triggered disappointment, anger and fatigue in the local debates 
(Leshchenko 2015; Forostyna 2015; Kudelia and Kuzio 2015). Lots of the 
Yanukovich clan’s remnants still hold power positions. Thus, the references to 
IDPs’ urgent needs occasionally made in public by the high-rank 
representatives of the troublesome regions are not enough to encourage 
inclusive citizenship of the displaced. The data illustrate a strikingly low level 
of acceptance of IDPs as fully-fledged citizens with voting rights in all regions. 
The challenge is underestimated: unable to vote (as Ukraine’s electoral 
regulations link the exercise of electoral rights to the place of residence), 
IDPs are denied a voice in the key decisions that directly affect the country’s 
life and, indirectly, influence scenarios for their future. 
Yet, in public’s view, restrictions on voting rights are compensated by some 
limited allowances in the economic sphere: 12 per cent in Kyiv and 15 per 
cent in the west would accept tax exemptions for IDPs from Donbas (although 
the figure is modest, it is almost twice as high as that for labour migrants, 
regardless of their unprecedented role in the national economy18) — see 
Figure 3.2. The data meaningfully speak of the different approach towards the 
IDPs as potential holders of power positions across the regions: with the 
lower per cent of allowing answers in the east, known since the conflict for its 
strong pro-Ukrainian attitudes19, and the highest in the Ukraine-controlled 
Donbas. For all regions, IDPs are more likely to be accepted in positions 
which allow little space for possibly discomforting narratives, views, and 
decisions. Allowing someone as a co-participant in the political process 
requires trust which is rather impossible ‘without a clear understanding of the 
political motivations involved’, therefore exchange of views ‘are crucial for 
establishing durable solutions’ (Lischer 2007, 144). 
18  According to the National Bank of Ukraine in 2014 the remittances sent from abroad 
made up 6.5 billion USD which constituted nearly five per cent of Ukraine’s GDP. 
19  See Zhurzhenko T. (2015). Ukraine’s Eastern Borderlands: The end of ambiguity? / 
What does Ukraine think? (edited by Andrew Wilson). European Council of Foreign 
Relations, 46. Available at: http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/WHAT_DOES_UKRAINE_THINK_
pdf.pdf (Accessed 10 October 2016). As Zhurzhenko points out, ‘the Ukrainian east 
reflects a new pro-Ukrainian consensus among local elites, business, and civil society, 
one that has emerged in response to the serious threat of internal destabilisation and 
Russian invasion’.
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Figure 3.1: Views on accepting IDPs on the political level by percentage 
across regions
Figure 3.2: Views on accepting IDPs on the civil and economic levels by 
percentage across regions
Speaking of the factors that influence the level of tolerance, data show that 
age does not have a significant impact on one’s acceptance of IDPs, contrary 
to education, which appears to be an important factor (the higher the level of 
education, the higher the level of tolerance). The regional factor is the most 
significant of all the socio-demographic categories (on the private level, the 
highest tolerance towards the IDPs from Donbas is observed in the Ukraine-
held border territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and towards the 
IDPs from Crimea — in Donetsk, Luhansk and the south).  Moreover, 
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respondents from small cities and villages are more welcoming towards the 
IDPs on all levels (presumably, that owes to the less competitive environment 
in small urban and rural areas). Type of employment has some influence on 
the acceptance on the professional level (small entrepreneurs are likely to 
accept IDPs as employees, and workers of state-owned enterprises are 
willing see IDPs as co-workers). Importantly, the effect of language on the 
acceptance of IDPs is low across all regions. 
Conclusion: Reframing the Challenge of Internal Displacement
We have seen that the problem of internal displacement in Ukraine cannot be 
explained in pure numbers (due to under-registration) and should not be 
understood in terms of a simplistic model of positive-negative attitudes 
towards the IDPs in host communities (owing to the complicated political 
context beyond the forced movement in Ukraine). As the conflict is not over, it 
remains unclear how far it will go and whether the eventual return of the 
majority of the displaced is even possible. In any of the feasible scenarios, 
keeping the IDPs on the margins of society will not serve the host 
communities’ interests. 
Although the surveys’ data indicate that only roughly one-fifth of the 
respondents have negative views of IDPs from Donbas and Crimea and 
would not accept them in any of the positions on private, professional and 
civil levels, the remaining vast positive spectrum should not be misinterpreted 
as unconditionally welcoming attitudes. It stands as an open question 
whether neutral or positive perception of the IDPs, manifested during the 
survey, can provide a firm ground for a friendly interaction in real life (equally, 
negative views, if not contextualised, might or might not lead to real 
hostilities). Still, attitudes might predetermine the reality. As social practice 
proves, intolerance in relation to newcomers is spontaneous (Mukomel 2014), 
particularly if they remain badly integrated (Mikheeva, Sereda 2015). Even if 
the IDPs are of the same ethnic origin as the host community, as in the case 
of Ukraine, possible ‘strained relations, frustration and indifference’ (OSCE 
2016) towards them call upon a discussion on their status and future role in 
the host environment. 
The issue of mutual respect between the host and the uprooted groups 
involves not only trust and sympathy but also equal distribution of civil rights 
and duties. As the data demonstrate, after the two years of conflict the IDPs 
are still perceived by large part of the host community as semi-fellows and 
semi-citizens limited in their access to society’s life. Reframing such attitudes 
is indispensable to avoid camp-type recognition of the IDPs. If not accepted 
as equals, they will not be able to contribute to the competitiveness and 
43 Migration and the Ukraine Crisis
facilitate positive changes. The host community and the displaced need to 
understand each other in the new post-Euromaidan reality. The lack of 
possibilities for future inclusive development in one state seems to be the 
biggest challenge for both. 
References
Aeschbacher, M. “Not in My Backyard,” Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, 
2006, http://www.uns.ethz.ch/pub/publications/pdf/1518.pdf
Avakov, A. Speech by Ukraine’s Interior Minister on IDPs and Crime in 
Ukraine, September 2016, http://nv.ua/ukr/ukraine/events/avakov-nazvav-tri-
kljuchovi-prichini-rostu-kriminogennosti-v-ukrajini-227444.html
Baron, N. and Gatrell, P. eds. Homelands: War, Population, and Statehood in 
Eastern Europe and Russia, 1918–1924, London: Anthem Press, 2004.
Batrin, S. “War Against Russia: The Legal Front,” Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, 10 April 
2015, http://gazeta.dt.ua/internal/viyna-proti-rosiyi-yuridichniy-front-_.html
Bogardus, Е.S. “Measuring Social Distances,” Journal of Applied Sociology 9 
(1925): 299-308, https://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject/Bogardus/
Bogardus_1925c.html 
Bohnet, H., Cottier, F., Hug, S. “Conflict-Induced IDPs and the Spread of 
Conflict” (paper presented at the European Political Science Association 
(EPSA) in Barcelona, 20-22 June 2013) http://www.unige.ch/ses/spo/static/
simonhug/ciasc/BohnetCottierHug2013_EPSA_Barcelone.pdf 
Bradley, M. ed. Forced Migration, Reconciliation and Justice, Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015.
Brettel, C., Holifield J. Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines, New 
York, London: Routledge, 2015. 
Collier, P. Exodus: How Migration is Changing Our World. Oxford, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013.
CRIMEA SOS, UNHRC, and the Embassy of Canada in Ukraine, 
“Relationships Between Host Communities and IDPs in Ukraine: Overcoming 
the Negative Effects of Stigma of IDPs, including the Community of Crimean 
44The Social Challenge of Internal Displacement in Ukraine: The Host Community’s Perspective
Tatars and the Roma community in Kharkiv (2015), http://krymsos.com/
files/5/9/59137aa-----------------------------------------eng.pdf 
Diken B., Lausten C.B. The Culture of Exception: Sociology Facing the Camp, 
New York, London: Routledge, 2005.
EU Commission DG Employment, Social Affairs, and Inclusion, Social Impact 
of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe: 
Ukraine (April 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/social/
BlobServlet?docId=8820&langId=en
EUROSTAT, Asylum Quarterly Report, 15 June 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_quarterly_report#Where_do_
they_come_from.3F
Forostyna, O. “Poaching, Simmering, and Boiling: The Declining Relevance of 
Identity Discourse in Ukraine, 2015, http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/WHAT_DOES_
UKRAINE_THINK_pdf.pdf
Haider, H. Refugee, IDP and host community radicalization (GSDRC 
Helpdesk Research Report 1162), Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of 
Birmingham (2014), http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/hdq1162.pdf.
Hébert, Y., & Sears, A. “Citizenship education,” Canadian Educational 
Association (2001), accessed 20 July 2016, http://www.cea-ace.ca/sites/
cea-ace.ca/files/cea-2004-citizenship-education.pdf 
Hrytsak Y. Passions Around Nationalism: Old History in a New Manner 
Essays, Kyiv: Krytyka, 2011: 284-297.
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, GRID 2016: Global Report on 
Internal Displacement (2016), http://www.internal-displacement.org/
globalreport2016/ 
International Organization for Migration, National Monitoring System of the 
Situation with IDPs. Round 1-2 (March/April 2016), http://www.iom.org.ua/
sites/default/files/iom_nms_r1_eng.pdf and http://www.iom.org.ua/sites/
default/files/iom_nms_r2-v.pdf 
45 Migration and the Ukraine Crisis
Ivashchenko-Stadnik, K. “Too Close or Too Far: Contemporary Challenges 
and Opportunities of the ‘Near Diasporas’ from a Country of Origin 
Perspective,” Wien, ERSTE Foundation Working Paper Series (forthcoming)
Іващенко, К., Стегній О. «Між близькістю та відчуженням: ставлення 
населення України до вимушених переселенців з Криму та Донбасу 
(проблеми, тенденції та рекомендації),  Українське суспільство: 
моніторинг соціальних змін (під ред. Ворони В., Шульги М.). Київ: Інститут 
соціології НАНУ, с.295.” [Between closeness and alienation: the attitudes of 
the Ukraine’s population towards IDPs from Crimea and Donbas: problems, 
tendencies and policy recommendation] [in Ukrainian],” 2015.
Kudelia, S. and Kuzio, T. “Nothing Personal: Explaining the Rise and Decline 
of Political Machines in Ukraine,” Post-Soviet Affairs 31, no.3 (2015): 254-
255, 274.
Leshchenko, S. “Sunset and/or Sunrise of the Ukrainian Oligarchs after the 
Maidan: What Does Ukraine Think?” European Council of Foreign Relations, 
2015: 100-101.
Lischer, S.K. “Causes and Consequences of Conflict-Induced Displacement,” 
Civil Wars, vol. 9 issue 2 (2007) 142-155.  
Meynatyan, S. “Nuclear Disasters and Displacement,” Forced Migration 
Review, no. 45 (February 2014), http://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/
FMRdownloads/en/crisis/meybatyan.pdf 
Міхеєва, О., Середа, В. «Сучасні українські внутрішньо переміщені особи: 
основні причини, стратегії переселення та проблеми адаптації,” Стратегії 
трансформації і превенції прикордонних конфліктів в Україні Збірка 
аналітичних матеріалів 2014-2015. Львів: Галицька видавнича спілка, 
9-49. [Contemporary Ukrainian IDPs: main causes, resettlement strategies 
and adaptation problems [in Ukrainian] (2015), http://peace.in.ua/wp-content/
uploads/2016/02/%D1%83%D0%BC%D1%88-%D0%B2%D0%B5%D0%BB%
D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B0-%D0%BA%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B8%D0%B3
%D0%B0.pdf
Milakovsky, B. “Understanding the ‘Under Control’ Donbas,” Kennan Cable 16 
(2016), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no16-
understanding-the-under-control-donbas#sthash.0MRj9lyj.dpuf 
46The Social Challenge of Internal Displacement in Ukraine: The Host Community’s Perspective
Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, “Report of the Ministry of Social Policy of 
Ukraine, http://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-society_and_culture/2042256-
number-of-idps-in-ukraine-shrinks.html 
Мукомель, В. ”Ксенофобия как стержень российского общества,” 
Фундаментальные проблемы модернизации полиэтничного макрорегиона 
в условиях роста напряженности: сборник рефератов. [Xenophobia as a 
pivot of the Russia’s society] (2015), http://www.usd.cas.cz/wp-content/
uploads/2014/12/referaty1.pdf  
National Museum of War and History of Ukraine, “War Casualties Database,” 
http://nvimu.com.ua/ 
Novoje Vremia, “What if Donbas is Ours Tomorrow?” 9 February 2016, http://
nv.ua/ukr/project/Donbas-nash.html
NUMBEO, “Cost of Living in Ukraine,” http://www.numbeo.com/cost-of-living/
country_result.jsp?country=Ukraine
Obozrevatel, “War Casualties Across the Regions of Ukraine,” 11 April 2016, 
http://ukr.obozrevatel.com/society/24915-u-merezhi-zyavivsya-poimennij-
spisok-vsih-ukrainskih-voiniv-yaki-zaginuli-v-zoni-ato.html 
Паніотто, В., Харченко, Н. «Актуальний стан справ в українському 
суспільстві.” Звіт результатів опитування за травень 2015. Київський 
міжнародний інститут соціології.  [The current situation in the Ukrainian 
society. Data of the survey conducted in May 2015] [in Ukrainian], http://kiis.
com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=529&page=1 
Паніна, Н. «Чинники національної ідентичності, толерантності, ксенофобії 
та антисемітизму в сучасній Україні,» Соціологія: теорія, методи, 
маркетинг. Київ: Інститут соціології НАНУ,  №4, 26–45 (2005) [Factors of 
national identity, tolerance, xenophobia and anti-Semitism in the 
contemporary Ukraine] [in Ukrainian]
Прибыткова, И. “Помаранчевый мир над Майданом: социальная 
дистанция как индикатор консолидации общества,” Социологические 
исследования современного общества: методология, теория, методы, № 
723, 133-139 (2006) [The Orange Peace over Maidan: social distance as 
society’s consolidation indicator [in Russian]
47 Migration and the Ukraine Crisis
Прибыткова, И. “Хроники миграционных событий в Украине до и после 
распада СССР,» Социология: теория, методы, маркетинг. Киев: Институт 
социологии НАНУ, №1. (2009) [Chronicles of migration events in Ukraine 
before and after the collapse of the USSR] [in Russian]
Rajput, S.G. “Internal Displacement: Simplifying a Complex Social 
Phenomenon,” Beyond Intractability (2013), http://www.beyondintractability.
org/rajput-internal-displacement 
Rajput, S. “Displacement of the Kashmiri Pandits: Dynamics of Policies and 
Perspectives of Policymakers, Host Communities, and the Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs),” PhD diss., George Mason University, 2012.
Raphael, D. “The intolerable” in Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and 
Historical Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Rothbart, D., Korostelina, K., Cherkaoui M.D. (eds.) Civilians and Modern 
War: Armed Conflict and the Ideology of Violence. New York, London: 
Routledge, 2012.
Rummel, R.J. Understanding Conflict and War Vol. 1: The Dynamic 
Psychological Field, Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1975. 
Samayeva, Y. “VIZual Cruelty,” Zerkalo Nedeli, 8-13 October 2016, http://m.
zn.ua/internal/vizualnaya-zhestkost-_.html
Science Daily, “Hybrid War and the Conflict Between Russia and Ukraine,” 3 
October 2016, https://www.sciencedaily.com/
releases/2016/10/161003092438.htm
Shlapentokh, V., Sendich, M., Payin, E. The New Russian Diaspora: Russian 
Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics, Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1994.
Smal, V. “A Great Migration: What is the Fate of Ukraine’s Internally Displaced 
Persons,” Vox Ukraine ( June 2016), http://voxukraine.org/2016/06/30/
great-migration-how-many-internally-displaced-persons-are-there-in-ukraine-
and-what-has-happened-to-them-en/ 
Spini, D., Elcheroth, G., Biruski, D. War, Community, and Social Change. 
Collective Experience in the Former Yugoslavia, New York: Springer, 2014.
48The Social Challenge of Internal Displacement in Ukraine: The Host Community’s Perspective
Українське суспільство 1992-2015. Моніторинг соціальних змін. 
Соціологічний моніторинг. Київ: Інститут соціології НАНУ. [Ukrainian 
Society: 1992-2015: the dynamics of social change] [in Ukrainian]
UNHCR, “Internally Displaced People,” 2011, http://unhcr.org/ua/en/2011-08-
26-06-58-56/news-archive/1244-internal-displacement-map 
UNHCR, Ukrainians’ Attitudes Towards IDPs from Donbas and Crimea. 
Summary of Opinion Polls (2016), http://unhcr.org.ua/attachments/
article/1605/Public%20Survey%20Report_ENG.pdf 
USAID, “Conflict Fact Sheet: Ukraine, no. 1,” 2016, http://www.cidi.org/
wp-content/uploads/11.19.15-USG-Ukraine-Fact-Sheet-1.pdf 
Vedernikova, I. “Dead Souls and Live Money,” Zerkalo Nedeli, 26 April 2016, 
http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/mertvye-dushi-i-zhivye-dengi-_.html 
Zhurzhencko, T. “Ukraine’s Eastern Borderlands: The End of Ambiguity?” in 
What Does Ukraine Think? Edited by Andrew Wilson, European Council of 
Foreign Relations, 2015: 46, http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/WHAT_DOES_
UKRAINE_THINK_pdf.pdf
49 Migration and the Ukraine Crisis
3
‘Strangers Among Ours’: State 
and Civil Responses to the 
Phenomenon of Internal 
Displacement in Ukraine
TANIA BULAKH
Last summer I packed some household items to donate to a humanitarian 
centre for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Kyiv. I called a taxi and when 
it arrived, a friend of mine volunteered to carry the bags to the car. As I was 
buckling my seatbelt, I noticed that my friend took a picture of the car’s 
license plate. A minute later I received a text from her, saying: ‘please, let me 
know when you arrive.’ I was surprised by her concern for my safety. When I 
called and asked what was it about, she said: ‘Didn’t you see? He had a 
Donetsk number plate. I was worried about you.’ In response, I told her that 
the driver offered me a free ride when he learned where we were heading. 
This incident is one of the signs of a growing tendency to categorise 
displaced people from the Donbas region of Ukraine as a social threat. In an 
exacerbated realm of hybrid war in Eastern Ukraine, increasing social tension 
could potentially escalate into more hostile confrontations. Thus, a critical 
examination and understanding of IDPs categorisation and its repercussions 
have significant importance.
In this chapter, I explore the transformations of responses toward the 
phenomenon of IDPs in Ukraine. My specific focus is the labelling of IDPs 
from Donbas, their acceptance and further alienation from a collective identity 
of ‘ours.’ Though the tendency to socially marginalise displaced people is a 
common problem all over the world (Malkki 1996, Pandolfi 2003, Calhoun 
2008, Fassin 2012, Dunn 2012), my interest is to follow the dynamics from 
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the de-terrorisation of people from Donbas to an accentuated image of 
Donbas; from a companionate acceptance as ‘ours’ (свої) to a growing 
rejection and outlawing. I aim to elucidate the internal diversity of Ukrainian 
IDPs, when those from Eastern Ukraine are perceived as less privileged, 
politically threatening subjects, while internal refugees from the annexed 
Crimea are often embraced as sufferers of political injustice. The hierarchy of 
othering and challenges of IDPs inclusion into a larger national community 
highlight nuances of identity politics in Ukraine, problematise equal access to 
social welfare, as well as jeopardise social stability in the country. 
My analysis is based on fieldwork conducted in Ukraine in the summers of 
2014 and 2015. This included participant observations at humanitarian 
centres, analysis of media discourses, and 13 in-depth interviews with aid 
providers for IDPs, such as representatives of the Ministry of Social Policy of 
Ukraine, local social welfare officers, representatives of international NGOs, 
and volunteers from Kyiv and Kharkiv. Exploring the perception of displaced 
people, I narrowed the pool of my informants to those who are directly 
involved in making decisions about welfare support. In this way, they have the 
power to translate emotionally charged negative or positive perceptions of 
IDPs into actions, for instance, influence the distribution of aid. In other 
words, their attitudes toward IDPs have tangible economic repercussions for 
the latter. However, I acknowledge that quite different perspectives can be 
obtained through studying how IDPs adapt in local communities and are 
perceived among them. 
One of the major challenges I encountered while working on this project was 
the issue of prejudices and stereotypes in relation to IDPs. These 
generalisations are based on ‘fixity’ which Homi Bhabha defines as a central 
component ‘in the ideological construction of otherness’ (Bhabha 1996). Fixity 
induces reproduction of stereotypes, often without their critical examination. 
In this process, the Other is constructed as essentially or even ontologically 
different. Importantly, the knowledge about the Other is not grounded in actual 
experiences, but rather dissimilated and replicated through repetitions. 
Bhabha’s explanation of fixity captures the danger that stereotypes present, 
namely that they produce an unchanging order, which is often taken for 
granted and maintained by constant reproductions of stereotypes. His 
observations were fundamental for the postcolonial critique and not so widely 
appropriated in studies of other discourses of power like social 
marginalisation of migrants. Though, when extrapolated for the situations with 
displaced populations, Bhabha’s theorisations can highlight how IDPs are 
stigmatised and how their social marginalisation is normalised. 
Expanding Bhabha’s ideas, my observations showcase that the fixity can be 
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challenged under certain critical circumstances, such as initial responses to 
emergencies. As Craig Calhoun observes, under the emergency imaginary of 
crisis, the relationships between people shift in the moral recognition of 
humans, where individuals are deemed as equivalent to each other (Calhoun 
2010, 34). The initial compassion for displaced people, who are seen as 
victims, overshadows the prejudice and stereotypes about them. Even 
though, as I will discuss further, this appears to be a temporary phenomenon, 
a critical investigation of the variability of attitudes can challenge the 
unchangeable order that fixity produces. Accordingly, this implies that 
stereotypes can be transformed, which can lead to some practical application 
in the informational and media policies related to IDPs and forced migrants.
Methodologically, the reproduction of stereotypes presented a dilemma in the 
course of research. Guesses, assumptions, and generalised comments about 
IDPs can be often seen as an elusive knowledge that fades upon further 
inquiry, as it is not supported by actual facts or evidence. But rather then 
dismissing these beliefs, I found that they could be a prolific material for 
investigation. At the end, they illustrate a paradoxical situation when actors of 
state and humanitarian systems, who make political decisions related to IDPs, 
are guided by the epistemology of imagining, assuming not only beneficiaries’ 
needs (Dunn 2012, 12), but their status and social identity. 
Another methodological complication was the on-going transformation of 
attitudes toward IDPs. At the initial stage of the project in 2014, the 
phenomenon that drew my attention was the welcoming positive attitudes 
among Ukrainians that mobilised their resources to assist displaced people in 
need. However, in 2015, I documented reappearing unfavourable comments 
about IDPs, which was also the case in media publications. Thus, instead of 
investigating the positive perception of IDPs as ‘one of us,’ I faced more 
dynamic processes of how positive generalisations were replaced by negative 
prejudices. This transformation called for alterations in interviewing 
techniques. In most cases, state employees and representatives of 
international programs did not want our conversations to be recorded, as they 
were worried about the professional repercussions of talking negatively about 
IDPs on the record.  
I recognise that my observations have a certain degree of generalisation as 
well. However, my intention to capture the prevailing opinions about displaced 
populations justifies a certain amount of generalisation for the purposes of 
giving a clear picture of the overall situation. At the same time, it is important 
to recognise that these generalisations are heuristic, and there are of course 
many nuances and variations to the perceptions. 
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Initial Responses: How Displaced People Became ‘Ours’
The initial civil responses to the needs of displaced people were highly 
praised as a prominent social phenomenon. Volunteer initiatives and 
grassroots engagement to assist IDPs were seen as a sign of an emerging 
civil society within a surge of political changes. Many of these responses 
originated from a self-coordinated grid of Euromaidan support (Euromaidan 
SOS, Automaidan, etc.). Already established and functioning networks of 
citizens refocused their activities either to support the Ukrainian army or to 
assist displaced populations. 
In a way, volunteers were overtaking or complementing fundamental functions 
of the state to secure the safety and provisions for its citizens in need. This 
fact was especially important considering the major political reconfigurations, 
triggered by Euromaidan such as the introduction of a new cabinet of 
ministers, rotation and lustration of other state officials. These changes 
complicated even more the promptness of emergency responses from the 
inflexible and bureaucratically immobile state system. In this light, the impulse 
to assist the state was often seen as a part of citizens’ responsibility on behalf 
of Euromaidan participants and activists. 
From a broader perspective, support for displaced people is rooted in the 
ethical principle of shared humanity beyond social divisions (Pupavac 2010, 
Calhoun 2010). However, citizenship status is an important link that connects 
IDPs with volunteers. The idea of belonging to the same community of ‘our 
fellow citizens’ is at play, even though the nation-community is internally 
diversified (e.g. politically and ideologically). As it was rationalised by one of 
my informants, Anna: ‘They are our people, our citizens and as we are 
building a new state, they should have faith in it’ (Anna, volunteer).1 In some 
cases, the acceptance into the category of ‘our people’ is rooted in the choice 
that displaced people have made. Some volunteers explained that from their 
point of view, IDPs fleeing to other regions of Ukraine were ‘voting by their 
feet’ in favour of a united Ukraine. It is particularly related to the displaced 
people from the Donbas region, where the conflict heightened political and 
ideological differences. However, it should be mentioned that in two volunteer 
centres that I visited, discussions on IDPs’ war experiences and reasons that 
made people flee were restricted in 2014. This facilitated romanticism towards 
1  As research shows, even though significant support for displaced people came from 
the civil society sector and NGOs, displaced people’s expectation was to receive 
assistance from the state (Semygina et al.). While a nuanced explanation can highlight 
different historical and ideological underpinnings of these expectations, in general, it 
was the status of citizenship that grants them entitlement and shaped their anticipation 
for the state’s support. 
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the displaced people and ascribing a moral dimension to their decision. 
Accordingly, it accommodated IDPs acceptance into the imaginary national 
community by the volunteers and generally within the hosting environment. 
Shared citizenship validated the volunteer assistance to the displaced people. 
Even though the first wave of displacement in 2014 was accompanied by 
critical narratives and some forms of housing and employment discrimination, 
the level of hostility toward IDPs remained comparatively low (KrymSOS 
2015). The ideological differences and labelling IDPs as pro-Russian at that 
time did not translate into active confrontations or violence. Much like 
refugees, IDPs were perceived as ‘stripped of the specificity of culture, place, 
and history’ (Malkki 1995, 12), therefore their affiliation with the Donbas 
region was largely overshadowed.2 Depoliticised and reduced to their status 
as citizens and humans, displaced people were categorised as victims, which 
meant that they were essentialised (Dunn 2012). Unlike refugees, displaced 
Ukrainians were not heavily labelled as distant or unknown Others. 
Citizenship affiliation granted them a place within a category of ‘ours’ 
(Ukrainian—свої), which has significant cultural implications in the post-
Soviet milieu. 
While the dichotomy of ‘ours—others’ has an extensive genealogy, I would 
like to focus on its function within the Soviet discourse, particularly because 
the semantic opposition of sviy/nash (ours/us) versus other/they obtained a 
strong political connotation during the Soviet times. In Catherine Wanner’s 
definition, sviy signifies a common Soviet identity produced by ‘shared 
experience with an oppressive state apparatus,’ in which ‘[we] bond together 
against ‘them,’ the enemy, the state and its institutions’ (Wanner 1998, 9; see 
also Yurchak 2006, 102-108). Bonding experiences of citizens in opposition to 
the oppressive state— or what would be more accurately described in this 
case as dysfunctional state— shaped the acceptance of displaced people by 
the volunteers and sympathisers. The recognition and acceptance of IDPs as 
‘ours’ mitigated and silenced potential ideological discrepancies. An amplified 
sense of unity and a threatening state of emergency also reinforced 
generalisations of displaced people and made their suffering more salient 
than their regional differences.  
Changing Image and Alienation of ‘Ours’ 
The critical reevaluation of Euromaidan and recalibration of post-Euromaidan 
optimism have significantly affected civil and state responses to the needs of 
2  While it should be acknowledged that there were some social tensions and blaming 
of IDPs for the conflict in Eastern Ukraine took place, the critical narratives did not 
prevent the wave of compassionate responses from civilians and the state.
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IDPs. The initial wave of compassion fuelled by the crisis and the anxiety from 
the unfolding war began to fade when the conflict shifted into a less active 
phase and when emergency displacement transitioned to a protracted one. 
Consequently, the narratives that criticised IDPs became more visible. These 
critical narratives were mostly directed towards the IDPs from Donbas and not 
to those from Crimea. People who fled Crimea after the Russian annexation 
were categorised as ideological refugees, who sacrificed their homes to resist 
the Russian occupation. In contrast, internal refugees from Eastern Ukraine 
were more commonly seen as those who ‘were not able to defend Ukraine’ 
(Olga, regional social welfare officer). This assumption was also reflected in 
gender biases, as male IDPs were often perceived as failed protectors or 
potential separatists. 
This division between Crimean and Donbas IDPs can be seen as an internal 
Ukrainian ‘hierarchy of othering,’ where one type of Other is imagined as 
more threatening than another (Kaneva and Popescu 2014).  The hostile and, 
accordingly, lower status of Donbas migrants is informed by the East-West 
division of Ukraine. Though the separation of pro-Russian Eastern Ukrainians 
and pro-European Western Ukrainians is highly debated and contested, the 
differing historical backgrounds and contrasting electoral preferences of these 
two parts of Ukraine cannot be ignored. 
The areas that first reflected a negative image of displaced people were the 
real estate market and the job market. Typically, they are the most critical for 
resettled people and crucial for their social integration. Both markets started 
to openly filter IDPs from potential contacts and beneficiaries and the marker 
of displacement soon became a reappearing category in the rubrics for 
announcements. For instance, in spring 2015, six out of ten long-term rent 
announcements for moderately priced apartments in Kyiv had some kind of 
reference to displacement: ‘displaced people and brokers, please do not 
disturb,’ or in some cases ‘displaced people might be considered’ (data from 
olx.ua). 
Even more damaging to their image is the growing tendency to criminalise 
displaced people. IDPs from Eastern Ukraine come from a region strongly 
associated with an industrial, underprivileged, and criminogenic environment. 
During the Euromaidan the hostility toward Eastern Ukrainians aggravated, 
particularly as the targets of the protests – former president Viktor 
Yanukovych and his Party of Regions – were from Donbas. The unfolding 
violence during Euromaidan was often extrapolated to the people from 
Eastern Ukraine. Not only were they blamed as supporters of brutality against 
Euromaidan protesters, but seen as a root cause for it because of the 
electoral choice they had made that led Yanukovych to presidency. The 
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negative attitudes disseminated in media discourse, when, for instance, 
Donbas people were named as ‘the most retrograde part of [Ukraine’s] 
population’ by historian Alexander Motyl (Radio Liberty 2014). 
Furthermore, within the past year, the overall decreasing quality of life and 
well-being in Ukraine became more frequently blamed on IDPs. Thus, a so-
called ‘return of the 90s’ is now often framed as IDPs’ fault. Ukrainian media 
widely circulated the comment by sociologist Inna Bekeshkina, who explained 
the rise of crime rates in Ukraine by the pre-war high level of crimes in 
Donbas that has ‘followed IDPs to other regions’ (BBC 2016). Such 
comments imply displaced people’s direct responsibility for this tendency. At 
the same time, Ukrainian police reported that the rise of crime rates started in 
2012 and for the past two years increased only by 0.3 per cent 
(Korrespondent 2016). Even though the tendency of increased crime rates 
might be linked to the demographic changes triggered by the war, it is more 
likely to be caused by the spread of uncontrolled weapons, deterioration of 
the socio-economic situation, and more accurate reports on crime rates that 
followed the police reform (Korrespondent 2016).
According to a media monitoring survey conducted by Krym SOS, the 
regularity of media news reports that ascribed increasing crime rates as a 
result of IDPs influx has been constantly growing since the end of 2014 (Krym 
SOS, 2015). While regional media are not so biased, Kyiv news outlets do 
publish unproven and unchecked materials that have negative overtones for 
the construction of the IDPs’ public image. A very recent example is related to 
a growing number of stolen cars in Kyiv. For the period of January-February 
2016 this number tripled in comparison to the previous year. While experts 
express their concerns with a technical side of the issue—e.g. an introduction 
of a special devise that allows intercepting car key signal—the media with no 
evidence link the disturbing statistics to the influx of displaced people. For 
instance, one of the key media outlets reported: ‘Among displaced people, 
many did not succeed in finding a job and normalising their lives, and some of 
them, to be honest, do not even want to do this. Stealing a car is a profitable 
alternative to official employment, especially under the unstable 
circumstances’ (Nash Kiev 2015). The implication that stealing a car is as 
easy as shoplifting and that it is the work of displaced people does not leave 
any room for critical examination of the issue and puts the blame on IDPs’ 
shoulders. The harming effects of reports like this result in alienation of 
displaced people and their further marginalisation. 
Negative depictions of IDPs by media raise significant concerns, as they have 
a strong potential to shape both civil and state responses to IDPs’ situation 
and influence policy decisions. Such media power is known as the ‘CNN 
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effect’, as described by Steven Livingston (1997, see also Robinson 2005, 
Peksen et al. 2014). Analysing the role of television in the US foreign policy, 
Livingston named one of the types of the ‘CNN effect’ as ‘policy agenda-
setting’ (Livingstone 1997, 1). He explained how emotional and dramatic 
reports necessitate political responses from governmental institutions. 
Drawing the parallel to the situation with internal displacement in Ukraine, we 
cannot dismiss the possibility that negative media discourse has had an 
impact on political responses from the state.   
What I found especially disturbing is that these negative perceptions influence 
mid-level state workers who are responsible for the development and 
implementation of relief programmes. In my interviews, the reproduction of 
media narratives commonly occurred among these respondents. Accordingly, 
a reappearing theme was the replication of stereotypes about IDPs. For 
instance, one of the ministry workers reproduced a fake story about displaced 
children burning a Ukrainian flag – a widely circulated media report that was 
refuted a few days after the publication. Thus, the previously imperfect 
system of state assistance is further hindered by the functionaries of the state 
apparatus, who express their prejudices while developing and distributing 
assistance to displaced people. And although a direct correlation between 
personal preconceptions of state workers and larger political decisions 
regarding IDPs cannot be clearly identified, the circulation of stereotypes 
exposes an existing distance between how IDPs’ experiences are imagined 
and what they actually are. 
Recently, the Ministry of the Social Policy suspended financial assistance to 
IDPs that are suspected of forging their documents. The decision was made 
based on undisclosed lists of the Security Council of Ukraine (SBU) and 
affected 600,000 IDPs who are dependent on state payments (OCHA report 
from 24 June 2016). This situation was alarming for volunteers, as people 
they help were suddenly cut from state assistance with no prior notices or 
explanations, which significantly increased the amount of assistance they 
needed. At the same time, the state employees interpret this response as an 
urgent step because of the ‘growing levels of fraud and crimes.’ The 
payments were eventually resumed under requirement that IDPs’ living 
conditions and places of actual residence would be inspected by special 
commissions (Cabinet of Ministry Decree №367). These forms of state 
responses damaged perceptions of IDPs, limited their mobility under strict 
state’s control,3 and are calling into question the state’s ethical responsibilities 
3  In case IDPs are not at place of their official residence during the inspection, they 
are deprived of their status and social welfare payments. The decision can be appealed 
within three days from the date of inspection. For this, applicants should come to the 
state welfare office at the place of registration in person. NGO and human rights 
57 Migration and the Ukraine Crisis
to IDPs. Importantly, as follow-up interviews showed in summer 2016, 
volunteers who initially presented an alternative form of social support 
network for IDPs also introduced control measures to check the background 
of displaced people.
Thus, over the past year the generalised entity of displaced people was 
fragmented. The initial responses based on empathy and compassion blurred 
the social and ideological boundaries between IDPs and a larger national 
community. However, a post-euphoria syndrome and social tension 
associated with economic and political instability (Malyarenko 2016) along 
with a growing competition for scarce economic resources shifted the IDPs 
from falling within the category of ‘ours’ (svoi) to the domain ‘they.’ 
Consequent proliferation of negative media images of IDPs and profiling them 
as a social threat is one of the factors that contribute to shaping public 
opinions and institutional responses, such as meticulous background checks 
of IDPs, suspension of social payments, and everyday discrimination. 
However, it cannot be ruled out that demographic changes caused by the 
influx of IDPs contribute to the social instability, magnified attention to their 
lives and totalisation of them as criminals as well as increase social tensions 
within the country. As one of the volunteer activists mentioned, it triggers ‘a 
road roller of repressions’ that affects all IDPs. The fluctuation of attitudes 
demonstrates the emotional and highly perceptive nature of the sense of 
national community and questions critical rationalisations of these responses. 
Contamination with Donbas 
A growing stigma of displaced people is a discursive phenomenon. In popular 
narratives, the danger that IDPs carry often has no tangible or actual 
references and are embedded into a larger clichéd perception of Donbas. 
The volunteers describe the everyday hostility towards the displaced people 
in the following way: ‘People say “You are guilty of what has happened in 
Donbas. And now you are coming here and it will start here (здесь будет то 
же самое)’’’ (Larisa, volunteer). These fears are often not rationalised, but 
emotional, and the threat is seen as an invisible, imaginary danger of ‘it’ – 
some indistinguishable quality of regional identity that is ascribed to Donbas 
IDPs. Interestingly, this perception resembles the alienation of people who 
were displaced from the Chornobyl zone in the 1980s.  
Conflict-driven displaced people are a new phenomenon in the history of 
independent Ukraine (Uehling, this volume). However, five years before the 
country’s independence, in 1986, almost 100,000 people were internally 
organisations alarmed that these conditions significantly restricted IDPs rights for 
movement and ‘imprison’ IDPs in their homes. 
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displaced from Chornobyl. The social marginalisation of nuclear disaster 
victims was heavily marked by social overreactions to the unknown 
consequences of the radioactive explosion. The lack of knowledge about the 
radioactive effects caused public anxiety, stress, and triggered the social 
exclusion of displaced people (Jaworowski 2010). 
The invisible threat of radiation can be compared to the invisible threat of 
association with Donbas that affects the ‘normalcy’ of displaced populations. 
In this way, belonging to the national community becomes secondary, 
whereas the regional marker (either Chornobyl or Donbas) is amplified. In her 
research on refugees in Tanzania, Liisa Malkki emphasises the significance of 
the category of ‘purity’ for displaced people – both a purifying effect of 
suffering that populations have gone through and how hosting actors 
categorise them as ‘pure,’ depriving from social and political markers in order 
to rationalise assistance (Malkki 1996, 384-385). In the case of Ukraine, an 
‘impure’ effect of radioactive or ideological ‘contamination’ is evident, as it 
converts the legal status of displaced people into a social label. The same 
effect can be seen as an important factor in the hierarchy of othering, as the 
‘impurity’ of separatist movements in Donbas and the on-going war there are 
seen as more dangerous elements for Eastern Ukrainian IDPs’ identity in 
contrast to the Crimean internal migrants.
Another parallel between Chornobyl and Donbas IDPs is their life-death 
experience that frames their social interactions and distances IDPs as ‘them’ 
(вони). Anthropologist Adriana Petryna in her study of post-Chornobyl life, 
politics and biological citizenship in Ukraine (2002), describes how victims of 
the nuclear catastrophe navigate their new social identities of survivors. For 
them, as Petryna argues, the idea of inclusion into a national community is 
‘charged with the superadded burden of survival’ (Petryna 2002, 7). For IDPs 
from Donbas the survival is largely marked not only with the eruption of war, 
but also with an internal political conflict. Their experience is often silenced, 
for instance when volunteers are instructed not to talk with IDPs about the 
war. These measures are introduced not to disturb highly traumatic memories 
but also to avoid potential confrontations. The silenced past, this ‘burden of 
survival,’ conceals a possibility of being a political opponent or a supporter of 
separatist movements, which often contribute to othering and distancing of 
IDPs.
Drawing the parallel between Chornobyl and Donbas IDPs I aim not to equate 
their experiences, but rather to compare the emotional, uniformed, and 
somewhat superficial assumptions that shape responses to their situations of 
displacement. The danger of these assumptions is in magnifying IDPs as a 
social threat. This does not mean that the connection between the arrival of 
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displaced population and social instability should be altogether dismissed. 
However, it calls for deeper critical examination of the process, reasons for 
IDPs’ social exclusion, and the alteration of responses.
Conclusion
In this paper, I highlight a shift on the axes of public perception of displaced 
people in Ukraine. The initial support of IDPs was celebrated as an indication 
of an important societal process, in which the regional belonging of IDPs was 
largely dismissed under the overarching concept of ‘ours.’ The same regional 
belonging became a marker of social stigmatisation over the past year. An 
accentuated image of Donbas ideological ‘impurity’ pictured IDPs from 
Eastern Ukraine in less favourable light than those from Crimea, creating 
internal hierarchisation of othering. Alienation and negative images of 
displaced people are reflected in the everyday discrimination and reinforce 
preconceptions about them. However, this fluctuation of attitudes questions 
the fixity of IDPs differentiation and demonstrates that the ‘unchangeable 
order’ can be more dynamic than unchangeable. Not only does it necessitate 
a revision of the conceptual framework of othering, but should be accounted 
for in the work of media communications, where often the generalised image 
of displaced people is generated.
The categorisation of uprooted people as impure and threatening is 
something that Lisa Malkki explores as a transcendent discursive 
phenomenon that affects public and academic languages about refugees 
(Malkki 1992). However, the danger of this tendency is particularly crucial in a 
larger context of ideological discrepancies within Ukraine, where the taken-
for-granted separation between Eastern and Western Ukraine is heightened 
by displacement. Beyond the declarative statements about a unified Ukraine, 
the social standing of the displaced population remains complicated. Their 
inability to participate in local elections due to the legislative inconsistencies, 
meager and unstable social payments, as well as a growing tendency to 
social marginalisation make their inclusion into the larger national community 
quite complex. 
This situation can potentially have significant political repercussions for 
displaced populations. The proliferation of negative images endangers their 
prospects of social inclusion and can affect future institutional actions and 
policy delivery (Zetter 1991, 2007). IDPs’ limited leverages in these processes 
undermine their status as citizens – the one that initially granted them access 
to aid resources – and puts them on the margins of the ‘state-citizens’ 
relations, which is a prolific area for further ethnographic observation and 
examination. 
60‘Strangers Among Ours’
References
Calhoun, C. The Imperative to Reduce Suffering: Charity, Progress, and 
Emergencies in the Field of Humanitarian Action. Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2008.
Dunn, E. C. “The Chaos of Humanitarian Aid: Adhocracy in the Republic of 
Georgia,” Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, 
Humanitarianism, and Development 3, no.1 (2012): 1-23.
Fassin, D. Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2012.
Jaworowski, Z. “Observations on the Chernobyl Disaster and LNT,” Dose-
Response 8, no.2 (2010): 148-171.
Interview with Alexander Motyl, “The Benefits Of A Partitioned Ukraine,” Radio 
Liberty, 20 February 2016, http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-split-
partition-/25270988.html. 
Kaneva, N. and Popescu, D. ‘‘We are Romanian, not Roma’: Nation Branding 
and Post-Socialist Discourses of Alterity,” Communication, Culture & Critique 
7, no.4 (2014): 506-523.
Livingston, S. “Clarifying the CNN effect: An Examination of Media Effects 
According to Type of Military Intervention,” Research Paper R-18,  June 1997, 
http://www.genocide-watch.org/images/1997ClarifyingtheCNNEffect-
Livingston.pdf. 
Malkki, L. “National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the 
Territorialization of National Identity Among Scholars and Refugees,” Cultural 
Anthropology 7, no.1 (1992): 24-44.
Malkki, L. H. “Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and 
Dehistoricization,” Cultural Anthropology 11, no.3 (1996): 377-404.
Malkki, L. H. Purity and exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology 
Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1995.
61 Migration and the Ukraine Crisis
Malyarenko, T. “Ukraine from the Euromaidan to the War with Russia,” The 
Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict (2016): 349-368.
Pandolfi, M. “Contract of Mutual (in) Difference: Governance and the 
Humanitarian Apparatus in Contemporary Albania and Kosovo,” Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies 10, no.1 (2003): 369-381.
Peksen, D., Peterson, T.M and Drury, A.C. “Media-Driven Humanitarianism? 
News Media Coverage of Human Rights Abuses and the Use of Economic 
Sanctions,” International Studies Quarterly 58, no.4 (2014): 855-866.
Petryna, A. Life Exposed: Biological Citizens After Chernobyl, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2013.
Pupavac, V. “Between Compassion and Conservatism: A Genealogy of British 
Humanitarian Sensibilities,” in Contemporary States of Emergency: 
Anthropology of Military and Humanitarian Intervention edited by Didier 
Fassin and Mariella Pandolfi, New York: Zone Books (2010): 47-77.
Robinson, P. The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and 
Intervention, London: Routledge, 2005.
Wanner, C. Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine, 
Pennsylvania: Penn State Press, 2010.
Yurchak, A. Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet 
Generation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.
Zetter, R. “Labelling Refugees: Forming and Transforming a Bureaucratic 
Identity,” Journal of Refugee Studies 4, no.1 (1991): 39-62.
Zetter, R. “More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in an 
Era of Globalization,” Journal of Refugee Studies 20, no.2 (2007): 172-192.
“За час конфлікту ставлення до внутрішньо переміщених осіб 
погіршилось,”13 March 2015, KrymSOS, http://krymsos.com/settlers/
news/55ba327458175/ 
62A Hybrid Deportation: Internally Displaced from Crimea in Ukraine
4
A Hybrid Deportation: 
Internally Displaced from 
Crimea in Ukraine
GRETA UEHLING
Introduction
In February 2014, troops lacking military insignia invaded Crimea and swiftly 
took over key military and strategic sites. A referendum was hastily organised, 
even though this violated Ukrainian law and international norms. The Russian 
press claimed that 83 per cent of the electorate had turned out, and that 97 
per cent of those who voted were in favour of annexation. While these figures 
are the ones featured by international news media sources, a report by the 
President of Russia’s Council on Civil Society and Human Rights posted at 
the president-sovet.ru website showed that only 30 per cent turned out for the 
referendum, and of those who voted, only half were in favour of becoming 
part of Russian Federation (Gregory 2014). 
With the bogus referendum swept under the rug, a treaty was signed between 
the newly proclaimed Republic of Crimea and the Russian Federation to 
initiate a process of integration. The peninsula was so radically transformed 
during this period that people describe the sudden change by saying they 
went to sleep in one country, and woke up in another. While the change in 
power and authority from Ukraine to Russia was greeted with a great deal of 
fanfare and enthusiasm by the pro-Russian part of the population, a 
significant pro-Ukrainian demographic felt sufficiently threatened to flee the 
peninsula. The first wave left very early when it was clear that Ukraine was 
not going to fight for the territory and the so-called ‘little green men’ were 
rapidly gaining control. A second wave followed after the ‘referendum,’ when 
the illegal occupation was declared an ‘annexation.’
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This chapter explores the experience of people from Crimea who became 
internally displaced within Ukraine. Unfortunately, there are no reliable 
statistics to tell us the exact number displaced by Russian occupation. In the 
beginning, statistics were captured by the State Emergency Services of 
Ukraine, a function that was subsequently transferred to the Ministry of Social 
Policy. The Deputy-Minister, Vitaliy Vadimovich Muschinin, points out that 
while some 20,000 IDPs from Crimea have been registered, this is only a 
fraction of the total number (Personal interview, 27 June 2016). Further 
calling the estimate of 20,000 IDPs from Crimea into question is the data of 
the Border Services, which have reported a net out migration from Crimea 
that is three times higher than the number being reported by the Ministry of 
Social Policy. IDPs who fled Crimea are now scattered across Ukraine. 
In what follows, I first explain my methods in the absence of accurate 
statistics or a reliable sampling frame. Then, I explore the reasons people left, 
which suggest Russian policies are designed not only to eliminate dissent but 
also to remove people. The nation that received these migrants was 
unfortunately ill-equipped to welcome them. If the government lacked 
experience and resources to address internal displacement, the Ukrainian 
people, inspired by the ‘Revolution of Dignity’, had both the will and the desire 
to help those who arrived from Crimea. Two main findings stand out: first, 
population displacement contributed to the development of a new civic 
identity that has the potential to unite Ukrainians and fill a void that previously 
existed with regard to Ukrainian national identity. Second, there is deep 
disenchantment with the Ukrainian state that manifests itself most strongly in 
feelings of having been abandoned and betrayed by the government. The 
principal task ahead is to resolve the barriers and overcome challenges that 
stand in the way of IDP integration, so that state and society can function 
together.
Methods
To capture the experience of people displaced by the conflict in Ukraine, I 
carried out 125 interviews over a two-year period. Participant observation at 
cultural, social, political and educational events helped identify the most 
salient interview questions. Educational trainings for IDPs were a particularly 
valuable opportunity to ‘hang out’ with IDPs and listen to their concerns as 
they expressed them to one another. Monitoring of the Ukrainian press and 
social media further enriched my understanding. 
The interviewing focused primarily on IDPs from Crimea (26 in 2015 and 18 in 
2016). I also interviewed state officials, the staff of NGOs, psychologists, 
political and cultural leaders, and IDPs from the conflict in the eastern part of 
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Ukraine. People who were not displaced and chose to stay in Crimea were 
also consulted for this study. Because random sampling of IDPs is not 
possible,1 I employed several non-random sampling techniques. Through 
quota sampling with NGOs that assist IDPs, respondents were selected 
according to gender, age and education. Gaps in demographic categories 
were then filled by snowball sampling with the assistance of three key 
respondents who were well-connected in their communities. I also used 
opportunistic sampling, inviting people I met at social, cultural, and 
educational events to respond to my questions. For these interviews, a semi-
structured interview schedule was used to explore the IDPs’ current thoughts 
and feelings about displacement. In 2016, follow-up interviews with 12 of the 
people interviewed in 2015 were carried out to assess the extent to which 
views changed over time. Since IDPs are dispersed widely across Ukraine, 
research was carried out in three cities favoured by IDPs and several small 
towns. 
The experts interviewed for this study, some of whom were also IDPs, were 
selected through purposive sampling. These interviews were tailored to the 
individual’s professional experience and expertise. All of the interview data 
was transcribed, translated, and analysed using Nvivo software for qualitative 
analysis. Monitoring of the Ukrainian press and social media sites further 
enriched the research. 
Without an effective sampling frame, this research cannot claim to be 
representative. The methods combined, however, give the study as much 
validity as is possible under the circumstances. One important limitation to 
this research is that for ethical reasons, only the IDPs who felt ready to talk 
about their experience were interviewed. The thoughts and feelings of those 
with serious mental health challenges, for example, remain largely outside the 
scope of this study. This gap is partially filled by interviewing the 
psychologists and the social workers that serve IDPs. I also learned about 
people who were too affected by the events to talk about them from friends 
and family members. IDPs speculated that for the most part, their 
demographic differs from the one that stayed behind in being relatively more 
reflective, entrepreneurial and forward-thinking.
1  Statistics are not disaggregated by ethnicity and only a subset, the most needy 
IDPs who need state assistance, register. NGOs have databases of beneficiaries, but I 
could not structure my sample around these data because they were said to be in bad 
repair (duplicate entries, gaps, omissions) and because they were unwilling to share 
these data. 
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Asked why they left, my respondents stated plainly and unequivocally that 
they disagreed with the change in power and would not live under the 
occupational authorities. Thus, a common denominator in the calculus of 
whether to stay or go is precisely the change in political regime. In addition to 
the most basic reason of not wanting to live in the Russian Federation, 
people leave to retain their human rights. Whether it was to have a political 
opinion, profess a faith, feel safe in their home, or avoid torture and death, all 
were seeking to preserve fundamental rights.
• Right to a political opinion. Individuals active in the Euromaidan 
protests or any form of pro-Ukrainian politics left to save their lives. The 
disappearances of colleagues prompted them to pack and leave. For 
Crimean Tatars, the death of Reshat Ametov is often mentioned. He was 
stuffed in an unmarked car after a one-man protest and later found dead 
with signs of torture. At least 20 disappearances of young Crimean Tatar 
men have followed. Expressing political opinion has become a risk. The 
Crimean Tatar political leadership, the Mejlis (a democratically elected 
representative body) was declared illegal and its top leadership barred 
from living in Crimea. Now, those who retain an allegiance are vulnerable 
to repression. 
• Right not to be tortured/right to a private life. Many people, but 
especially academics and artists, left after their homes were searched for 
banned material, or they were invited for informal ‘conversations’ and 
subjected to psychological pressure. Searches of homes, in which the 
occupants must lay face down, and in which important property like 
computers and cell phones are confiscated, have become routine. 
• Right to religion. The Ukrainian church was deprived of its premises and 
forced to operate underground. Similarly, devout and observant Muslims 
predicted they would be a target of the new Russian authorities. 
Searches of mosques, banning of even basic religious texts, detentions, 
and various forms of humiliation such as being booked and having to 
submit a DNA sample (obtained from urine and spit submitted at police 
stations) for attending a mosque have followed. 
• Right to education. During the first two years of occupation, diplomas 
issued in Crimea were not recognised as valid in mainland Ukraine. 
Realising this separated them from any viable future outside Crimea, 
young people and their families left for education. Today there are plans 
for these diplomas to be translated and converted into official Ukrainian 
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documents. Children in schools are pressured to become pro-Russian 
and inform on parents who are pro-Ukrainian. Some families stated they 
left to protect their children from this kind of abuse in the educational 
system and to preserve family unity. 
Given these conditions, it is not surprising that Crimean Tatars label the 
policies of the de facto authorities as a hybrid or hidden deportation: 
If in 1944 the Soviet authorities selected the reason of 
collaboration with the Nazis, and the whole Soviet people just 
agreed with that, in the 21st century, to simply take a people 
and deport them is not going to be viewed favourably. Since 
they can’t do that, they create the conditions to make people 
leave of their own accord. It would be too obvious to use trains’ 
(No. 21, Crimean Tatar male IDP).
I think the 2014 occupation was interpreted through the metaphor of 
deportation in part because the process of mourning the 1944 deportation has 
never been completed. While governments may have rushed to proclaim the 
deportation a genocide in 2014, for over two decades it was proclaimed to be 
‘humane’ by the pro-Russian authorities in Crimea. Thus, Crimea lacked a 
commonly agreed upon historical narrative. Without adequate ways to 
remember (memorials to those who perished were routinely vandalised) it 
remained contentious. The Russian Federation further disrupted the process 
of mourning when they occupied Crimea in 2014. Now the traumatic past is 
the present and termed ‘hybrid deportation.’ Whether or not it is scientifically 
accurate, the phrase transduces feelings of vulnerability and historical 
injustice, and captures the ways in which the choice to leave is a forced one. 
The Ukrainian Government’s Response
The Ukrainian government was not prepared to deal with flows of internally 
displaced persons. Ukrainian officials interviewed for this study readily admit 
a lack of experience that resulted in notable policy and protection gaps. 
Corruption has also undermined the government’s ability to meet the needs of 
IDPs. Further complicating the ability to respond, recent years have been 
marked by restructuring and reorganisation, leading to staff turnover, loss of 
institutional memory and issues with coordination. For example, there has 
been disagreement between the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian Parliament) 
and the Presidential administration on the best course of action for IDPs. The 
legislation put forward by Verkhovna Rada has lacked mechanisms for 
implementation. 
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There is also a significant problem with government officials passing 
responsibility to non-governmental organisations. For example, the 
government hotline established by the Ministry of Social Policy directed IDPs 
not to services provided by the Ukrainian government, but to volunteers. Even 
the process of registering as an IDP has been fraught with problems. 
Ambiguity in the law about whether or not the spravka or document identifying 
one as an IDP must have a stamp from the Migration Services led to a period 
of time in which it was impossible to register as an IDP. The Migration 
Services threw out their stamps according to one interpretation of the law, 
while regional authorities interpreted the law in a different way and required 
the stamp. Making matters worse, highly placed officials are rumoured to 
make negative statements about IDPs publically. 
The government policy has led to a situation in which IDPs do not enjoy a full 
set of rights in mainland Ukraine. One manifestation of the issue is voting 
privileges. In July 2015, Ukraine’s Parliament approved a law that excludes 
IDPs from participating in local elections. This obviously bars them from 
forming local councils and electing village and city mayors. Ukraine’s 
displaced population has essentially been deprived of a voice in making 
policies, some of which are related to them, the IDPs. 
Another example is that according to Ukrainian law, neither birth nor death 
certificates issued in the territory occupied or controlled by Russia are 
recognised. In other words, a baby born to Ukrainian parents in the occupied 
territory is not a Ukrainian citizen. When they bring their child to mainland 
Ukraine, IDPs are excluded from the stipend the Ukrainian government offers 
other families for the birth of a child until they go through a complicated legal 
process. The issues continue with death certificates that are not recognised in 
continental Ukraine. Although an attorney was able to win benefits for a child 
by presenting both the child and her medical records to a Ukrainian court, the 
matter is more complicated after death. ‘A corpse?’ he mused, ‘much more 
difficult to transport’ (Uehling 2015). This affects the ability to inherit property 
within families – a transaction that is only possible with a valid death 
certificate. In most countries of the world, the registration of births and deaths 
is accomplished through a simple administrative process. The Ukrainian 
government has taken steps to simplify and speed the process, but it is still 
only accomplished through time consuming and potentially costly court 
proceedings.
Banking is another example of a skewed policy response to IDPs. One of the 
first activities of the Ukrainian authorities after the occupation of Crimea was 
to freeze Crimeans’ funds in Ukrainian banks in the occupied territory. Some 
were able to recover their funds through the painstaking intervention of 
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Diaspora, a Kyiv-based NGO, others lost them irretrievably. What is more, 
Ukrainian citizens with Crimean propiskas cannot open a new bank account 
in mainland Ukraine. They must first go through the long process of 
registering at an address in mainland Ukraine. The notion that she lacked the 
right to open a bank account in her own country led one IDP to exclaim she 
had been abandoned by Ukraine. 
In short, IDPs from the occupied territories think Ukrainian government 
policies make them second-class citizens, attached to the body politic, but not 
fully joined as political subjects. The Ukrainian government seems to be 
‘saying’ that the territory has been occupied unlawfully. What IDPs are 
‘hearing’ however, is a form of rejection and condemnation. Thus, the current 
legal environment is one in which IDPs question whether they genuinely 
belong, and whether their hopes for incorporation will be fulfilled by a state 
that fails to offer them full rights. 
Ong’s insight (1996) that within the seemingly unitary category of citizenship 
there are in fact hierarchical schemes of difference that intersect in contingent 
ways is useful here. People holding valid Ukrainian citizenship but formerly 
residing in Crimea (and bearing a stamp called a propiska to that effect in 
their passports) have a different set of rights in independent Ukraine. 
Somewhat like the ‘whitening’ and ‘blackening’ processes described by Ong 
(1996, 741) there is a ‘marking’ by Russian occupation that sets these 
political subjects apart. IDPs from Crimea, whether Russian, Ukrainian, or 
indigenous Crimean Tatar, find themselves in a special status. Theoretically, 
citizenship is supposed to work against this (MacDonald 2012, Bosniak 2006) 
but Ukrainian citizens who come to the mainland from Crimea are viewed as 
politically tainted. IDPs said that in the beginning, they were called ‘traitors’ on 
account of the bogus referendum, whether they had voted in it or not. 
In response to the gaps in services and the lack of harmonisation, the 
government of Ukraine has recently created a Ministry for the Temporarily 
Occupied Territories with two directives, one for the occupied territory of 
Crimea and another for the so-called Anti-terrorist operation (ATO) in the 
East. This Ministry is, however, only beginning its work. Officials interviewed 
in late June 2016 stated they see their primary role as coordination. They 
hope to identify gaps in legislation and services to IDPs. Their influence at 
this time is limited. Their current budget is limited to the administrative 
expenses related to supporting a staff of 35 people. They have a plan, which 
they have submitted for approval to the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of 
the Economy.
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Work and Housing: Don’t Build Us a Ghetto
In addition to civil liberties and legal protection, IDPs who have left homes, 
jobs, and personal belongings in Russian-occupied territory sometimes need 
financial assistance. At a time when the average monthly income is between 
5000 and 6000 UAH, individuals who are registered as IDPs are entitled to a 
stipend of 440 UAH, the equivalent of 20 USD per month, to offset the cost of 
housing. Pensioners, invalids and children are eligible to receive 880 UAH a 
month, the equivalent of 40 USD, but there is a maximum payment of 2400 
UAH per family per month. The limitation associated with these benefits is 
that they are highly contingent and there are a host of factors that make one 
ineligible. For example, if an individual is unemployed for one month the 
benefits are cut in half. At the end of two months, they are cut entirely. This 
results in a situation in which those most in need are least able to receive IDP 
benefits. Officials in the Ministry of Social Policy suggested the logic behind 
this policy is to avoid dependency syndromes and provide a reward or 
incentive to work. 
Work is, however, hard to find. Crimean Tatars who left Crimea observe 
anecdotally that they are an extremely active demographic: none are sitting 
idle waiting for a handout. Ukrainian officials corroborate this, stating that 
most Crimean Tatar IDPs have simply found themselves work. NGOs have 
turned their attention from reception of IDPs to this very question of work, 
focusing on training IDPs to open small businesses and giving them grants 
and loans to do so. This is a wise approach; the Ministry of Social Policy 
observes that there are more job seekers than jobs, and the jobs that are 
available officially are low paying ones (interview, 27 June 2016). 
Concern about their housing arrangement was a strong enough sentiment to 
appear in my interviewing as the primary reason IDPs stated they do not yet 
feel at home in mainland Ukraine. The vast majority of IDPs rent housing and 
are concerned with the high cost of accommodation, the looming possibility 
that they could be asked to move, and reluctance on the part of the host 
population to rent to them. IDPs from Crimea have not suffered nearly the 
stigma or discrimination as those from the East, who are stereotyped as 
wealthy, spoiled, arrogant, and uncultured. Those from Crimea who wore 
head covering told stories of repeatedly being denied housing. 
Housing is a wedge that separates IDPs from the local population who live in 
homes and apartments that they own, having only to struggle with the rising 
cost of utilities, not rent. By contrast, IDPs must pay for housing and utilities 
while earning the same, and often lower, salaries. Unfortunately, the stipend 
to offset the cost of housing is too small to make an appreciable difference, 
70A Hybrid Deportation: Internally Displaced from Crimea in Ukraine
and also became a justification for landlords to actually raise rent, further 
disadvantaging IDPs. Good solutions are still needed: in response to plans for 
an IDP settlement outside of Kyiv, one IDP exclaimed ‘No, don’t build us a 
ghetto.’ Indeed, most of the social science literature shows that physical 
separation or special treatment is likely to impede, rather than facilitate 
integration. 
With an eye toward the future, the government of Ukraine is collaborating with 
international organisations to resolve the issues of work and housing 
confronting the internally displaced. The World Bank and the United Nations 
Development Fund are perceived as the primary donors. In the last two years, 
the World Bank Group has provided a total of 4.7 billion USD to Ukraine 
(World Bank 2016). The International Organization for Migration and United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees have also been very active 
partners, distributing humanitarian aid to the neediest families, as well as 
grants and loans to start businesses to those with promising business 
proposals. The IOM has supported self-employment and micro-
entrepreneurship with funding from the European Union, and the 
governments of Canada, Norway, Japan, and the United Kingdom (IOM 
2016).
Inventing Tradition 
In spite of the weak government response to IDPs, Ukrainian civil society was 
primed to receive them. The Euromaidan protests resulted in the formation of 
coordinated networks of citizens that turned their attention to IDPs once the 
Revolution was behind them. I suggest this is significant and could shape the 
outcome of population displacement far into the future. 
Writing before the ‘Revolution of Dignity’, Shevel notes that unlike Russia, 
there was no domestic consensus on the definition of the Ukrainian nation 
(2006, 221). The only compromise among various viewpoints was that those 
with family origins on the territory of Ukraine were eligible to apply for 
Ukrainian citizenship, irrespective of ethnic, linguistic, or other characteristics 
(2006, 221). My research shows that after the conflict with Russia in the east 
and the occupation of Crimea in the south, there is a clearer sense of what it 
means to be Ukrainian emerging. This new civic identity, initially marked by 
the recognition of a common enemy in Vladimir Putin, has grown to 
encompass the identification of a common Ukrainian-Crimean Tatar history, 
the attenuation of the salience of ethnic and religious differences, and a new 
sense of political agency. 
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After the Maidan, we began to construct a civic identity that 
was not there before. People began to say, ‘Now I feel myself 
to be a citizen of Ukraine.’ Most of the residents of Crimea 
never had the cause or the opportunity to think of themselves 
as being the citizen of ANY state (No. 32, Russian female IDP 
in Kyiv).
This statement was made by an ethnically Russian woman who left 
Sevastopol, underscoring that this is a politically not ethnically-motivated 
migration, and that the national identity is envisioned as subsuming multiple 
ethnic groups. 
We understood that to be Ukrainian isn’t to be Ukrainian 
ETHNICALLY. It’s more like the way the American mind sees 
things. It’s not about NATIONALITY. It’s a style of thinking, 
really. I’m Crimean Tatar [pointing to heart]. I’m Ukrainian 
[pointing to head] (No. 35, Crimean Tatar female IDP in Kyiv).
The pragmatics and gestural deixis of this conversation suggest that in the 
structure of feeling following the ‘Revolution of Dignity’, being Ukrainian and 
Crimean Tatar are different dimensions (head and heart) of the same body 
politic. These sentiments were echoed by Ukrainians coming to know the 
IDPs in their midst.
No longer just the inhabitants of a distant ‘island,’ IDPs from Crimea are in a 
unique position to educate. If the average Ukrainian knew very little about 
Crimea or Crimean Tatars before, they became very curious as a result of the 
occupation. Cooking clubs, master classes, common apartment block 
entryways, playgrounds, personal friendships, and the flush of new 
businesses opened by IDP-entrepreneurs are all bridging this gap. IDPs 
speculated that they have a special role to play, helping the Ukrainian 
population as a whole to become psychologically prepared for the day when 
Crimea is (hopefully) de-occupied.
This newfound sense of ‘Ukrainian-ness’ relies in part on separating itself 
from the Soviet and the Russian. Respondents in my study generated 
discourses that constructed Russians as being fundamentally different and 
‘other’. These conversations referenced genetic material, history, and values. 
They [Russians] are people who are ready to destroy any 
other people just in order to remain a superpower. That is not 
a part of who we are, we are free people and we would never 
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allow this to occur (No. 121, Crimean Tatar male IDP, 
Kherson).
This informant went deeper to hypothesise that Russians carry a genetically-
based hatred for Crimean Tatars originating in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries. Discourses that essentialise the Other are prevalent in this region 
where the past has never been fully mourned or put away. As Etkind 
describes, post-Soviet memory ‘operates as a living combination of various 
symbols, periods, and judgments which are experienced simultaneously’ 
(2013, 11). It is specifically ‘freedom’ that is the primary marker of Ukrainian 
identity, which not only unites various peoples of Ukraine, but separates them 
from Russians who presumably do not value freedom of thought or 
conscience.
FREEDOM! Ukrainians are a freedom loving people. This is a 
country in which there were no tsars or institutionalised 
slavery. Ukrainians always elected their khetmen. Then they 
killed them of course, but that’s another story (No. 35, Crimean 
Tatar female IDP).
While discourses of freedom are hardly surprising in this post-revolutionary 
moment, the folding in of both Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians under this 
rubric represents a shift in comparison to the separation and suspicion 
between the two groups in the past. It is important to underscore that these 
feelings were not unique to Crimean Tatar IDPs. A common refrain was that 
whereas it used to be ethnicity that divided people of Ukraine, it is now 
political loyalty. 
A crucial part of this civic identity relies on creating a collective past – a 
process that resonates with nation-building projects the world over as amply 
demonstrated in a volume edited by Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983). Held to 
be in common in today’s Ukraine are fighting battles on the same side; 
common wedding rituals; the same melodies in music; common toponyms; 
styles of dress among Tatars and the Cossacks; and values. 
The history of the Crimean khanate, and the Crimean Tatars is 
closely tied to the history of Ukraine, to the people of Ukraine 
and to Europe, because among other things, it has been 
shown historically that the first khan was from what is now 
Poland. These relations are very deep. It’s our common 
history. All the paraphernalia, sharovars [pants worn by 
Cossacks] the names of the clothes, the weapons, it is all 90 
per cent Tatar (No. 39, Crimean Tatar male IDP, Kyiv).
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I had a project in which both Ukraine and Crimean Tatar music 
groups participated. We found that Crimean Tatar and 
Ukrainian melodies could be heard in the same piece. The 
music is identical. Yes. We never studied this before, and the 
[political] events inspired us (No. 6, Crimean Tatar male IDP). 
These ideas about a common past from respondents only partially align with 
scholarly accounts. For example, Wilson places more weight on the social 
distance between Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians. In a discussion of how the 
Russian and Ukrainian Cossacks were allied with one another, Wilson states, 
‘Sometimes, the groups were in conflict with each other. At other times they 
joined forces to fight against their mutual enemy – the Crimean Tatars. In 
some respects, they were caught between slave-trading Islam and, as 
Orthodox, Counter-Reformation Catholicism’ (2000, 59). Absent from Wilson’s 
account is the acknowledgement that the Cossacks and the Crimean Tatars 
were on the same side. 
There is more alignment when it comes to common cultural markers. As 
Wilson states, ‘Still, the open steppe where they lived provided an opportunity 
to absorb the dress, vocabulary and methods of military organization from 
their Islamic enemies’ (2000, 59). In other words, respondents in today’s 
Ukraine were beginning to develop a counter-history to the version passed 
down to them, and are now casting Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars as friends 
rather than enemies. As one respondent put it: 
Well, firstly what I want to say, the object of Ukrainian peoples’ 
pride are the Cossacks, because the Cossacks were the 
libertines, they loved freedom, and they provided the first 
seeds of statehood. And the Cossacks, their mode of life, their 
costumes, their weapons – all of these were Crimean Tatar 
(No. 25, non-IDP female, Lviv).
How far this reframing of history will proceed will be important to analyse as it 
continues. It is an open question whether this Ukrainian counter-history will 
withstand the pressure of Russian narratives and propaganda.
No Longer Victims
This new sense of Ukrainian-ness was strengthened by a growing awareness 
of their own political agency, which represents a departure from the past 
when the dominant narratives had to do with victimisation at the hands of the 
Soviets, either in the form of the collectivisation, the 1944 deportation or the 
Holodomor.  
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The idea for the exhibit arose in conversations in which we 
said: ‘wait a minute. We are used to victimising ourselves – 
talking about ourselves as victims. We may have been 
deported, but we emerged victorious, we are strong, and we 
are going to survive’ (No. 43, Crimean Tatar male non-IDP, 
Kyiv).
To a certain extent, IDPs saw their displacement as a loss that also contained 
an opportunity. If discourses have the power to create the things of which 
they speak, IDPs were socially constructing themselves as resilient and 
creating openings for experiencing themselves as empowered. 
I am more than certain that in my generation there will be 
many notable people. Whether or not they are stars of the 
screen, they are going to be stars in the human rights field, in 
the field of management, in politics, because that is what is 
happening with us. Someone will get a Pulitzer, someone will 
become a Nobel Prize laureate (No. 3, Crimean Tatar male 
IDP, Kyiv) 
These narratives, rich in the sense of individual political agency, represent an 
intriguing departure from the kinds of narratives that prevailed when I did 
research in Crimea in the 1990s. Political agency, defined here as seeing 
oneself as having and making choices to act or not act politically in the world, 
was a preoccupation of IDPs and is a theme in a majority of my interviews. 
While the theme of deportation and its legacy of discrimination surfaced in the 
metaphor of a hybrid deportation, these IDPs problematised any discourse of 
victimisation or victimhood, and spoke rather of crossing thresholds, turning 
pages, and otherwise moving forward, based on their own choices. 
Loyalty and Betrayal
The fact that Ukraine did not defend Crimea from Russian incursion, coupled 
with the lack of rights and lack of benefits in mainland Ukraine have led many 
IDPs to say they have been betrayed by Ukraine. The word used to describe 
this, predatelstvo, is heavily saturated with meanings because it is also the 
word that has been used to discredit and disenfranchise Crimean Tatars since 
the Second World War. After the 2014 occupation, Ukrainians asked why the 
Crimean Tatars had not stepped forward to do the work of the Ukrainian army 
and defend the peninsula against Russian takeover. There were also 
announcements that anyone who voted in the referendum was a traitor. There 
is a deeply painful irony in this choice of words because of the 
(unreciprocated) loyalty to Ukraine that Crimean Tatars demonstrated for over 
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two decades in independent Ukraine. In the last 12 months, thoughts of 
leaving entirely have become more possible. Some IDPs rationalised that with 
time, the political environment would be improved and the economy would 
grow. Others lost the hope that led them out of Crimea into mainland Ukraine: 
Now I do not feel like a patriot of Ukraine, I am less tied to this 
country than ever before. Some of my friends have left already 
and others are planning to leave to Europe or wherever 
because they don’t see a future or any possibilities. This is the 
very unpleasant effect of all these events (No. 109, Russian 
female IDP, Lviv).
Indeed, according to the IOM, 11 per cent of the Ukrainian population is 
located outside of Ukraine (IOM 2011). The displacement of people from 
Crimea to mainland Ukraine occurred as a result of an unlawful occupation. 
While traumatic and disruptive to the lives of individual IDPs, this migratory 
flow also presented Ukraine with an unexpected opportunity to generate its 
own traditions and become more integrated. It will take concerted effort on 
the part of state officials, civil society, and of course IDPs themselves to 
create positive momentum. 
Conclusion: A Double-Edged Sword
It is difficult to predict whether the solidification of Ukrainian national identity 
occurring in 2015 and 2016 will continue to be ascendant, or whether tropes 
of treason and betrayal will undermine the forging of new political culture. 
Concerns that they could be labelled ‘traitors,’ undergo deportation at the 
hands of Ukraine, or become divided amongst themselves are sobering 
reminders that the structures of feeling following the ‘Revolution of Dignity’ 
are still in solution and have yet to precipitate into robust and longstanding 
institutions of civil society. 
Upon returning from a short visit to aging parents in occupied Crimea, one 
IDP captured the ambivalence of being displaced in mainland Ukraine by 
highlighting that it is uncomfortable for migrants whether they return to 
occupied Crimea or stay in ‘free’ Ukraine. 
I went to visit and when I am home, among my own, on my 
land, in the house of my birth. Everything is the same, but not 
the same. There is an inexplicable pressure that’s so intense 
you can’t think. I told my husband I was either tired or going 
crazy. When I come back to mainland Ukraine, I can say 
anything I want, I can do anything I want, I can go anywhere I 
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want, but my loved ones and my native land are still missing. 
It’s like a double-edged sword (No. 57, Crimean Tatar female 
IDP, Lviv).
This double-edged sword provides a good cipher for understanding IDP 
psychology. The hope for loyalty and the fear of betrayal run alongside a 
celebration of agency and unity, forming the complicated ground upon which 
state policies and institutions will continue to take shape. While IDPs from 
Crimea may be relatively small in number, they provide an important window, 
perhaps even a magnifying glass, on contemporary Ukraine. 
References
Anthropoliteia, “Birth, Death, and Fictive Citizenship: Political Agency in 
War-Torn Ukraine,” 20 July 2015, http://anthropoliteia.net/2015/07/20/
birth-death-and-fictive-citizenship-citizenship-and-political-agency-in-war-torn-
ukraine/
Barabantseva, E. and Sutherland, C. “Diaspora and Citizenship: Introduction,” 
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 17, no. 1 (2011): 1-13.
Bosniak, L. The Citizen and the Alien, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2006.
Etkind, A. Warped Mourning: Stories of the Undead in the Land of the 
Unburied, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013.
Gregory, P.R. “Putin’s ‘Human Rights Council’ Accidentally Posts Real 
Crimean Election Results,” Forbes, 5 May 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/
paulroderickgregory/2014/05/05/putins-human-rights-council-accidentally-
posts-real-crimean-election-results-only-15-voted-for-
annexation/#6ab3645810ff
Hobsbawm, E. and Ranger, T. eds. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983.
International Organization for Migration, Migration in Ukraine: Facts and 
Figures, September 2011, https://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/
mainsite/activities/countries/docs/Ukraine/Migration-in-Ukraine-Facts-and-
Figures.pdf 
77 Migration and the Ukraine Crisis
International Organization for Migration, “Ukraine Displacement: Rise to the 
Challenge,” 26 April 2016, http://www.iom.int/video/ukraine-displacement-
rise-challenge
Marshall, Th. “Citizenship and Social Class,” in States and Societies edited 
by Held, D. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983: 248-260.
Ong, A. Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality. Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1999.
Wilson, A. Ukrainians: The Unexpected Nation, New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2000. 
World Bank, “World Bank Vice President Reaffirms Support for Ukraine on 
First Visit to Kyiv,” 3 June 2016, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-
release/2016/06/03/world-bank-vice-president-reaffirms-support-for-ukraine-
on-his-first-visit-to-kyiv 
78Economic Migration of Ukrainians to the European Union: A View from Poland
5
Economic Migration of 
Ukrainians to the European 
Union: A View from Poland
JOANNA FOMINA
The present chapter aims to analyse several aspects of economic migration 
from Ukraine to Poland in the context of the military conflict on Ukraine’s 
territory. It looks at how the Euromaidan and the ensuing war with Russia 
impacted the dynamics of migration to Poland, which has been for a long time 
one of the most popular destinations for Ukrainians. It seeks to debunk the 
myth of the influx of Ukrainian refugees to Poland, promulgated by the Polish 
authorities, as a way to excuse their unwillingness to share the burden of the 
international migration crisis faced by the European Union. The chapter looks 
at the dynamics and significance of economic remittances from Poland. 
Finally, it discusses the unprecedented socio-political mobilisation of 
Ukrainian migrants in response to the Revolution of Dignity and the armed 
conflict on its territory that has resulted in increased consolidation of the 
Ukrainian migrant population and contributed to the development of migrants’ 
social capital. The article employs the official data received upon request by 
the author from several state institutions including the Office for Foreigners, 
Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Bank of Poland and Ministry for 
Labour and Social Policy; a series of in-depth interviews with Ukrainian civic 
activists in Poland collected by the Institute of Public Affairs (Warsaw) and 
Institut für Europäische Politik (Berlin) as well as additional interviews with 
stake-holders conducted by the author as part of ongoing research on 
Ukrainian migration to Poland. 
The Polish government has been supportive of the pro-democratic forces 
during the Revolution of Dignity and has backed Ukraine in the Russian-
Ukrainian conflict from the start. Public opinion has also been relatively open 
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towards the acceptance of Ukrainian refugees – around half of the population 
agreed that Poland should admit Ukrainian refugees arriving from the conflict 
zone (CBOS 2016). Poland organised the resettlement of about 200 
Ukrainian citizens of Polish ancestry from the military conflict area, bringing 
them to Poland and granting permanent residence. 
The increased migration flows from Ukraine triggered by the war in Donbas 
have become embedded into the wider debate on the EU’s response to the 
unprecedented influx of migrants from Africa and Asia, in particular from 
Syria, and exploited by some public figures for their political ends. The Polish 
Prime Minister, in a speech in the European Parliament, claimed that Poland 
did not have the capacity to accept any Syrian refugees, as it has already 
accepted one million Ukrainian refugees (Chapman 2016). However, while 
the migration flow has indeed increased, neither the purported volume, nor 
the declared character of migration has been reflected by the official data. 
The vast majority of Ukrainians coming to Poland seek gainful employment 
and are not a burden on the Polish taxpayer, but rather contribute to the 
country’s economic growth. 
The number of applications for asylum from Ukrainians has indeed increased 
after 2013 in relative terms, yet even the total number of applications does 
not come close to the purported one million. If in 2013 there were 46 
applications, in 2014 the number rose to 2318 and in 2015 it reached 2305. In 
2016, until July, 709 asylum claims were registered. The Office for Foreigners 
(UDSC) distinguished several main groups: the Crimea, the Euromaidan, and 
the Eastern Ukraine profile. In terms of the number of submitted applications, 
currently Ukraine is second only to Russia, as the vast majority of 
applications come from Chechens. What is more significant, however, the 
vast majority of applications have been unsuccessful: the number of persons 
who were granted refugee status or subsidiary protection is just several 
dozen (Table 1) (UDSC 2016).
Table 1: Number of persons granted refugee status or subsidiary 
protection in years 2013-2016
2013 2014 2015 2016
Refugee status 2 0 2 32
Tolerated stay 8 11 6 1
Subsidiary protection 5 6 24 63
Total 15 17 32 96
Source: Office for Foreigners, 2016, own elaboration of the data.
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Altogether between the year 2013 and 2016 almost 6000 Ukrainians applied 
for asylum and only 36 persons were granted refugee status, and 161 
persons received international protection. As of 4 April 2016, 1600 citizens of 
Ukraine were receiving social aid (UDSC 2016). While claims about the 
gigantic number of refugees from Ukraine are vastly overstated, there has 
been a pronounced increase in the migration flow from Ukraine in the 
aftermath of the Euromaidan and the ensuing military conflict.
One could wonder where the quoted number of one million comes from. Most 
likely it refers to the number of Polish visas issued to Ukrainian citizens in the 
past year. Visa statistics shed some light on the dynamics of short-term, 
seasonal and circular migration, yet the cumulative numbers are not fully 
illustrative of migration trends for several reasons. First of all, the almost one 
million visas encompasses all visas issued to Ukrainians coming to Poland for 
various purposes, including business, tourism, family visits, conferences, 
often for just a few days1.
Table 2: All visas issued to Ukrainian citizens (C+D)2 in years 2013-2015
Ukraine 2013 2014 2015
C D C D C D
528,274 192,401 556,511 276,748 457,885 466,791
720,675 833,259 924,676
Source: own elaboration of the data received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016
The number of all visas issued by Polish consulates has increased. In 2015, 
around 200,000 more visas were issued in comparison to 2013.3 Notably, 
1  Not all visa holders cross the border, as it is explained below.
2  It should be noted that persons undertaking business activity, studies or work in 
Poland may be issued both C or D visas. The decision on the type of visa issued 
depends on the duration of the intended stay. While a holder of a C-type visa is allowed 
to stay on the territory of the EU for not longer than 90 days over a 180-days period (yet 
such a visa may be valid for up to five years), D-type visas are granted for stays that 
are longer than 90 days, with the maximum stay of one year. Those intending to stay 
longer need to apply for a residence permit.
3  It is worth pointing out that the dynamics of visas issuance numbers are related to 
the term of validity of C visas issued: the issuance of multi-entry visas with long-term 
validity (up to five years). According to the statistics collected by the European 
Commission around 70 per cent of C visas issued by Polish consulates are multi-entry, 
yet their validity may vary from six months to five years. If people who travel to Poland 
on a regular basis are granted visas with relatively short validity, visas granted to them 
artificially boost statistics. 
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there has also been a considerable increase in the number of work-related 
visas (Table 4). If in 2013 the number of visas issued on the basis of 
employer’s declaration of intent to entrust a job was 125,871, in 2015 it has 
almost tripled (362,889). The share of study-related visas has also increased 
almost two-fold.  
Table 3: Visas issued to Ukrainian citizens by Polish consulates in years 
2013 – 2015, selected purposes of visit (C and D visas combined)
Purpose 2013 2014 2015
Business activity 182,649 185,021 133,570
Work on the basis of employer’s 
declaration of the intent to entrust a 
job
125,871 192,614 362,889
Work on the basis of work permit   17,241   29,481 40,299
Study   12,093   17,258 20,243
Source: own elaboration of the data received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016
One needs to be cautious, however, when interpreting these numbers. While 
they undoubtedly reflect an increased flow of Ukrainians to Poland following 
the military conflict in the east of Ukraine, the number of visas issued does 
not necessarily directly correspond to the number of persons coming to 
Poland or undertaking work in the country. While some visa holders never 
actually cross the border during the period of validity of their visa, often 
wishing to have a Schengen visa ‘just in case’, others use the services of fake 
employers in order to secure a visa and later seek employment after their 
arrival in Poland, possibly in other EU countries.4 Notably, the share of 
irregular migration, contrary to conventional wisdom, is relatively low and 
according to a large-scale IOM survey study amounts up to 13 per cent of all 
4  As it turns out, the declaration of intent to entrust work system, while considerably 
liberalising the access to the labour market for Ukrainian workers, is prone to various 
abuses and malpractices. In general, it is perceived that getting a visa on the basis of a 
work declaration is relatively easy, and thus an option chosen by many Ukrainians. This 
is especially the case if one uses the services of intermediary Ukrainian companies 
cooperating with Polish companies whose main source of income is precisely issuing 
declarations of intent. According to the data collected during the State Labour 
Inspectorate investigation of companies that had issued work declarations in 2014, only 
69 per cent of Ukrainians who were issued declarations actually entered the territory of 
Poland. Out of those who entered Poland in 2014 on the basis of visa issued on 
grounds of declaration of intent, only 37 per cent took up jobs with the employer who 
issued the declaration. For more, see the State Labour Inspection report, 2015.
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Ukrainian migrants in Poland (IOM 2016).
The volume of long-term migration has also increased. As the data collected 
in Table 2 demonstrates, the number of residence permits (usually valid for 
one to two years) has almost quadrupled (from 9595 issued in 2013 to 37833 
issued in 2015). The majority of temporary permits in 2015 (63 per cent) were 
issued on the basis of work. This increase also reflects the effects of the Law 
on Foreigners from 12 December 2013 (art. 114 and 126) introducing a single 
work and residence permit for stays longer than three months. 
Table 4: Temporary Residence permits issued to Ukrainian citizens, 
according to purpose of stay 
Purpose of stay 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 – until 
30.04.2016
Family 2482 2450 2726 3888 3236
Education 1649 2351 3798 7054 2668
Work 3323 8718 8307 23,925 11,327
Other 2373 931 2277 2997 NA
Total 9827 9595 17,108 37,833 17,231
Source: own elaboration of data by Office for Foreigners, 2016.
As of 1 July 2016, Ukrainian citizens were holding 83,000 residence permits 
(31 per cent of all foreigners in Poland). This number also corresponds to the 
IOM estimations of long-term Ukrainian migrants in Poland at the level of 
90,000 (IOM 2016). Out of this number 22,500 were permanent residence 
permits, 57,500 were temporary residence permits and almost 3000 were 
long-term EU resident permits. In addition, the state issued 143 permits for 
EU citizen family members, 229 humanitarian protection permits, ten permits 
based on tolerated status and 17 based on refugee status (UDSC 2016).
Apart from the changes in sheer volume, there has been a significant change 
in the ratio of men to women, which is often interpreted as evidence that men 
migrate to escape army conscription. If in 2013 women clearly dominated 
over men among holders of temporary residence permits (5760 to 4036), in 
2015 the situation was opposite: 22,817 men and 15,165 women were 
granted temporary residence and in the first half of 2016 – 15,672 men and 
10,603 women. Moreover, the number of permits on the basis of family 
reunion, in particular marriage to a Polish citizen and membership of the 
family of Ukrainian citizen holding a residence permit, has increased 
considerably compared to the pre-2013 period. Around one in three of these 
83 Migration and the Ukraine Crisis
documents are issued to first-time holders while the rest are granted to 
persons continuing their stay in Poland (UDSC data 2016).
The data on age and gender of visa holders is not available, nonetheless the 
survey conducted by the National Bank of Poland (NBP) confirms previously 
mentioned changes in gender mix and also demonstrates that the recent 
migrants tend to be younger. According to the survey results – which should 
not be treated literally, but rather as illustrative of the trends – among the new 
migrants 58 per cent are men, compared to 33 per cent among experienced 
migrants. In addition, the mean age of the new migrants is 33, as compared 
to 43 in the experienced migrants group. Moreover, the share of persons 
originally coming from eastern parts of Ukraine has also considerably 
increased (28 per cent in the studied group of post-conflict migrants, as 
compared to six per cent) (NBP 2016).5 
Ukrainian workers most often work in domestic services, building, 
construction and remodelling and agriculture (NBP 2016). But there is also an 
increasing number of highly-skilled Ukrainian workers in IT and 
communication, science and education, and health care, often graduates of 
Polish universities.
The number of Ukrainians studying in Poland has also notably increased. 
According to the IOM survey, Poland is for Ukrainians a top destination for 
education purposes – 31 per cent of students studying abroad study in the 
country (as compared to ten per cent studying in Russia and eight per cent in 
Spain). Student fees and costs of living in Poland are not prohibitive, besides, 
holders of the Pole’s Card study for free. The number of students enrolled in 
full-time programmes in 2014/2015 (20,693) has doubled in comparison to 
2012/2013 (9620) (Stadnyi 2015). This increase is also reflected in the 
number of visas and residence permits issued on the basis of undertaking 
studies in Poland (an increase from 12,093 visas in 2013 to 20,243 visas in 
2015 and from 2351 residence permits in 2013 to 7054 residence permits in 
2015) (Tables 3 and 4). Students are an important group in the context of 
economic migration, as considerable part of them will seek employment in 
Poland or other EU countries after graduation. The law on foreigners from 
2013 (art. 187(2)) allows graduates of Polish universities to stay in the 
country for one year to look for employment.  
5  Importantly, this data is not fully representative of the whole population and thus 
should not be treated literally. Yet it illustrates some trends characteristic of this group 
of migrants. The survey study was implemented by the Migration Studies Centre 
Foundation using the Respondent Driven Sampling (RDS) on a sample of 710 
respondents employed in the area of Mazovian voivodship in the Warsaw metropolitan 
area and localities specialising in agricultural produce. 
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Significantly, according to the NBP estimates, the presence of Ukrainians on 
the Polish labour market so far has not impacted either the level of 
unemployment or salaries (NBP 2016). In other words, they have neither 
been a burden on the tax payer, nor have negatively impacted the situation of 
Polish employees.
Remittances
The increase in migration flows from Ukraine to Poland translates into 
increase of remittances by long-term migrants as well as the size of salaries 
earned by Ukrainian short-term migrants (and supposedly their remittances 
as well). While in 2013, according to the National Bank of Poland non-
resident Ukrainians earned 3.6 billion PLN (1.2 billion USD), in 2014 it was 
5.4 billion (1.5 billion USD) and in 2015 – 8.4 billion PLN (2.1 billion USD6) 
(NBP 2016). While the total amount in Polish zloty more than doubled in 2015 
in comparison to 2013, the differences in American dollars are slightly less 
considerable due changes in exchange rates. There is no clear data on what 
share of this sum is transferred to Ukraine, as part of it is spent on their 
sustenance in Poland. If we assume that one third of the salary is spent in 
Poland on living expenses, around 5.5 billion PLN (1.4 billion USD) was 
transferred to Ukraine as remittances, savings, and in-kind contributions.
Long-term migrants are less likely to regularly transfer considerable amounts 
back home – only a share of them have transnational families relying on their 
support. The remittances by long-term Ukrainian workers via banks and 
international financial institutions amounted to 55.1 million USD (also an 
increase, as compared to previous years: 39.9 million in 2012, 40.5 million in 
2013, and 39.2 million in 2014) (NBU data 2016). However, this number does 
not include in-kind contributions, savings and remittances through informal 
channels made by long-term migrants. However, the official and estimated 
remittances of Ukrainians in Poland are considerably smaller than the 
numbers quoted publically by the Polish Foreign Minister, who claimed that 
Ukrainians sent to Ukraine about five billion EUR to Ukraine last year.7 
6  According to the exchange rates from 30.12.2013, 30.12.2014 and 30.12.2015, 
respectively.
7  ‘More than a million of Ukrainians who live in Poland annually transfer – only 
through official bank channels – about ten billion PLN, and the same amount in cash 
they transfers when visiting their families in Ukraine. This means that last year, 
according to the NBP, as a result of their work in Poland, Ukrainian citizens transported 
about five million EUR. This is an important support for the Ukrainian economy’ (my 
translation of the quotation from Minister Waszczykowski’s speech at the IX Europe-
Ukraine Forum in Łódź): http://wpolityce.pl/polityka/279295-minister-waszczykowski-
polska-bedzie-wspierac-suwerenne-decyzje-ukrainy
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While remittances on macro-level may not play such a significant role as 
compared to some other countries, they contribute about 50 per cent of long-
term migrants’ and 60 per cent of short-term migrants’ household income. The 
funds are mainly used for basic daily needs (food, clothing), improving the 
living conditions (furniture and household appliances), and expanding or 
building a house. Education or investing in business are also mentioned (IOM 
2016). Some remittance researchers emphasise that remittances contribute 
to economic inequality (Kupets 2012, Malynovska 2014), yet the funds 
received from abroad are spent on domestic products and services, 
contributing to the overall development.8 
The Rise of Ukrainian Civil Society in Poland
One of the significant consequences of the Euromaidan for the Ukrainian 
population in Poland has been an unprecedented civic mobilisation. It has 
contributed to the integration of the migrant population, the settled Ukrainian 
minority as well as the wider Polish society. The Ukrainian civil society existed 
in Poland well before; the Ukrainian minority has had a well-developed 
organisational structure focused on promoting Ukrainian language and culture 
for many decades. There also were a number of NGOs supporting Ukrainian 
migrants, run by both Ukrainians and Poles in Poland, with the largest share 
of them in Warsaw (for a comprehensive review of formal and informal 
Ukrainian civil society initiatives see Łada and Böttger 2016). However – as 
the in-depth interviews with Ukrainian civic activists demonstrate9 –  the 
dramatic events in Ukraine have motivated many Ukrainians with no prior civil 
society participation experience to engage in formal and informal civic 
initiatives, as well as prompted closer cooperation between various existing 
organisations.
8  Other negative side-effects, apart from typical problems of transnational families, 
include both official (bank accounts and loans) and unofficial (household savings) 
dollarisation, which in turn limits the effectiveness of monetary policy, makes the 
banking system more vulnerable to economic crisis and currency depreciation; 
increasing inequalities; and reducing political will to undertake necessary reforms 
(Kupets 2012; Grotte 2012; IOM 2016).
9  I would like to thank the Institute of Public Affairs and the Institut für Europȁische 
Politik for sharing the transcripts of in-depth interviews with representatives of formal 
and informal civil society initiatives of Ukrainian migrants, the Ukrainian minority as well 
as their Polish partners conducted as part of the project „Ukraińcy w Polsce i w 
Niemczech – zaangażowanie społeczno-polityczne, oczekiwania, możliwości, 
działania”, supported by the Polish-German Foundation for Science and PZU 
Foundation.
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During the Euromaidan in Kyiv and after the annexation of Crimea, Ukrainian 
NGOs as well as unaffiliated activists organised protests in front of the 
Russian embassy as well as rallies and public events in support of the pro-
democratic civic opposition in Ukraine. These events gathered rank-and-file 
Ukrainian workers, students, settled Ukrainian academics, civil society 
activists, representatives of the Ukrainian minority in Poland, as well as many 
Poles, including politicians and other well-known public figures. A Civic 
Committee for Solidarity with Ukraine united outstanding Polish public figures, 
including some representatives of the Ukrainian minority in Poland, as well as 
settled Ukrainians. Its activities have also helped to draw the attention of the 
Polish elites and the wider public to the events in Ukraine.     
Apart from more formal fundraising initiatives (organised by various groups) 
there has been a considerable number of smaller, but equally important 
informal initiates. Funds and in-kind donations have been raised in order to 
aid the families of Ukrainian soldiers and refugees from the east of Ukraine as 
well as buy food, clothes, vehicles, equipment and medicine for Ukrainian 
soldiers. It is next to impossible to calculate the precise amount of funds 
collected and transferred to Ukraine, because these initiatives have been 
irregular, often unofficial and sometimes very small. Social media have played 
a very important role in mobilising Ukrainians, integrating different circles as 
well as making the fundraising initiatives effective. Many of those initiatives 
have been run almost solely through social media platforms, in particular 
through Facebook, benefitting from large transnational networks that include 
not only other Ukrainian migrants in Poland, but also Poles, Ukrainians in 
other countries as well as volunteers based in Ukraine, in a way creating a 
virtual civil society (Kittilson and Dalton 2011). Many of these initiatives have 
been promoted through dedicated Facebook groups, such as ‘Ukraiński 
wolontariat w Polsce’. The newly developed social capital will contribute to 
further integration of the Ukrainian population in Poland. 
The period of the Euromaidan and shortly afterwards was also the time when 
representatives of the Ukrainian community – often PhD students and 
graduates of Polish universities – were invited to comment and explain the 
ongoing events in the media. It has become an opportunity to not only provide 
a better understanding of what was happening in Ukraine, but also to reshape 
the image of Ukrainians in Poland, who are not only domestic help and 
builders but also well-educated and knowledgeable experts.
The civic engagement of Ukrainians during and after the Euromaidan has 
helped to draw the attention of the local authorities and to secure three new 
centres for the Ukrainian community: the Ukrainian World (Ukrainsky Svit), 
run by the Open Dialogue Foundation and Euromaidan Warsaw Foundation, 
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the Ukrainian House (Ukrainsky Dim), run by Our Choice (Nash Vybir) 
Foundation and more recently – the Association of Friends of Ukraine Centre. 
These institutions provide legal and psychological help to Ukrainian migrants, 
raise funds and organise public events hosting Ukrainian public figures as 
well as various artistic events and initiatives, including experimental theatre at 
the Centre. 
The unprecedented mobilisation of the Ukrainian migrant community in 
Poland has also boosted their self-esteem and increased their sense of 
agency. Many study participants believe that it has contributed to a more 
positive perception of Ukrainians by the Polish public opinion (Lada and 
Böttger 2016). Opinion poll results demonstrate, however, that the overall 
perception of Ukrainians as a people has not considerably changed in the 
past few years. Nevertheless, there has been a steady improvement from 15 
per cent of Poles having a positive attitude towards Ukrainians in the 1990s to 
31 per cent in 2013 and 36 per cent in 2015 (CBOS 2015).
Conclusion
The military conflict on the Ukrainian territory has considerably increased 
migration flows into Poland as well as made previously seasonal migrants 
take a more long-term stay. The gender and age mix of the Ukrainian migrant 
population has also changed, with a considerably increased share of young 
men. However, it is wrong to assume that Ukrainians arriving in Poland as a 
result of the conflict are refugees living on government handouts. Only a tiny 
minority has claimed asylum and just a few dozen persons have actually 
received a refugee status over the period of the past three years. The vast 
majority of Ukrainians in Poland are economic migrants earning their 
livelihoods, contributing to the Polish economy as well as supporting their 
families via financial and in-kind remittances. The military crisis in Ukraine 
has not produced an influx of asylum seekers, but resulted in an increase of 
economic migration. 
The financial remittances do not play such a significant role for Ukraine on the 
macro-scale, as compared to other countries where they comprise a very 
significant share of the country’s GDP (IOM 2016). Yet, they are a very 
important source of income for individual households. The total volume of 
remittances is hard to establish. According to official data 55.1 million USD 
were transferred through banks and international money transfer institutions 
by Ukrainians who worked in Poland for longer than a year. But the estimated 
income of non-resident Ukrainians in Poland for the last year has amounted 
2.1 billion USD (8.4 billion PLN). If the assumption that the living costs 
comprise about one third of their salaries is correct, Ukrainian non-resident 
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workers may have transferred to Ukraine up to 5.5 billion PLN (1.4 billion 
USD) through informal channels and in-kind contributions.
The Euromaidan and the Russian-Ukrainian war have led to an 
unprecedented mobilisation of the Ukrainian population in Poland and 
contributed to the greater institutionalisation of the civil society as well as the 
development of new Ukrainian centres. Ukrainian migrants’ active 
engagement in various civic initiatives has boosted their self-esteem and 
helped to develop their bridging and bonding social capital. It also has 
contributed to some extent to reshaping the perception of Ukrainians in 
Poland by native Poles. Further research is needed to see how these 
developments affect the integration of Ukrainian migrant population into 
Polish society.
Thus, contrary to the statements of key Polish politicians, the increased 
presence of Ukrainian migrants in Poland has not been a burden on the 
Polish taxpayer. On the contrary, it contributed to the overall economic growth 
as well as public finances (through various official fees and taxes). Not only 
has the presence of a large number of Ukrainians proved politically 
uncontroversial, but it also provided political backup for Poland’s tough stand 
against Russian aggression against Ukraine.
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Moving out of ‘Their’ Places: 
1991–2016 Migration of 
Ukrainians to Australia
OLGA OLEINIKOVA
Introduction
Ukraine, like many other Central and Eastern European nations in the 20th 
Century, went through several sharp turns and endured many tragic twists. 
This chapter will look into two important historical turning points in the context 
of the migration of Ukrainians to Australia. The first is the collapse of the 
Soviet rule in August 1991 and the resulting massive emigration. The second 
is the 2014 Euromaidan protests and the associated intensification of 
migration caused by political unrest, economic downturn and the war in 
eastern Ukraine. These events touched every Ukrainian family deeply and will 
produce ripple effects for decades to come, both for those who migrated and 
those who stayed at home.
Ukrainian immigration to Australia has a long history. The first ethnic 
Ukrainians from western Ukraine are known to have settled in Australia as 
early as 1860. Then the First World War and the Russian Civil War led to the 
first massive political emigration, which strengthened the existing Ukrainian 
communities in Australia by infusing them with people with political, scientific, 
and cultural backgrounds. During the second wave of political emigration from 
1945 through the 1950s, the Ukrainian diaspora in Australia also reasonably 
increased. The 1990s saw a third wave of Ukrainian immigration to Australia. 
Today, more than 35,000 people of Ukrainian origin live in Australia, half of 
whom were born in Ukraine.
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Given the dramatic swelling of the Ukrainian community in Australia in the 
early 1990s and the complete change in Ukrainian migration patterns from 
2004 onwards, understanding the larger context of the recent migration flows 
to Australia is critical. This chapter emphasises the structural variables that 
shape Ukrainian migration, particularly the events in Ukraine and the shifts in 
Australian migration policy in the period between 1991 and 2016. Depending 
on the combination of structural and individual factors, the profile of Ukrainian 
migrants varies across three periods of migration: (1) 1991–2003, (2) 2004–
2013 and (3) 2014–2016. The profile of 1991–2003 arrivals, hereafter called 
‘transition migrants’, is characterised by survival life trajectories and 
dominated by the arrival of blue-collar working class migrants through 
humanitarian and family reunion migration streams. Between 2004 and 2013 
the character of Ukrainian migration changed towards the arrival of skilled 
professionals from the white-collar working class families through the skilled 
migration stream and marriage, and this cohort is addressed as ‘dividend 
migrants’. Since 2014 the profile of Ukrainian migrants in Australia has 
experienced another shift back towards the dominance of survival aims and 
mechanisms, and the arrival through the humanitarian and skilled migration 
stream. These arrivals have been referred to as ‘post-dream migrants’, a 
reference to the situation where dreams for Ukraine’s democratic and 
economically sustainable future are being destroyed by a reality that pushes 
its citizens to migrate.
The post-independence Ukrainian migration to Australia is an understudied 
phenomenon and this chapter seeks to address this gap. The analysis is 
based on the author’s PhD research project that explored Ukrainian migration 
to Australia between 1991 and 2016. It did so by focusing on the bifurcation of 
migrant life strategies before, during and after migration. The study used a 
two-fold methodology. It began with the collection and assessment of 
secondary data on both Australian migration policy and Ukrainian migration 
from 1991 onwards. Later, qualitative fieldwork was conducted in Australia 
(NSW and Wollongong) between October 2012 and May 2013, which 
involved 51 semi-structured interviews with Ukrainians. A further five 
interviews with Ukrainians who arrived in Australia during or after 2014 (the 
Euromaidan protests) were conducted in June 2016. Hence, this chapter 
relies on a total of 56 interviews. Participants were stratified across Ukrainian 
regions. Of the participants, 32 were men and 24 were women. Regarding 
their social origins, 25 of the interviewees were born into white-collar working 
class families and 29 into blue-collar working class ones, while the remaining 
two interviewees originated from the class of cultural and scientific 
intelligentsia. 
The empirical qualitative fieldwork garnered rich data that was then used to 
investigate the differences in migrants’ profiles across the migration process 
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as well as over the three time periods. Post-independence Ukrainian 
migration, our primary focus here, varied depending on a combination of 
structural and individual factors. Let us first sketch out the structural context 
and scrutinise the power of emigration dynamics to shape the profiles of 
‘transition migrants’ (1991–2003), ‘dividend migrants’ (2004–2013) and ‘post-
dream migrants’ (2014–2016) in Australia.
Dynamics of Emigration from Ukraine to Australia: Structural Contexts
The 1991–2003 Migration Context
The analysis of emigration dynamics between 1991 and 2003 are a direct 
reflection of Ukraine’s period of instability and the country’s negative 
economic, political and demographic situation during the first 12 years of 
independence. Ukraine faced a deep economic crisis, price hikes of basic 
consumer goods and transport, the commercialisation of education and the 
elimination of social benefits such as a guaranteed job, free health care and 
state housing. While these factors made migration more difficult, the 
economic problems forced people to look for opportunities to survive, which 
included migration. Hence, the huge difference in living standards between 
the post-Soviet Ukraine and the countries of the West significantly impacted 
the level of Ukrainian migration to the West for permanent residency. 
Between 1991 and 2004, many countries experienced an influx of Ukrainian 
immigrants. According to official statistics, 2,537,400 individuals left Ukraine; 
1,897,500 moved to other post-Soviet countries while 639,900 moved to 
other, mainly Western, states. More geographically distant countries, such as 
Australia, have only recently (in the second half of the 1990s and the 
beginning of the 2000s) become emigration destinations for Ukrainians. 
Based on the interviews, the choice of migrating to Australia was always 
associated with family ties, successful migration stories of friends and/or 
biographical circumstances. 
The first five years of independence saw the most intensive flow of Ukrainians 
to Australia. Later, the flow of immigration decreased slightly, with 11 per cent 
arriving between 2001 and 2006, and 9.6 per cent during 2007–2011 (DIAC 
2013). Between 1991 and 2003 a total of 3519 Ukrainians arrived in Australia 
with permanent residency status (DIAC 2014). Figure 1 summarises the data.
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Figure 1: Ukrainian-born arrivals in Australia
Source: Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2013) Community Information 
Summary: Ukraine-born. Australian Government: Canberra
Since the 1990s, key changes in Australia’s migration policies have shaped 
the character of Ukrainian migration to the country. From 1970 to 1996 the 
government had made it increasingly more difficult for unskilled migrants to 
migrate to Australia outside of humanitarian and family reunion programmes 
(Larsen 2013). It encouraged family migration because it saw family migrants 
as bonding agents for the next migration wave, thereby assisting their cultural 
and economic integration (Larsen 2013). Only after 1996 were the first 
reforms to family migration introduced, resulting in a shift towards skilled 
migration, which was perceived to have earning potential (Boucher 2013; 
Hawthorne 2005; Markus et al. 2009). Therefore, at the beginning of the 
1990s, Australia’s migration policy created a number of barriers for Ukrainian 
migration. Given the policy, the majority of Ukrainians in the 1990s arrived as 
family and humanitarian (refugee) migrants. The UNHCR Statistical Online 
Population Database shows this clearly (see Table 1). 
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Table 1: Ukrainian citizens granted refugee status in Australia and 
asylum applications submitted by Ukrainian citizens 1999–2009
Population 
type
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Refugees 13 20 27 40 44 40 34 30 55 55 52
Asylum 
seekers
88 203 259 125 9 0 4 6 2 0 3
Source: UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database, United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Data extracted: 18 January 2014, www.unhcr.
org/statistics/populationdatabase
As the situation of the mid 2000s changed, so did Australia’s migration policy 
and in turn the migration trajectories of Ukrainians.
The 2004–2013 Migration Context
During this period, many Ukrainian citizens tried to find a legal opportunity to 
leave their country under any pretext—either for work or for permanent 
residence. Against the background of Yushchenko’s myth-making and 
demagoguery about patriotism, more and more ordinary citizens lost any 
hope for a bright future in Ukraine and began looking for a better life abroad. 
The main destinations for Ukrainian labour migrants remained the same. In 
2009 these were, firstly, Russia (48.1 per cent) and then the European Union 
countries (41.2 per cent) (State Statistics Service of Ukraine 2009, 33). 
However, between 2010 and 2013, migration research and statistics revealed 
a shift in the migration choices of Ukrainians towards Asia. Due to its 
geographical distance and the lack of an easy way for Ukrainians to access 
the country, Australia was still not among the most popular destinations. In 
addition, since 2004, there have been changes in the number and character 
of Ukrainian arrivals to Australia. 
The number of Ukrainian arrivals into Australia during 2004–2013 decreased. 
The main feature of Ukrainian migration to the country during this period was 
the change in the quality of migrants since 2004: the skilled migration stream 
with permanent status came to outnumber humanitarian and family migrants. 
Out of the 2470 permanent arrivals between 2004 and 2013, a total of 1312 
migrants came through the skilled stream while only 1005 came through the 
family stream (DIAC 2014)10. Between 1 January 2004 and 1 January 2014, 
10  As per the DIBP Settlement Database (SDB) data (extracted on 30 April 2014), the 
total number of Ukraine-born arrivals granted a permanent visa in Australia between 1 
January 2004 and 1 January 2013 was 2470 people, out of which 1312 were skilled 
migrants, 1005 – family migrants, 6 – humanitarian migrants and 147 unknown.
95 Migration and the Ukraine Crisis
only six Ukrainian migrants were granted a permanent visa through the 
humanitarian migration stream (DIAC 2014).
Figure 2: Ukrainian permanent arrivals by migration stream
(from 1 January 1991 to 1 January 2014)
Source: DIAC Settlement Reporting Facility
This shift towards skilled arrivals from Ukraine was triggered by the change in 
the government’s migration policy. In 2008 the Rudd Labor Government 
announced plans to increase the numbers of skilled migrants to Australia by 
30 per cent compared to the previous year and this trend continues (Boucher 
2013; Markus et al. 2009). The growing demand for highly skilled migrants 
attracted IT professionals and engineers from Ukraine. Hence, Australia’s 
migration policies have evolved from focusing on attracting migrants for the 
purposes of increasing Australia’s population to attracting migrants as 
temporary and permanent (skilled) workers in order to meet the needs of the 
economy.
The 2014 – 2016 Migration Context
Since the outbreak of mass protests against the Yanukovych regime in 
November 2013, Ukraine has been wracked by political and social unrest and 
violent conflict, especially with the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and 
the outbreak of war in eastern Ukraine. In the years leading to the 
Euromaidan protests, political instability and pervasive corruption inspired not 
only a movement for democratisation and greater ties with the European 
96Moving out of ‘Their’ Places: 1991–2016 Migration of Ukrainians to Australia
Union, but also the ambition to migrate among a significant portion of the 
population. The post-Euromaidan events have affected all Ukrainian migration 
flows, which can be broken down into three main categories: forced internal 
migration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) by the war in the Donetsk 
and Luhansk regions; international migration of asylum seekers driven by 
political motives, as well as the desire to avoid military conscription; and 
continuous emigration of skilled and professional Ukrainians, along with 
educational migration driven by a mix of political and economic motives.
During 2014 and 2015 there was a significant increase in the number of 
applications for refugee status submitted by Ukrainians to the EU countries, 
the US, Canada and Australia. In 2014, Ukrainians submitted 14,000 
applications for refugee status, compared to 1120 in 2013. Given the increase 
in the number of applications for asylum from Ukrainian citizens in Australia 
between 2014 and 2015 (DIAC 2015), the country has become more 
restrictive in granting temporary tourist, study and business visas. 
Participants from this study who arrived in Australia in 2014 and 2016, 
mentioned that they know from their own experience and heard from their 
friends and relatives about instances where temporary visas for Ukrainians 
were refused. However, there are no open statistics to confirm the increase in 
the number of refusals from the DIAC. 
Among the interviewed males, one of the main reasons for seeking asylum 
abroad was to avoid army conscription. As the conflict in the east escalated, 
the Ukrainian government reinstated a general draft with the power to 
conscript men between the ages of 20 and 27. As a result, many young men 
used diverse channels of migration to avoid conscription. This included 
employment, study, training programmes, internships and other available 
opportunities. It was in these different structural contexts and circumstances 
that Ukrainians made their decisions and plans to move to Australia. And 
these contexts have shaped the different migration profiles of Ukrainian 
migrants in Australia.
Who Are They: Three Profiles of post-Independence Ukrainian Migrants 
to Australia
As stated above, the main finding of the 56 interviews of Ukrainians in 
Australia is that there are three waves of post-independence Ukrainian 
migration to Australia that correspond to three migration profiles: ‘transition 
migrants’, ‘dividend migrants’ and ‘post-dream migrants’. These profiles vary 
depending on a combination of structural and individual factors (values, aims, 
needs, sense of agency and decision-making). 
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Transition Migrants
Analysis of the emotional, occupational, and class characteristics of the 
‘transition migrants’ who arrived in Australia between 1991 and 2003, along 
with their professional, identity and emotional shifts after migration suggests 
that they created a set of personal and social characteristics which reflected a 
survival life trajectory. Drawing on the interview data, their survival-oriented, 
risk-minimising trajectory is mainly characterised by: (1) the aim to escape 
poverty and starvation and regain job status; (2) material values, values of 
traditionalism, family well-being, comfort and conformity; (3) the need for 
security (order and stability, living in a safe environment, avoiding threats), 
environmental needs (a healthy environment) and social needs (integrity of 
social and individual values); and (4) weak agency and behavioral passivity 
(meaning operation within the most accessible and safe opportunities, and 
not actively transforming their lives by extending their opportunities). These 
characteristics were found to be shaped in Ukraine before departure, and 
they are what defines and reinforces the survival life trajectory of ‘transition 
migrants’ in the post-migration stages. 
The analysis of the motivations and aims for migration typical for ‘transition 
migrants’ shows that their choices are dominated by migration push factors. 
In the interviews, ‘transition migrants’ spoke about economic crisis and 
political turbulence as a push factor for their migration, and framed their 
emigration to Australia as being ‘more forced than voluntary’. The main 
migration push factors found in their life stories were: (1) unemployment; (2) 
lack of occupational work; (3) low wages and arrears; and (4) the suppression 
of entrepreneurial activity. 
The ‘transition migrants’ cohort mostly used the family reunion and 
humanitarian migration streams to assist their entry into Australia. The blue-
collar workers and suppressed entrepreneurs formed a particular group of 
humanitarian ‘transition migrants’ comprised of regular and irregular short-
term arrivals who tended to obtain their permanent residency in Australia by 
claiming asylum. This cohort was identified as using ‘conspiracy’ and 
‘maneuvering’ tactics to enable their entry into the country and attempts to 
gain permanent residency. Their effective tactics were found to grow out of 
explicit social networks. Such networks were crucial for this group as they 
assisted them in managing the different types of precarity associated with the 
lack of life and work predictability and security, which affected their financial 
or psychological welfare. 
The family reunion migration stream for ‘transition migrants’ was the second 
most popular way of entering Australia. Here, the economic rationale, in the 
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form of a plan to escape poverty and unemployment in Ukraine, was the main 
driving force behind the participants’ choice of family reunion. A connection to 
family and dependency on the resources that the family provided was found 
in many cases to encourage dependency on the Australian welfare system in 
the post-migration stage. It also tended to create a type of comfort zone that 
favoured the continuation of survival life patterns after migration. 
Talking about migration as ‘an ongoing emotional journey’ (Ryan 2008, 301), 
the majority of ‘transition migrant’ interviewees emphasised the role of 
psychological discomfort and the depression that was induced by the social 
and economic conditions arising from post-Soviet unrest before migration that 
threaded through their post-migration life. The majority of ‘transition migrants’ 
showed disappointment, guilt, nostalgic depression and homesickness 
caused by their separation from home and those they left behind. Most of the 
stories expressed partial satisfaction with migration and demonstrated 
precarity, emotional insecurity and opportunism. These emotions were a 
deterrent to the success of their integration into and adaptation to Australia.
Influenced by occupational insecurity and ‘structural disempowerment’ 
(Mrozowicki 2011), a typical work experience for the ‘transition migrants’ was 
an occupational downgrade alongside an economic upgrade. Using 
Mrozowicki’s (2011) terminology of ‘dead-end careers’, the occupational 
experiences of the majority of ‘transition migrants’ proved to be shaped by 
employment in non-professional jobs (dead-end careers) which were 
associated with the absence of occupational mobility in the new, changed 
environment. Thus, the survival life trajectory of the ‘transition migrants’ was 
reflected in their experience of a sharp downgrade of professional and social 
status after migration. 
This cohort demonstrated a low level of English proficiency and a strong 
national identification with Ukraine, which created barriers for successful 
social adaptation and integration into Australian society. As the most powerful 
and important motivation to work, material orientation facilitated their quick 
economic adaptation to life in Australia. ‘Transition migrants’ tended to start 
their employment in the first available job, typically a manual job in 
construction, painting, or teaching Ukrainian at the Ukrainian language 
schools. Material values were also found to guide their behaviors and 
consumption practices. 
Being born into blue-collar working class families and in majority having a 
secondary education, the ‘transition migrants’ do not attach much importance 
to professional growth and self-development. However, all of them mentioned 
that back in Ukraine they would never have believed that they would have 
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had to wake up at 4 am in the morning and work as hard as they did in the 
construction industry, with only short breaks for holidays. Furthermore, the 
future plans of ‘transition migrants’ tend to be retrospectively oriented towards 
their past life in Ukraine. They continued to invest money in Ukraine and 
some of them cherished plans to return to the country for their retirement. 
Dividend Migrants
On the contrary, the ‘dividend migrants’ who arrived in Australia between 
2004 and 2013 approach their migration as a kind of investment. Their 
narratives show that their choice of Australia as a destination was informed 
and driven by calculated advantages–socio-economic dividends from 
migration – i.e. social, ethical, cultural, aesthetic, educational and civic 
capital.
Unlike ‘transition migrants’, ‘dividend migrants’ are motivated by Australian 
pull factors. Economic push factors are not the primary ones for these 
migrants—they all come from the class of professionals or scientific and 
cultural intelligentsia, and said they felt economically secure back in Ukraine 
and only went abroad seeking, to use one interviewee’s words, an upgrade in 
life. Here, an ‘upgrade’ means professional growth and self-realisation, better 
money and an improvement in the quality of life, with interesting work with 
social mobility. The life trajectory of this cohort is defined as achievement life 
strategy. 
Based on the interviews, the achievement life trajectory of ‘dividend migrants’ 
is characterised by the following: (1) long-term aims for professional success 
and self-realisation oriented at opening new opportunities (extensive goals) 
and the extended recreation of social and economic status; (2) socially-
oriented needs for professional and cultural success and individually-oriented 
needs for creative self-expression and professional self-realisation; (3) 
instrumental values, aimed at achieving the goals accompanied by a set of 
non-material values, such as the prospects and opportunities for self-
realisation and a favorable environment for developing their own initiative, 
freedom and independence. 
Compared to the ‘transition migrants’, financial welfare comes second and is 
a minor value. ‘Dividend migrants’ demonstrate strong agency that is 
expressed through their active life position and the internal capacity to take 
responsibility for themselves instead of relying on external circumstances. 
Youth (the average age of the cohort was 30) also played a role in their active 
life position and determined their focus on high performance and the ability to 
live and work in conditions of uncertainty and risk. ‘Dividend migrants’ value 
100Moving out of ‘Their’ Places: 1991–2016 Migration of Ukrainians to Australia
originality, as well as access to a variety of choices of cultural styles and ways 
to implement them. The cohort is dominated by the young IT-skilled migrants 
from Ukraine who chose to be globally engaged through migration and used 
this strategy to achieve better pay, professional development and future 
alternative employment opportunities.
‘Dividend migrants’ arrived in Australia through the skilled and family 
migration streams. Both streams reflect how this cohort was affected by the 
lack of opportunities for development and professional self-realisation in 
Ukraine. Skilled migration during the 2003–2014 period was found to be 
mostly male and structured by IT market growth in Australia and Ukraine, as 
well as the international exposure of Ukrainian professionals, linked to global 
orders, services and corporations, to parts of the IT industry outside their 
country. Marriage migration in the cohort of the ‘dividend migrants’ is 
characterised by the involvement of highly educated (Master degree and 
PhD), middle-aged (in their 30s–40s) women in highly skilled professions 
such as law, banking and research. Despite the elite character of the 
participants’ marriage migration, this cohort expressed their suffering from 
being stereotyped as ‘mail-order brides’.
All the interviewed ‘dividend migrants’ have successfully adapted and 
integrated into Australian society both socially and professionally. They have 
an Australian and/or cosmopolitan identity, high levels of English and 
complete satisfaction with migration, with future plans to succeed in terms of 
professional self-realisation, career growth and personal development. Given 
their capacity to successfully maintain their social status after migration, they 
are the group of migrants who are positively contributing to Australian society 
in terms of social cohesion, innovation and economic production.
Post-Dream Migrants
For ‘post-dream migrants’, the most recent cohort to arrive in Australia 
between 2014 and 2016, survival life trajectories dominate. The values, 
needs and aims that were found in the five stories of the ‘post-dream 
migrants’ were very much similar to those of ‘transition migrants’, where 
material values dominated and family welfare and security, financial freedom 
and independence came first. The popularity of security needs, along with the 
needs for self-realisation and self-expression, are explained by the fact that 
before migration, the interviewees supported the 2014 Euromaidan protests 
and were investing emotionally and financially in Ukraine’s democratic future. 
Significantly, this cohort is dominated by people under the age of 29 from the 
white-collar social class. Due to the absence of the promised reforms and 
changes in Ukraine, they experienced disappointment and the loss of hope 
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for future changes. Ultimately the reality of their faded dreams pushed them 
to migrate. Such a reactionary behavioral response, spontaneous choice of 
migration and short-term aims drive the lives of the interviewed ‘post-dream 
migrants’. 
All participants in this cohort mentioned that their decision to migrate was 
reactionary and quick, rather than strategic. ‘Conspiracy’ and ‘maneuvering’ 
tactics to turn their Australian temporary visas (study and business) into 
permanent ones was the case for the majority of the interviewed ‘post-dream 
migrants’. Their emotional sphere is threaded with precarity, emotional 
insecurity, opportunism and concerns about the future of Ukraine, as well as 
their future in Australia. Despite the negative attitudes and emotions 
associated with the events in Ukraine, all the ‘post-dream migrants’ express 
satisfaction with their choice to migrate. They enjoy their new life in Australia 
and do not plan to return to Ukraine. 
‘Post-dream migrants’ have cosmopolitan identities as well as a rediscovered 
Ukrainian identification. Social networks played the most important role in 
their integration. In Australia they often found new acquaintances and first 
jobs through relatives or friends. ‘Post-dream migrants’ tend to settle with or 
near Ukrainian friends and Ukrainian neighborhoods in Sydney. Their 
involvement in primary groups is also high, as with the ‘transition migrants’. 
The effect that all the interviewees experienced is a rather slower integration 
into Australian society compared with the fast and successful integration of 
the ‘dividend migrants’. Moderate and high levels of English language 
proficiency dominate and play an important role in the first years of the ‘post-
dream migrants’’ lives in Australia. 
Conclusion
The post-independence Ukrainian community in Australia is a mixed group. 
Based on 56 interviews, three profiles of Ukrainian migrants were identified 
and described as ‘transition migrants’, ‘dividend migrants’ and ‘post-dream 
migrants’. These three profiles vary depending on the combination of 
individual values, aims, needs, agencies and the structural factors at the time 
of the migrant’s departure from Ukraine. 
A key point is the discovery that Ukrainian migration to Australia has changed 
since 2004, when the representatives of the professional class and the class 
of the cultural and scientific intelligentsia began using the skilled and 
marriage migration stream. At that point, Ukrainian immigrants in this group 
outnumbered the blue-collar working class and entrepreneurs of the earlier 
period who arrived through the humanitarian and family reunion programmes. 
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In 2004, for the first time in the history of Ukrainian migration to Australia, the 
number of skilled arrivals outnumbered those who arrived using the family 
reunion and humanitarian streams. The 2014 post-Euromaidan events also 
impacted on the life trajectories of Ukrainians, whose motives for migration 
into Australia underwent another shift, this time towards survival: economic, 
political and physical. As a result, the number of asylum seeker applications 
from Ukrainians increased in 2014 in comparison with the last ten years. 
Hence, the changed structural context of Ukraine in 2014–2016 has again 
reshaped the profile of Ukrainian migrants and their migration pathways in the 
last two years. 
Given the small scope of the study and the number of respondents, the 
findings presented here should not be regarded as exhaustive. Migration 
situations are mobile and dynamic, and further research is needed on post-
independence Ukrainian migrants, their profiles and adaptation to the 
structure of contemporary Australian society. 
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Migration of Ukrainians to 
Russia in 2014–2015. 
Discourses and Perceptions of 
the Local Population
VLADIMIR MUKOMEL
Introduction
Migration flows between Ukraine and Russia have always been high, but they 
increased particularly in the 2000s when Russia became one of the main 
directions for labour migrants from Ukraine. As of 2 February 2014, shortly 
before the Ukraine crisis began, there were 1.6 million Ukrainian citizens 
living in Russia. Labour migrants, chiefly circular, comprised two thirds of this 
number. Since Ukrainian labour migrants do not belong to ‘visible minorities’ 
that are targets of xenophobia, they did not attract a particular attention from 
Russians. If the issue of labour migration from Ukraine began to be discussed 
among Russian society, it happened solely due to the influx of migrants from 
the east of Ukraine.
The large influx of individuals seeking asylum in Russia began in July 2014 
when the most intensive hostilities evolved. By the end of 2014 (data from 5 
December 2014) the number of Ukrainian citizens who stayed in the territory 
of Russia increased by more than 0.9 million and went up to 2.5 million 
persons.1 Deterioration of living conditions in the territory of the so-called 
Novorossiya and bitter fighting which flared up in the region of Debal’tsevo 
1  Hereinafter references are made to data of the Central Database of Foreign 
Citizens and Stateless Persons’ Registration of the Federal Migration Service of Russia 
(FMS).
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and Mariupol in January–February 2015, further increased the number of 
people who fled from the war. By March 2015 the number of Ukrainian 
citizens in Russia increased to 2.6 million and afterwards stabilised at that 
level.
The necessary help was provided to the people who left Ukraine2 and the 
migrants were offered preferential treatment. The local populations perceived 
the support ambiguously, particularly in the near-border regions where many 
natives from Ukraine had relatives and friends. How were the problems of 
people who left Ukraine covered by mass media and articulated by the 
authorities? What discourses dominated? And how did the recipient 
population react to the influx of people seeking asylum? This chapter seeks to 
address these questions.
Methodology 
The study is based on the following data: 1) Automated real-time media 
monitoring and analysis called Medialogia information and analytical system; 
2) Sociological studies carried out by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences in summer and autumn of 2015. These included 40 
focus groups and 25 in-depth interviews, conducted in five regions of Russia, 
with the local and migrant youth aged between 20 and 29 years, belonging to 
the higher strata of the middle class and the lower class3; 3) Data collected in 
the course of the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, RLMS-HSE. The 
twenty-fourth wave of RLMS-HSE was conducted between October 2015 and 
February 2016 and included 18,400 respondents4; 4) Department statistics of 
the FMS (the Central Database of Foreign Citizens’ and Stateless Persons’ 
Registration).
Dominant Discourses in Russia
The issue of refugees has been considered by the producers of the discourse 
2  The Government of the Russian Federation allocated 4.94 billion RUB (about 140 
million USD) as early as July 2014.
3  Studies were carried out within the framework of a project supported by the Russian 
Scientific Fund, grant #15-18-00138.
4  Russia Longitudinal Monitoring survey, RLMS-HSE conducted by the National 
Research University Higher School of Economics and Demoscope closed joint-stock 
company together with Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill and the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The 
RLMS-HSE is a series of nationally representative surveys designed to monitor the 
effects of health and economic welfare reforms on households and individuals in the 
Russian Federation.
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(first of all the mass media and political figures) in the context of the 
assessment of Russia’s actions in Crimea and south-east Ukraine. The 
cleavage within Russian society ran along the pro et contra line.
In the news and information programmes controlled by the state, compassion 
toward people who left Ukraine was accompanied by references to ‘Kyiv 
junta’, ‘Fascists’ and ‘Bandera’s followers’ who were accused of waging ‘war 
against their own people’. Federal TV channels every day transmitted talk-
shows on Ukraine where the above terms were used. Few liberal mass media 
attempted to present an alternative version of the events.
Personalities of mass culture who have had an enormous influence on the 
formation of public opinion were also divided on the matter.5 When the 
popular singer Andrei Makarevich sang to the children of Ukrainian refugees 
in Ukraine, cultural figures6 as well as the authorities turned against him and 
imposed a secret ban on his music performances and those of other singers 
who opposed the war. Some State Duma members suggested depriving 
Makarevich of all his titles and state rewards. Later, a suggestion to deprive 
Makarevich of Russian citizenship followed (Vesti.ru 2014; Izvestia 2015).
The discourse of authorities that backed the mass media propaganda 
campaign had two main components: the articulation of messages conveyed 
by propagandists (‘citizens of Ukraine… are fleeing from the enemy which 
turned out to be the army of their own country’ – as Sergey Naryshkin, the 
speaker of the Russian parliament stated, TASS 2014) and the demonstration 
of their actions’ success (‘It was done quietly, with no political outcry, buzz, 
and scandals. The people [refugees] are accommodated, the people work, 
their children take classes’, RIA Novosti 2015).
The civil society was also split. On the one hand, the pro-government Public 
Chamber reproduced propaganda messages of success7, but on the other 
5  One pole is represented by Aleksey Kortnev (‘inflamed with the fraternal love the 
people applauds the fraternal war’) and the other by the song ‘Our Cossacks go, go 
through Slavyansk’ which was changed into ‘And our Cossacks will reach Kharkov… 
and Kiev’ (the song was propagandised as the ‘Hymn of the Russian spring’).
6  A quotation from a song by Andrey Makarevich (‘My former brothers have 
obediently become helminths’).
7  Speaking of people coming from south-east Ukraine Vladimir Slepak, the member 
of the Russian Federation Public Chamber, said: ‘The genuine gist of events will be 
understood in all countries of the world and people will rally against mendacious 
Ukrainian politicians who wage war against their own people. The world public will 
finally discern outright fascists in Ukrainian nationalists’ [Public Chamber 2014а]. See 
also [Public Chamber 2015].
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hand the Council for Human Rights under the President of Russia focused on 
the socio-economic problems of Ukrainian refugees. It drafted a well-
researched report, many recommendations of which were implemented (The 
Consolidated Report 2014).
For all parties involved in the dispute the issue of refugees was just a pretext 
to influence the public. The struggle for the man in the street began in the 
summer of 2014 when the influx of people from Eastern Ukraine sharply rose. 
Of 70,000 publications in mass media and the Internet between June 2014 
and June 2016 related to people who fled Ukraine, 64 per cent were written 
between June and September 2014 and 22 per cent between October 2014 
and May 2015. Subsequently, the attention of the media in relation to 
refugees fell drastically; according to Medialogia only 9 per cent of 
publications on the issue appeared in the period from June to November 2015 
and mere 5 per cent of publications in the period between December 2015 
and June 2016.
The interest in the problems of refugees rose in times of active hostilities 
when the attention of the media was drawn to Ukraine, and fell after the 
conclusion of the Minsk and Minsk-2 agreements. The change in policy with 
respect to Ukrainian migrants at the end of 2015 played an important role in 
the decline of the media’s interest in refugees. Namely, special privileges 
were abandoned and the requirements to legalise a refugee’s stay in the 
territory of Russia were made more stringent. As a result, the continuation of 
a propaganda campaign was no longer needed. 
The issue of migrants from Ukraine split internet communities too. About 460 
thematic groups related to helping Ukrainians who had fled to Russia were 
formed on social networks. These groups organised fundraising and in-kind 
support for the displaced individuals as well as advertised job and 
accommodation offers. The expression ‘help for refugees’8 stood at the level 
of 105,000–115,000 of requests made in retrieval systems throughout 
summer months of 2014 (Public Chamber 2014b, 10). At the same time, from 
the summer of 2014 onwards groups that were actively opposed to people 
who came from Ukraine formed online via patriotic websites (for instance 
http://politicus.ru, http://pravda.ru etc.). Headlines of articles published on 
those websites provide a good summary of their content and include the 
following: ‘Unfortunately, many refugees from Donetsk region proved to be 
cads, swindlers, and bottom-feeders’ (politicus.ru 2014a) and ‘The Ukrainian 
refugees: brothers or freeloaders?’ (Pravda.ru 2014). Specialised blogs under 
symptomatic names ‘We are against #Ukrainian refugees in Russia!!!’, using 
8  In the Russian discourse, all those who came from the south-east of Ukraine were 
treated as refugees regardless of their status.
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foul language, were created. 
The issue of people who fled from Ukraine attracted attention of scientific 
circles as early as 2014. The first publications were written predominantly by 
specialists from the Russian regions closest to Ukraine: Belgorod, Rostov and 
Volgograd. Later, the circle of authors had expanded up to Primorski region. 
The influx of refugees is considered in these publications in the context of 
challenges to security and social stability (Popova, Timofeeva 2015, Boiko 
2015), communications (Borisova 2014, Olenitskaya 2015, Golub’, Timofeeva 
2015) regional finances (Vergun 2014) and socio-psychological and economic 
aspects of adaptation (Golub’, Bezrukova et al. 2015, Yakimov et.al 2015).
Perception of Forced Migrants from Ukraine by the Receiving Population
The first wave of people who left the east of Ukraine settled in regions located 
close to the border: Rostov, Belgorod, Voronezh and Crimea. According to 
Konstantin Romodanovsky, the Director of the Federal Migration Service of 
Russia, over 80 per cent of the 515,000 inhabitants of east Ukraine who 
arrived to Russia between 1 April 2014 and 21 July 2014, stayed in the near-
border territories (RF Government 2014). Striving to avoid gathering of 
migrants from east Ukraine in these regions, the authorities organised 
migrants’ movement to other areas, up to the Far East, the Kaliningrad 
exclave, the Volga basin and to the Urals. At the same time, a ban on 
accommodating refugees in the near-border regions, Moscow, Saint 
Petersburg and some other areas was imposed. 
The first migrants from Ukraine were received with a genuine enthusiasm on 
the part of Russian citizens, which was fed by vigorous propaganda spread 
by state media. With Ukrainian refugees arriving to other regions of Russia, 
the enthusiasm of Russian citizens has decreased. In 2014 the share of 
Russians who spoke in favour of providing the migrants from Ukraine with all 
necessities and propitious living conditions decreased considerably, from 50 
per cent in July to 40 per cent in September. The share of respondents who 
thought that it was necessary to send refugees back to Ukraine as soon as 
conditions were favourable increased from 39 per cent in July to 45 per cent 
in September (VCIOM 2014). 
The influx of refugees has affected the everyday life of the recipient 
population, particularly in the regions of Russia near the borders: ‘The 
Ukrainians have settled in all our yards’ (Belgorod). The attitude of the part of 
migrants who think that the recipient population is bound to help them 
provoked rejection: ‘The Ukrainians think that because their country is 
ravaged by war it is precisely we who ought to help them’ (Belgorod); and ‘As 
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if somebody owes them’ (Kaluga).
Migrants have been accused of taking the jobs of local people and 
contributing to the decrease of local salaries: ‘Our people who are looking for 
jobs cannot find employment because refugees are the first ones who are 
hired’ (Rostov). The authorities’ demand to provide the refugees with 
employment caused discontent: ‘I work at a state institution… and we were 
obliged to allocate between ten and 15 per cent of jobs to Ukrainians’ 
(Rostov); ‘When it was ordered to allocate jobs for refugees from Ukraine our 
people were just fired. The administration simply found some pretext and fired 
people’ (Belgorod).
Many local inhabitants were irritated by claims put forward by some migrants 
and by their willingness to live at other people’s or the state’s expense: ‘We 
are refugees and you have to provide housing, prosperity, jobs for us; you 
have to do everything for us. It is certainly a problem’ (Crimea).
The lack of gratitude on the part of refugees was also widely emphasised by 
respondents: ‘My boss helps orphan homes, brings clothes there… And they 
[refugees] scrutinise these clothes and say: what did you bring to us? We will 
not wear these clothes. At first we feel pity for refugees and then…we felt no 
pity’ (Kaluga).
Some refugees aroused bewilderment and doubts in their genuineness 
among local inhabitants: ‘A taxi driver from Donetsk said: well, I have come 
here and I want to get an apartment at the southern coast of Crimea’ 
(Crimea).
Local people accused refugees of contributing to the overcrowding of pre-
school institutions and universities: ‘The refugees get places in children care 
centres while local people do not get places for their children’ (Belgorod); 
‘People grumble not so much against migrants taking their jobs as against 
them taking places in schools and higher education institutions’ (Rostov); ‘The 
fact that refugees get places in schools and higher education institutions 
provokes greater talks’ (Rostov). The last claim is true, as the government 
has created preferential conditions for migrants from Ukraine. Moreover, local 
people have complained about refugees begging: ‘Refugees go door to door 
and say: “I am a refugee, give me alms please”’ (Belgorod).
An opinion that more is being done for refugees than for the local people has 
become widespread: ‘People got angry not so much with refugees as with our 
state because refugees got subsidies and everything as if we, local 
inhabitants, were not humans’ (Kaluga). Surveys carried out in the Volgograd 
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region demonstrate that irrespective of amiable or negative attitude to 
refugees, respondents were convinced that the state behaved better towards 
refugees than its own citizens. 75 per cent of respondents shared this opinion 
(Golub’, Timofeeva 2015, 67).
The state-imposed methods of supporting refugees have been clumsy. The 
supposedly voluntary, but in fact compulsory, nature of this help has caused 
particular concern among the recipient population. Employees of state-funded 
organisations came across dubious practices: ‘… a daily earning was taken 
from every employee as a help to refugees’ (Belgorod). Such practices 
(taking away from one group in order to give to another) are unthinkable in 
other countries, and naturally raised concerns among those affected in the 
Russian Federation ‘… it has to be done not in a compulsory way but on a 
voluntary basis’ (Kaluga).
Rumours that a daily allowance of 800 RUB (at that time the sum was the 
equivalent of about 23 USD) was allocated to every refugee caused a 
particular frustration. Comments from the internet are illustrative: ‘A friend of 
mine works at a plant. Now they have to work two days a week for free in 
order to pay 800 roubles daily allowance to refugees’ (We are against it… 
2014). However, it was a misapprehension, as the money was allocated to 
the maintenance of migrants in temporary accommodation facilities, their 
food, transport and running of facilities.
Migrants were accused of unwillingness to work and of having excessive and 
unreasonable demands from the host community: ‘The refugees say “But 
Vladimir Putin promised us?” They think that we owe them something’ 
(Belgorod); ‘Moms with children must come and not fathers in rough and 
tough cars. Let men protect their motherland. And they fear doing that’ 
(Belgorod).
Accusations that the massive influx of refugees has led to the increase in 
criminal activity have been widespread; ‘They plundered the local church… 
These people have nothing sacred’; ‘They do nothing. They steal hens and 
pigs from their neighbours’ (Rostov). ‘Yes, Ukrainians pillaged. That really 
occurred’; ‘It was the first wave of refugees. People say it was the most 
dreadful wave’; ‘… people who were stealing in Ukraine, now came to us’ 
(Belgorod). Increased criminal activity is not an unusual outcome when a 
society is unable to fully integrate refugees. In some instances, it is a media 
effect: local media outlets may single out refugee activities while omitting 
similar reporting with regard to the general population. Even though the 
accusations are unlikely to be pure fiction, it is still a far cry from objective 
reporting. 
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On their part, migrants have complained about the difficulties finding jobs and 
housing. They have displayed four main reactions to the anti-migrant 
resentment. The first one was that of acknowledgment that some of the 
complaints of the local population have been substantiated: ‘It is simply 
unpleasant to hear that because local people do not know what we had 
experienced… Yet the greater part of the population is loyal to us and 
understands us…’ (Belgorod). The second reaction is that of ‘deafness’, 
reflecting resignation: ‘Trivial matters not worthy of acute conflicts, it is silly’; 
‘Well, they have said and made their point, it is no big deal’ (Belgorod). The 
third position is a position of agreement that there are serious problems with 
the behaviour of some fellow-countrymen: ‘We ourselves are the source of 
problems’ (Ukrainians from Belgorod). 
The fourth position is very similar to the position of local residents’ majority. It 
is characteristic for those Ukrainians who have settled down in Russia and 
received Russian citizenship. The proponents of the fourth position blame the 
newcomers for the deterioration of their living conditions: ‘The most important 
thing is: their coming should not create problems for us’ (Belgorod). At the 
same time, local Ukrainians have been dissatisfied with the need to turn down 
claims of relatives who live in Ukraine: ‘All relatives in Ukraine think that we 
have to support them, that we have to dispatch something to them, remit 
money to them… They think we owe them’ (Ukrainians from Belgorod).
However, when comparing the situation in Russia and in Ukraine, many 
Ukrainian refugees have expressed gratitude to inhabitants of Belgorod: 
‘There is a lot of kind and sympathetic people here. I meet primarily good 
people’; ‘The people are simply good and less prone to conflicts’ (Ukrainians 
from Belgorod).
Conclusion
For many years, Russians were open to Ukrainians and saw them as 
desirable neighbours. However, in recent years the attitudes have 
deteriorated: in the course of a longitudinal poll of 18,400 respondents, 16.2 
per cent expressed negative attitudes towards the idea of having Ukrainian 
neighbours and 25.5 per cent of respondents expressed negative attitude to 
the possibility of having a Ukrainian boss.9 Thus, there is evidence to suggest 
that the recent geopolitical changes have had negative consequences on the 
ability to maintain good relations between the two nationalities. 
The recipient population’s attitude towards Ukrainian migrants and Ukrainians 
9  RLMS-HSE, 24 wave
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in general began to worsen between 2014 and 2015; 14 per cent of 
respondents were ready to restrict Ukrainians’ residence in the territory of 
Russia in August 2015 (versus five per cent in October 2013 and eight per 
cent in July 2014) (Levada-Center 2016). This shift in the public opinion can 
lead to more serious social problems, if the tension between Ukrainian 
refugees and the local population continues. There are some steps that could 
be taken to ameliorate this situation. First, those Ukrainians who intend to go 
back home, should adapt to the Russian realities while awaiting the change of 
circumstances in Ukraine. This means that they need a job, housing, and 
schooling for children within a Russian reality in which people rely 
predominantly on themselves. Second, people who came from south-east 
Ukraine and who do not intend to go back, as they connect their future with 
Russia, must be better integrated into the Russian society to avoid the 
negative social consequences associated with a factionalised society lacking 
in tolerance, empathy, and the ability to co-exist.
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Russian Society and the Conflict 
in Ukraine: Masses, Elites and 
National Identity
VIACHESLAV MOROZOV
This chapter looks at how Russian society reacted to the conflict in and with 
Ukraine. The active phase of the conflict began in March 2014 with the 
annexation of Crimea and continued with Moscow’s support for the separatist 
movements in the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine. The main object of 
interest here is popular views of the conflict and its context, and in particular 
the way these views are conditioned by nationalism and the national identity 
discourse. At the same time, as I show in the first section, it is hardly possible 
to consider ‘public opinion’ as ontologically separate from the public debate 
waged mainly by the elites, as well as from the state’s policies and the way 
they are legitimated. The issue is not just that public opinion is influenced by 
the state propaganda, but that both are part of the same broader discursive 
domain where meaning is constructed and reproduced.
Accordingly, this chapter starts with an analysis of Russian public opinion on 
the conflict and its relationship to the official propaganda. I then go on to 
discuss how the attitudes to Ukraine and the wider assessment of Russian 
foreign policy in recent years are related to the complex ways in which the 
Russian nation is defined and how the concept of the ‘Russian world’ plays 
into the picture. The final section focuses on the broader context of what 
Russians see as Western expansionism and how they justify Russia’s 
conduct in terms of the need to defend the country’s sovereignty and moral 
integrity against Western subversion. It is not my ambition in this chapter to 
present any original analysis of primary sources; rather, I see my task as 
summing up the findings of the existing studies (including my own) and 
highlighting the key issues that have come up in the scholarly debate so far. 
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Russian Public Opinion on Ukraine and the Conflict
Russian society’s response to the conflict in/with Ukraine must be analysed at 
different levels. The most easily accessible type of data are opinion polls. 
These, unsurprisingly, demonstrate that the Russian government enjoys the 
overwhelming support of its population. This phenomenon is most visible 
when it comes to the annexation of Crimea. Around half of the population 
‘definitely’ supports this move, while the total share of positive attitudes has 
consistently remained above 80 per cent (Levada Centre 2016a). Similarly, as 
Denis Volkov (2015) points out, ‘Russians are virtually unanimous (95-96 per 
cent) in denying their own country’s responsibility for anything that’s 
happening in Ukraine: the ongoing conflict, breaches of the Minsk 
Agreements, the shooting down of MH17 etc.’ As highlighted by Lev Gudkov 
(2015b, 35-36), the annexation of Crimea produced a political transition 
among the relatively prosperous urban population, comprising about 20-25 
per cent of the citizenry, who used to distance themselves from the regime 
but now fully support Putin and his foreign policy.
Even though the profound effect of the conflict with Ukraine on Russian public 
opinion is beyond doubt, this fact remains open to vastly different 
interpretations. Thus, Levada Centre scholars tend to explain Russia’s stalled 
transition to democracy in general and the intervention in Ukraine in particular 
by referring to the lingering paternalistic attitudes, imprinted on the political 
culture by the 70 years of the Soviet rule (e.g. Levada 2004; for a critique, 
see Gabovich 2008). This reading implies that, in the final analysis, the role of 
the Kremlin’s anti-Ukrainian propaganda consisted not so much in shaping 
the preferences of the audience as in voicing, legitimising and radicalising the 
views that the pro-Putin majority had held ever since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. It seems that a similar view is embraced by Ted Hopf in his 
study of the interplay between mass common sense and elites’ views in 
Russia. According to Hopf, while the elites strive to bring the country closer to 
the West, ‘common sense is hindering any Russian movement from the semi-
periphery to the core of Western hegemony’ and thus ‘has an effect on the 
distribution of power in the international system’ (2013, 348). From this 
perspective, the conservative turn in Russian politics after 2012 could be 
interpreted as a result of the elites having finally embraced mass common 
sense. As Volkov (2015) puts it, the ‘propaganda machine can only exploit 
sentiments and fears that are already present’, ‘a mistrust for the West …, the 
passive consumption of television content by the majority of the population, 
and a nostalgia for lost superpower status’ experienced by the typical Homo 
Sovieticus.
At the same time, both Hopf and Gudkov, a leading proponent of the Homo 
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Soveticus theory (see Gudkov 2009), are much more careful in their empirical 
analysis of the ‘Crimean syndrome’. Gudkov, for instance, dismisses the 
implication that ‘Russians have a metaphysical inclination toward 
traditionalism as such’ and explains the surge in nationalism by ‘a perceived 
lack of choice – a lack of alternative sources of authority and alternative ideas 
about the desirable and likely medium- and long-term future of the country’ 
(2015b, 38). Similarly, in a later article, Hopf (2016) offers a more complex 
account of the discursive struggles that led up to the Crimean annexation, 
emphasising the role played by Putin and other leaders, as well as the impact 
of the Western expansion, which most Russians viewed as hostile. 
The elites’ agency comes out as an even more prominent factor in Peter 
Pomerantsev’s influential account of the Kremlin’s tactics: in his view, the goal 
is to infuse the public with a poisonous dose of cynicism by constantly 
exposing conspiracies and corruption – real and imagined – behind all 
political actors and institutions, in Russia and elsewhere, with only the 
Kremlin being immune to such disparagement. The resulting worldview is that 
‘nothing is true and everything is possible’ (Pomerantsev 2015). Nuanced 
studies of public opinion consistently emphasise the complexity of this 
phenomenon: even though the anti-Western, anti-Ukrainian and xenophobic 
views clearly dominate, they go along with the reluctance to support direct 
military intervention in the neighbouring country and even the view that 
cooperation with the West on certain issues is desirable (Gerber 2015; 
Sherlock 2014; Volkov 2015).
This multifaceted discussion has direct bearing on the central argument of 
this chapter. It demonstrates that it would be wrong to reduce the 
consideration of Russian society’s response to the Euromaidan revolution, the 
annexation of Crimea and the conflict in the Donbas to any individual factor. 
More specifically, while it must certainly be viewed through the prism of such 
concepts as nationalism and imperialism, these phenomena themselves are 
inherently contradictory and conditioned by radically dissimilar historical 
legacies. While imperialism is expansionist and inclusive, ethnic nationalism 
emphasises cultural homogeneity and thus treats even some Russian citizens 
as unwelcome strangers. The lasting impact of Soviet official internationalism 
makes the picture even more complex. Russian mass common sense is a mix 
of all these diverse elements: indeed, the concept of common sense itself, as 
it was introduced by Antonio Gramsci, presupposes a view of this 
phenomenon as necessarily protean, an incongruous combination of archaic 
and modern norms and values (Morton 2007, 62; Liguori 2009, 129). While 
the official ideology might be able, at times, to come up with a more 
consistent national identity narrative, it is also subject both to the demands of 
the political moment and the constraints imposed by the socially embedded 
popular views. As a result, many of the key political statements made by the 
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Russian leaders are deliberately ambiguous and open to multiple 
interpretations. Nowhere is this more evident than in the field of national 
identity politics.
National Identity, Nationalism and Foreign Policy
It is common to point out the incompatibility between the ethnic, imperial and 
civic versions of Russian national identity (Tolz 1998, 2004; Shevel 2011). 
The first two appear to be conducive to some form of intervention in Ukraine, 
while the latter must, in principle, offer an alternative image of Russia and 
Russianness. Civic identity, however, has been in retreat since 2012, while 
the rise of ethnic nationalism was admittedly behind the perception of Russia 
as a divided nation and the image of ‘the Russian world’, used to legitimise 
the annexation of Crimea and the support for the Donbas insurgents (Zevelev 
2014; Feklyunina 2015). Nevertheless, as Marlene Laruelle demonstrates,
the status of this ‘divided nation’ line of argument remains 
instrumental: it is part of the discursive repertoire of Russia’s 
foreign policy, deployed whenever the Kremlin needs to 
penalize a neighbor for its geopolitical or political disloyalty, 
but it does not appear as a driver of routine foreign policy 
decisions. (2015b, 95)
At the same time, ethnic nationalism is difficult to reconcile with the political 
reality of a multi-ethnic nation created on the ruins of empire. The problem is, 
however, that neither of the available alternatives can achieve unconditional 
hegemony (Laruelle 2015c). While nostalgic memories about the Soviet and 
imperial past seem to dominate mass common sense (Kozlov 2016) and are 
a useful resource for the propaganda machine, it is hard to directly translate 
them into a national identity for today’s Russia.
A key, albeit not the only, reason for the limited utility of the imperial legacy is 
that the latter is, in itself, full of contradictions. Thus, the Soviet ‘affirmative 
action empire’ (Martin 2001) promoted the essentialised notion of ethnicity as 
the basis for nationhood, the principle of ethnic ownership of territories 
through the system of national autonomies (Miller 2007), the ideology of 
proletarian internationalism and equality of nations, combined, somewhat 
uneasily and with a varying degree of determination, with the imperial idea of 
ethnic Russians as ‘the first among the equals’. If one adds to that the 
prominence of Orthodox Christianity and the romanticised view of family and 
other ‘traditional values’ usually associated with the pre-1917 Russia, the 
resulting mixture becomes utterly eclectic and untranslatable into a clear-cut 
dividing line between the national ‘self’ and the ‘others’.
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While the broad set of patriotic values promoted by the Kremlin is shared by a 
vast majority of the population, no specific definition of what it means to be a 
patriot enjoys the same universally accepted status. As revealed in a recent 
study by Paul Goode, when confronted with direct and specific questions, 
Russian citizens find it hard to agree on the meaning of patriotism and have 
to deploy various strategies to eliminate apparent contradictions. Importantly, 
for Goode’s respondents, ‘ethnic nationalism – though common in 
discussions of patriotism – rarely figured into evaluations of foreign policy or 
the Kremlin’s policy toward Ukraine’ (Goode 2016). 
Opinion polls demonstrate that the Russian public is split down the middle on 
the question of whether Russians and Ukrainians are one people or two 
separate peoples, with the proportion of those who see Ukrainians as a 
separate nation steadily, but unevenly, increasing from 17 per cent in 2005 to 
43 per cent in May 2016. The approval of the idea that Russia and Ukraine 
must merge into a single state peaked at 28 per cent at the moment of 
Crimean annexation, before dropping below ten per cent by the end of 2014 
and remaining at more or less the same level ever since. On the contrary, a 
growing share of the population (36 per cent in May 2016) supports complete 
separation between the two states, with visas, customs controls and so on. In 
spite of this, those in favour of friendly relations with an independent Ukraine, 
without visas and customs barriers, have always remained a majority (Levada 
Centre 2016a). Generally, the Russian public does not support slogans of 
territorial expansion or intervention in the affairs of neighbouring states 
(Volkov 2015).
In other words, detailed studies looking at the relationship between the 
attitudes of the Russian masses and foreign policy, using both qualitative and 
quantitative methods and looking through the prism of public opinion as well 
as from the disciplinary perspective of international relations, tend to agree 
that Russian society remains divided with regard to any specific foreign policy 
issue. It would be equally wrong, however, to conclude that the masses are 
completely passive and ready to approve of any policy that the Kremlin might 
happen to select at any given moment. Any serious political choice still 
requires careful legitimation that needs to be constructed out of the existing 
eclectic elements of common sense.
Moscow’s bold decision to intervene in Ukraine stands out as an exception 
against the overall background of Putin’s presidency, which, at least prior to 
2014, had been associated with prioritising the status quo and avoiding direct 
confrontation (with an important exception of the 2008 war with Georgia, see 
Astrov 2011). This decision needs to be understood as a reaction to what was 
perceived as an acute crisis of the international system, which in this view 
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had lost its balance and required urgent action to prevent a genuine 
catastrophe. The point of origin of the crisis was easy to identify: predictably, 
it was seen as instigated by the irresponsible and expansionist West. The 
relationship with the West is important not just for Russian foreign policy 
makers, but for the society at large, and it needs to be explored in some 
detail.
Looking in the Western Mirror
What unites all definitions of the Russian nation examined in the previous 
section is that eventually they need the Western mirror to make sense in the 
wider context of the Russian political debate. The predominance of anti-
Western attitudes is registered by all sociological instruments (Herber 2015, 
Volkov 2015, Goode 2015) as well as by discourse-analytical tools (Hopf 
2016). It is also reflected in the recent conservative turn in Russian politics, 
ideology and legislation: such measures as the law banning ‘propaganda of 
homosexuality’, promotion of ‘traditional family values’ and other elements of 
Russia’s ‘spiritual sovereignty’ seem to pay off in the sense of consolidating 
the social base of the regime (Sharafutdinova 2015).
It was the broad anti-Western consensus that made the annexation of Crimea 
and the support for the Donbas separatists possible and in some sense 
inevitable. It was prepared by a wide-ranging transformation of the Russian 
security discourse: while in the early Putin years Russians were inclined to 
see the weakness of their own state as the primary security challenge, by the 
end of the decade the external threats were seen as paramount and the 
domestic issues were redefined accordingly (Snetkov 2015). Even though, as 
Kingsbury shows in her chapter, the relative prominence of various threats 
varied with time and depended on the Kremlin’s short-term priorities, Russian 
leadership never stopped worrying about subversive Western influence. 
Against the backdrop of the urban protest movement of 2011–2012, the 
Euromaidan came to be interpreted as anything but Ukraine’s domestic 
matter: it was seen as instigated by the West and as a repetition of a future 
‘colour revolution’ in Moscow.
This view, shared by the elites and by the pro-Putin masses alike, provided 
both the motivation and the legitimation for the dramatic foreign policy steps 
that followed. The Russian society sees itself as a victim of the West, which is 
aggressively promoting its own norms, institutions and values throughout 
post-Soviet space. The EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative, NATO 
enlargement, US plans to create anti-ballistic missile defence, the 
supranational jurisdiction of the European Court for Human Rights, efforts at 
democracy promotion, support for LGBT rights movement and human rights 
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in general are all seen as manifestations of Western expansionism. To defend 
its sovereignty, culture and independent moral standing, Russia needs to 
protect its sovereignty in all possible ways, but in particular by emphasising 
its unique values, strengthening ‘spiritual bonds’ within society (Putin 2012) 
and beefing up information security – a broad concept that includes control 
over media, social networks and private communications (Chernenko 2013; 
Morozov 2015, 103–134; Oliker 2016). If necessary, it also has to fight back 
to stave off the prospect of Ukraine’s NATO membership and to make sure 
there are no NATO military bases in Crimea.
As a result, positive identification with Europe, which was dominant in Russia 
in the 1990s, was replaced by an equally forceful othering. While in late 
1990s around two thirds of Russians believed their country must strive to 
become an EU member, this share dropped below 25 per cent after Putin’s 
re-election in 2012, and the attitude to the EU underwent an even more 
drastic reversal in March 2014 (Gudkov 2015a; Levada Centre 2016c). In 
other Levada Centre polls, 59 per cent of respondents said they do not 
consider Russia a European country (Akopov 2016), while only 17 per cent 
believe that Russia must develop in the same way as Europe (Levada Centre 
2016b, 46).
It would seem therefore that the Russian public shares the slogan ‘Russia is 
not Europe’, proclaimed by the Ministry of Culture in its April 2014 draft 
(Izvestia 2014). The reasoning behind this U-turn in identification is aptly 
summarised by the prominent nationalist historian Andrei Fursov:
who would want to associate oneself with the zone of today’s 
Europe, where traditional values are destroyed, 
homosexualism is on the rampage, there is a migration crisis 
etc. Europe today is, in essence, a dying zone, where the 
population is unable to defend its cultural and religious identity. 
It is a post-Christian and post-European world, a graveyard of 
European civilisation (quoted in Andreeva 2016).
As a radical intellectual who, in fact, had for a number of years been 
preparing the ground for the change of the official discourse, Fursov is 
probably more dismissive about Europe than most Russians would be. The 
same message, however, has been repeated by the official propaganda, 
which has exploited widely shared fears (xenophobia, homophobia etc.) in a 
situation where the defenders of individual rights and non-traditional lifestyles 
are silenced and sometimes even repressed (Sharafutdinova 2014; Stella and 
Nartova 2016).
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Yet it would be wise not to exaggerate the significance of this reversal. Firstly, 
as already pointed out, Russian society would still prefer to see relations with 
both the West and Ukraine improve (even though it blames the other side for 
that not happening). The ‘material’ aspects of the European way of life, such 
as economic prosperity and rule of law, still remain hugely attractive to the 
majority of the Russian citizens (Volkov 2015; Levada Centre 2016b, 47, 
130).
Secondly, and most importantly, even as the modality of the identification with 
Europe changes, Russian national identity discourse remains Eurocentric. 
While the overall success of the officially declared ‘pivot to Asia’ remains 
subject to a heated debate, identity-wise it has definitely not made Russia an 
Asian country. Likewise, there is no distinct ‘Eurasian’ identity so far, unless 
one would like to use this label to refer to the attempt to liberate the country 
from its normative and economic dependence on Europe – among other 
things, by building a Eurasian Union as an alternative integration project (cf. 
Morozova 2009; Laruelle 2015a; Schenk, this volume). 
The latter example, however, highlights the Eurocentric nature of the attempts 
to establish ‘Eurasia’ as a separate political space, as the Eurasian Union is 
explicitly modelled on the EU both in its design and in the surrounding 
discourse about the usefulness of economic integration (Dragneva and 
Wolczyk 2015). Speaking in more general terms, the only way to insist on the 
uniqueness of Russian ‘traditional values’ and ‘spirituality’ is by contrast with 
what is perceived as Western or European values. Both Europe and the West 
thus remain indispensable as key Others against which Russia’s identity 
continues to be defined (for a detailed analysis, see Morozov 2015, 118–134).
In sum, Russian society – both the elites and the masses – remains focused 
on Europe as the primary Other, which is seen as a geographical space 
where history unfolds and as a model (positive, negative or both) of social 
development and well-being. The Ukrainian conflict is viewed against this 
broad background, as resulting from the irresponsible expansionism of the 
West and as indisputable proof that Russia must remain firm in defending its 
interests and sovereignty. This is perhaps the main reason for the high levels 
of approval of the Crimean annexation and other foreign policy steps taken by 
the Kremlin since 2014: they are seen not as aggressive but as defensive, 
while the true aggressor is the West in its main incarnations as the US, NATO 
and the EU.
Conclusion 
Russian society remains fully behind President Putin’s leadership. In 
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particular, the decision to ‘reunite’ Crimea with Russia continues to enjoy 
overwhelming support, while all ensuing conflicts are blamed on the West. So 
far, this attitude has not been shattered by the economic crisis; confidence in 
the top leadership remains high in spite of omnipresent corruption, significant 
inflation eating away people’s real income and blatant inequality.
As this chapter has argued, this phenomenon cannot be explained by simply 
reducing it to the effect of the official propaganda. The propaganda is 
certainly massive, but it hardly creates any new meanings: rather, it feeds on 
the mass common sense by picking certain elements from the vast and 
incongruous stock of popular beliefs and blowing them up, sometimes 
completely out of proportion.
The way the ordinary Russians comprehend the conflict in and with Ukraine is 
fundamentally conditioned by nationalism, but this nationalism is not 
necessarily xenophobic and aggressive. Kingsbury is right to point out in her 
chapter that the xenophobic attitudes are to a large extent deliberately 
promoted by the Kremlin at certain junctures and tend to subside when such 
campaigns are over. Besides, xenophobes are often racist and thus worry 
much less about Ukrainians than about labour migrants from Central Asia. In 
more general foreign policy terms, Russians would prefer to have good 
neighbourly relations with Ukraine, the EU and the US, but they are not happy 
with how their neighbours treat Russia as a nation, as well as their fellow 
‘compatriots’ in post-Soviet states. While the concept of Russia as a divided 
nation is key to the understanding of Russian national identity and foreign 
policy, it is also extremely vague and open to a number of incompatible 
interpretations. It can be read in ethnic nationalist, imperialist and even civic 
terms, and all of these terms are present in the actual debate and policy 
documents. As a result, Russian nationalism can, in principle, be compatible 
with a rather broad range of actual policies.
Current Russian policy is both motivated and legitimised by the fear of 
Western expansionism. There is a serious and widely shared concern among 
Russians about the subversive effects of Westernisation for the spiritual 
integrity of the Russian nation. At the same time, Russian national identity 
discourse remains Eurocentric: all attempts to create an ‘alternative’ identity 
for Russia imply the need to explain how Russia is different from Europe. 
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Migration to Russia and the 
Current Economic Crisis
MIKHAIL DENISENKO
Introduction 
The economic crisis in Russia, which began in 2014, was caused by a rapid 
fall in oil prices and the imposition of Western sanctions in connection with 
the events in Ukraine. Prior to the crisis, Russia was attracting a large 
number of both permanent and temporary labour migrants. International 
migration has become an important factor in the development of Russian 
labour market and overcoming demographic decline in the country. For the 
members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), from where 
large part of migrants originate, work in Russia was an important source of 
foreign currency, and a factor in poverty reduction. The current economic 
crisis, however, has had a significant impact on both permanent and 
temporary migration into Russia. Consequently, it has also affected the CIS 
countries and the region as a whole.
This chapter analyses the latest available statistical data to address the 
questions of how the volume and structure of migration flows in Russia has 
changed since the beginning of the recession, and how the crisis affected the 
remittances sent to the CIS countries. We shall try to answer these questions 
by looking at the statistics provided by the Federal Migration Service and 
Russia’s Central Bank.  I argue that changes in the migration law of Russia 
introduced in 2014–2015, and the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union in 
2015 have had significant effects. While the economic crisis affects all 
migrants, the other factors influence only a subset of countries under 
consideration. It is advantageous here to be specific in explaining migration 
changes regarding migrants’ origin countries, by examining particular 
components of those changes. Thus, the chapter starts with a description of 
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general trends in labour and permanent migration between Russia and the 
CIS countries in the post-Soviet period.
 The Recent History 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new state 
borders in 1992, travel between the former Soviet republics changed from 
domestic to international. Therefore, Russia became one of the world’s 
largest destinations for migrants overnight.1 In 1994, migration growth in 
Russia reached its historical maximum of almost one million people (Figure 
1). In the 1990s a significant portion of the movement into Russia involved the 
repatriation of persons who had once left this country, as well as their 
descendants. Additional strong factors pushing population from the former 
Soviet republics to Russia were the political events, especially laws about 
state languages and armed conflicts in the Caucasus, Transnistria, Tajikistan 
and others. The combined factors caused a flow of refugees and internally 
displaced persons of different nationalities. Ethnic Russians dominated this 
migration (constituting a little less than 60 per cent of all immigrants). 
According to current registration statistics and Census 2002 data, there was 
also a significant influx of other ethnic groups of Russia (nearly 15 per cent), 
Ukrainians (ten per cent), Armenians (more than six per cent) and 
Azerbaijanis (nearly three per cent). The proportion of indigenous peoples of 
Central Asia among immigrants was insignificant and did not exceed three per 
cent at that time. 
In total, during the period between the censuses of 1989 and 2002, Russia 
gained an additional 5.5 million residents due to migration. 
1  According to estimates of experts from the Population Division of the United 
Nations, Russia is on the second place in terms of the number of migrants in the world 
after the United States. International migrant is defined as a person born in a country 
other than that in which he/she lives. In Russia, as in the other new states on the 
territory of the former USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, ‘large numbers of 
international migrants appeared, literally from one day to the next, as persons who had 
moved within each of those countries and were born in a successor State different from 
that in which they resided at the moment of independence, became international 
migrants without necessarily having moved at that time’ (UN Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, Population Division. Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2005 
Revision. United Nation 2006, 5)
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Figure 1: Migration increase in the Russian Federation, 1990-2015 (in 
thousands)
Source: Rosstat2, Demographic Yearbook of Russia, 2014. Moscow; Rosstat, 2014; 
Rosstat, Total results of migration in Russia. http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_
main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/demography/#
Since the beginning of the 2000s, economic factors strongly affected the 
volume and direction of migration flows in the post-Soviet territories. The 
rapid economic growth in Russia and Kazakhstan created a high demand for 
labour. The increasing difference between the CIS countries in their tempos of 
economic development and, as a result, in earnings (see Table 1) and 
standards of living also played a role. The number of temporary foreign 
workers in 2012-2013 in Russia reached seven million people, of which three 
to four million were undocumented migrants.3 At the same time, the sizes of 
Russian-speaking populations outside of Russia significantly decreased.4 
2  Rosstat – The Federal State Statistical Service of the Russian Federation 
3  The Head of the Federal Migration Service, Konstantin Romodanosky, said there 
were more than 3.5 million undocumented migrants in 2013 (ww.rwbc.ru/
rbcfreenews/20130730135511.shtml).
4  According to the last Soviet census (1989) and the last national censuses, during 
1989-2009 the number of Russians in Kazakhstan declined from 6.2 million to 3.8 
million; in Kyrgyzstan, from 962,000 to 420,000; and in Tajikistan, from 388,500 to 
34,500. The number of Ukrainians in Kazakhstan fell from 896,000 to 108,000; in 
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A distinctive feature of the 2000s compared to the previous decade was a 
marked increase in the number of migrants from three countries of Central 
Asia (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan), where the difficult economic 
situation was deepened by military and political conflicts. Almost 40 per cent 
of all permanent workers came from these countries in 2010-2011. Temporary 
migrants from the three Central Asian states received most (in 2012, nearly 
60 per cent) of the issued documents permitting work (work permits and 
patents). Moreover, unlike in the past decade, migration from these countries 
to Russia was clearly dominated by people belonging to ethnic groups of 
Central Asia, rather than by people of European origin. The new post-Soviet 
generation of migrants from the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus 
generally have lower levels of education, Russian language skills and 
vocational qualification training, as compared to the older generations. The 
majority of the young migrants perform heavy and dirty physical work. 
Therefore, Saodat Olimova, an expert from Tajikistan, characterised that 
situation as a muscle drain, rather than brain drain.5 
In general, migration exchange has been beneficial for both Russia and the 
sending countries. In total, between 1992 and 2013 inclusive, Russia 
accepted over 8.4 million additional residents. The migration gain of over 60 
per cent compensated the natural decrease of the population during this 
period. In the 1990s due to migration from the territory of the former Soviet 
Union, a significant redistribution of human capital took place, to the benefit of 
Russia, since the Russian-speaking migrants have higher levels of education 
and better skills. 
Therefore, the loss of skilled labour that was earlier caused by mass 
migration from Russia to countries outside the former USSR was 
compensated.6 Permanent and temporary migrants smoothed the imbalance 
in the labour market and solved labour shortages. However, while the 
immigrants worked where high or medium levels of qualifications were 
required, temporary migrant workers were mainly taking low-paid jobs with 
hard working conditions, unattractive for the Russian population. In 2013 
almost 80 per cent of foreign workers were employed in construction or 
performed unskilled jobs in different sectors of the economy. 
Kyrgyzstan, from 108,000 to 22,000; and in Tajikistan, from 41,000 to 1000.
5  Money transfers and their influence on living standards in Khatlon oblast of 
Tajikistan. MOM-NITS, ‘SHARK’, Dushanbe, 2006, 30 (Denezhnye perevody i ikh 
vliyanie na uroven zhizni v Khatlonskoi oblasti respubliki Tadkhikistan MOM-NITS, 
‘SHARK’, Dushanbe, 2006, 30)
6  By the author’s estimation over 1.5 million persons in 1990s had left Russia, of 
which more than 90 per cent for Germany, Israel and the US.
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A significant flow of migrants and temporary workers from the CIS countries to 
Russia was accompanied by a counter-flow of money that migrants were 
remitting home to their families. According to the available data, between 
2006 and 2013, the annual volume of money transfers from Russia to CIS 
countries increased by more than three times. In 2013 alone, the CIS 
countries and Georgia received 21.5 billion USD from Russia.7 In addition to 
the money earned, migrants, especially those from rural areas of Central 
Asia, acquired professional training, improved their qualifications and work 
experience, and broadened their horizons.8  This has contributed to the 
accumulation of human capital in their homelands. 
Factors of Migration in 2014–2016
Changes in the Economy 
Between 2000 and 2008 the Russian economy was rapidly developing: the 
average annual GDP growth amounted to seven per cent per year. The 
engine of development was the oil and gas sector, which was pulling other 
sectors of the economy, including services and construction. The 
unemployment rate was kept at five per cent and the state employment 
service was consistently showing one million vacancies. That pattern of 
growth was broken in 2009 by the financial crisis, when the GDP fell by 7.8 
per cent. In 2010-2012 the economy started to recover, but again fell in 2013. 
Already in that year, economists were predicting a crisis caused by exorbitant 
social spending and declining investment.  
The immediate cause of the new crisis in Russia was the fall in oil prices in 
the second half of 2014. As a result, in December 2015 the rouble 
depreciated by more than 50 per cent against the dollar. The current crisis 
was further exacerbated by external economic sanctions in connection with 
the events in Ukraine. In total, in 2015 the GDP decreased by 3.8 per cent. 
The most significant declines in output took place in the sectors involving 
predominantly migrant workers: construction (by seven per cent), wholesale 
and retail trade (by ten per cent), industry (by five per cent), hotels and 
restaurants (by five per cent). 
One distinguishing feature of this crisis is the drop in Russian households’ 
7 World Bank, Migration and Remittances data.  http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/
migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data
8  Central Asian countries are poorly urbanised.  According to the results of the last 
censuses the proportion of the total urban population in each country is as follows: in 
Kazakhstan (2009) – 54 per cent, Kyrgyzstan (2009) – 34 per cent, Tajikistan (2010) – 
26.5 per cent. Rural youth predominates among migrants.  
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income (which fell by five per cent in 2015 alone), which did not decline 
during the previous crisis. Russian households employ at least half of all 
migrant workers. Many people prefer cheap labour of foreign workers – 
builders, motor mechanics, drivers, nurses, servants etc., to expensive 
services of the Russian firms. All of the above changes have led to a decline 
in demand for labour. Demographic factors have been partially counteracting 
these trends. For example, since 2007, the working age population of Russia 
has been declining by one million persons annually. Secondly, the imposition 
by the Russian government in August 2014 of a food embargo against 
Western countries has stimulated the development of the domestic 
agricultural sector. 
These estimates do not include temporary foreign workers. However, as 
statistics show (and as will be discussed in the following section), in 2015 the 
proportion of foreign labour was significantly reduced. This was mainly 
caused by the fall of the rouble, which led to the reduction of wages in dollar 
terms. Thus, while in 2013 the average monthly salary in Russia was 963 
USD, in 2015 it fell to 560 USD. The wages decreased not only against the 
dollar or euro, but also against the currencies of the former Soviet republics 
(Table 1). As a result, for part of population from the CIS countries, the 
incentives to go for work to Russia have diminished, especially given the fact 
that the Russian food embargo against the West has led to growth in the 
agriculture and food sectors in CIS countries. In this regard, Ukraine has 
been the exception, as due to the ongoing crisis, the living standards continue 
to decline, even compared with Russia. Therefore, the factors pushing 
Ukrainian workers abroad continue to intensify.
135 Migration and the Ukraine Crisis
Table 1: Average wages per month in CIS countries as share of average 
wages in Russia (%). 
Country 1990 2000 2007 2013 2015
Russia (US $) 170 80 532 963 560
Russia (=100) 100 100 100 100 100
Azerbaijan 64 63 47 38 81
Armenia 80 53 41 58 69
Belarus 89 63 61 60 74
Georgia 71 47 41 45 73
Kazakhstan 88 129 80 77 101
Kyrgyzstan 74 32 20 25 37
Moldova 78 42 32 31 44
Tajikistan 68 9 9 16 26
Turkmenistan 81 … … … …
Uzbekistan 72 … … … …
Ukraine 81 54 50 44 34
Source: CIS STAT9, National Statistical Office of Georgia 
It should be noted that we are not observing large-scale unemployment 
among migrants in Russia. A characteristic of the Russian labour market is 
that wages remains its main regulator. If wages become low, migrants either 
look for a new job, or leave Russia and go back to their home countries, 
where the costs of living are lower. 
Studies show that in the countries of Central Asia, Moldova and Armenia, a 
circular migration mechanism has developed. Returning migrants are the 
most adventurous part of society; they look for and take up new economic 
niches. Migrants with years of experience abroad in construction, transport 
and industry offer their specific skills to the local labour markets. They are 
used to work more than those who did not participate in migration. But soon 
the former migrants realise that living on the earned money in their home 
country without significant savings is impossible. They again go to work in 
Russia, Kazakhstan and other countries (Marat 2009).
9  CIS STAT – Interstate Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth Independent 
States
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The International Situation
In addition to economic factors, in 2014 and 2015 migration processes were 
influenced by political circumstances. Since 1 January 2012 Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia have been united in the Common Economic Space 
(CES). This form of interstate integration provides for the removal of 
restrictions on citizens’ access to the labour markets of CES countries, the 
abolition of the quota system and compulsory work permits for migrant 
workers, and a more liberal procedure for migration registration. On 1 
January 2015, the three states formed the Eurasian Economic Union (EAZS) 
and shortly after Armenia and – in August 2015 – Kyrgyzstan entered the 
organisation. As Armenia and Kyrgyzstan are significant exporters of labour to 
Russia, joining the EEU has created more opportunities for labour migration 
of their citizens. 
Another group of political factors was generated by the military-political crisis 
in Ukraine. The armed conflict in the east of the country has caused a flood of 
asylum-seekers from Ukraine. With the beginning of the combat operations, 
Russia introduced preferential conditions in terms of residence and 
employment (no need for work permits) for the citizens of Ukraine who have 
left their homes and moved to Russia. However, at the end of 2015, Russia 
cancelled these benefits and instead gave persons of Ukrainian descent the 
same migration rights as are enjoyed by citizens of CIS countries that do not 
belong to the single economic space 
Changes in Migration Policy and Irregular Migration
In June 2012, the Russian government adopted a new Concept of the State 
Migration Policy until 2025.10 Its content reflects the experience of reforming 
migration policy in Canada, Australia, Germany, the UK, the US and other 
countries. The first phase of implementing the Concept was targeted towards 
preventing irregular migration. Between 2012 and 2015 more than 50 laws 
were adopted, almost half of which was aimed at strengthening the 
administrative and criminal penalties for violating migration laws. Let us now 
consider the laws that have the greatest direct impact on the size and 
structure of both legal and undocumented migration flows.
Under the new rules from 1 January 2014, a temporary stay in Russia is still 
limited to 90 days, but individuals can enter the country only once within a 
period of 180 days. After the introduction of the rule, the number of crossings 
10  Concept of the State Migration Policy until 2025. Adopted by the president of the 
Russian Federation on 13 June 2012. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15635
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of the Russian border fell and migrants from CIS countries coming with the 
purpose of work for a longer period have had to obtain authorisation to work. 
This policy was further supported by a ban to enter Russia introduced in 2013 
for migrants who had overstayed in the country during their previous trip. This 
is the most common offense in the field of migration, which is directly related 
to illegal employment. Those who lived in Russia illegally for more than 270 
days are forbidden to enter the country for ten years, whereas those who 
overstayed between 170 and 270 days cannot re-enter Russia for five years. 
Those who overstayed for less than 170 days are not allowed to enter the 
country for three years. In the middle of 2016 the total number of offenders 
approached two million persons.11 Most of them were the citizens of 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. It means that almost ten per cent of the male 
population between the ages of 20 and 50 of those two countries is now 
barred from entering Russia. 
Let us also note two important changes in the Russian migration legislation. 
Before 2015 there were two types of labour authorisation documents: work 
permits and the so-called patents (2010). Work permits are further divided 
into general permits, permits for qualified professionals and permits for highly 
qualified specialists. General work permits are subject to numeric quotas. 
Patents were introduced in 2010 to allow individuals (or households) to 
employ foreign nationals from CIS visa-free countries. 
Under the new law, from 1 January 2015, foreigners who arrive from the CIS 
countries with visa-free entry to Russia do not have to obtain work permits.12 
Instead, they need to acquire patents for their work, whether they want to be 
employed by an individual, an organisation or an individual entrepreneur. By 
introducing patents, the government has eased the access of CIS citizens to 
the Russian labour market. Another policy change adopted on 1 January 
2015 requires all foreigners who seek employment (except highly qualified 
professionals) to pass an exam in the Russian language, Russian history and 
the fundamentals of law of the Russian Federation.
According to estimates of the Federal Migration Service (FMS), as a result of 
the above changes the number of undocumented migrants decreased in 
2015 by more than 900,000, from 3.6 to 2.7 million. The head of the Federal 
Migration Service, Konstantin Romodanovsky, noted that ‘for the first time in 
many years the number of legally employed persons exceeded the number of 
11  Olga Kirillova (The head of the General Administration for Migration Issues of the 
Interior Ministry of Russia), Interview for Interfax. 1 July 2016. http://www.interfax.ru/
interview/516300
12  With the exception of students who must get work permits, provided they plan to 
work outside their universities. 
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workers without permits.’13 In Russia, undocumented immigrants are mostly 
citizens of CIS countries, who work without appropriate permits. The 
tightening of migration legislation was reflected in their number.
Permanent Migration from the CIS Countries
The study of permanent migration into Russia is complicated by frequent 
changes in the statistical definitions of migrants. The last such change 
occurred in 2011. Until that time, permanent migrants were considered to be 
only those who were permanently registered in a new location (or were 
withdrawn from the migration registry at their former places of permanent 
residence). However, in 2011 the statistical category of permanent migrants 
was extended to include other long-term migrants who were registered at a 
given place of residence for a period of nine months or longer. Withdrawal 
from the register of this category of migrants is carried out automatically upon 
termination of their stay. As a result, large groups of foreigners started to be 
treated as migrants: students of academic programmes, workers with 
employment contracts for a period of over nine months and relatives of 
permanent residents of Russia who arrived for a longer period.14 Obviously, 
these changes immediately increased the number of arrivals and after a year 
– the number of departures.15
As a result of the changes in the flows of arrivals and departures, migration 
gain in Russia between 2013 and 2015 decreased from 296,000 to 245,000. 
Especially significant changes occurred in the migration exchange between 
Russia and Uzbekistan. Prior to the crisis, over 20 per cent of migration gain 
to Russia was due to Uzbekistan. According to official statistics, in 2015 
Russia has started to lose population in the migration exchange with this 
most populous Central Asian country. The only exception is Ukraine, which in 
2015 provided more than half of the total migration gain in Russia, although in 
2012–2013, i.e. before the Ukrainian economic and political crisis, its 
contribution to the Russian migration gain was limited to 12 per cent.
Whereas Uzbekistan demonstrates how significant economic factors are in 
explaining long-term migration, Ukraine underlines the importance of non-
13  Romodanovski K.O., Mukomel’ V.I., Regulation of migration processes: problems of 
transition from reactive to system policy [Regulirovanie migratsionnykh protsessov: 
problem perekhoda ot reactivnoi k sistemnoi politike]. Obschestvennye nauki i 
sovremennost. 2015, No 5:10.
14  Those who seek temporary asylum in Russia are not included in the number. In 
2015 circa 330,000 persons applied for asylum in Russia.
15  The number of arrivals in 2011 was twice as large as in 2010, while the number of 
departures in 2012 was twice as large as in 2011. 
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economic factors. Long-term migrants, as already noted, are divided into 
several groups. The first group consists of immigrants, i.e. those who come to 
live in Russia. As a rule, such a decision is not taken spontaneously, but long 
before the move and is strongly influenced by the situation in the countries of 
origin. In many cases, statistical reports on migration cover those who have 
stayed in Russia long ago and in a given year received their permanent 
resident status i.e. temporary residence permit or a residence permit.
Some migrants arrive in Russia with their Russian citizenship already in hand. 
There are many such migrants from Moldova (45 per cent), or to be more 
precise – the territory of Transnistria, as well from Kyrgyzstan (41 per cent) 
and Kazakhstan (41 per cent), with which until 2011 Russia had an 
agreement about simplified procedure of citizenship acquisition.16
A separate group is composed of migrants who arrived within the framework 
of the State Program of Assistance to Voluntary Resettlement to the Russian 
Federation of Compatriots Living Abroad. Under this programme, the 
government provides certain immigrants who have strong ties to Russia 
(known as ‘compatriots’) with financial support and work. Between 2007 and 
2016, over 400,000 persons arrived in Russia under this scheme and until 
2014 most participants were from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The situation 
changed in 2015, when out of 183,000 participants 110,000 (more than 60 per 
cent) were citizens of Ukraine. Thus, the majority of all 194,000 migrants from 
Ukraine in that year arrived in Russia as ‘compatriots.’ The use of this term is 
striking in light of the political conflict.
Among the migrants who have arrived for a longer term (nine months or 
more) and failed to receive permanent residence, students and migrant 
workers are highly represented. The number of students from the CIS 
countries, despite the crisis, has increased from 156,000 in 2013 to nearly 
200,000 in 2016. In contrast, the economic crisis has directly affected the 
number of labour migrants from CIS countries. Below we shall examine these 
changes in temporary foreign labour migration in more detail.
Labour Migration
Statistics show that the highest number of work permits in Russia was 
granted to foreigners in 2014, the first year of the current crisis. The total 
number of such permits issued was 3.4 million, of which 1.3 million were work 
permits and 2.1 million – patents. Over 95 per cent of the documents were 
16  At the same time, those who have acquired Russian citizenship have also kept their 
former one. 
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granted to the citizens of CIS countries with visa-free entry to Russia.17 Let us 
now consider how the flow of foreign workers has changed along the major 
channels of labour migration: work permits, patents and free movement within 
the single labour market of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAZS).
Work Permits
In 2014 there were three types of work permits in Russia: (1) general permits, 
(2) permits for skilled workers and (3) permits for highly qualified specialists. 
General Work Permit for a long time was the main channel for labour 
migration to Russia. They are granted for up to one year with a possibility of 
prolongation. The number of permits issued is subject to numeric quotas; in 
total, over the time period between 2010 and 2014, about six million such 
permits were issued. Most of them were granted to citizens of Uzbekistan 
(about 42 per cent), Tajikistan (15 per cent) and Ukraine (11 per cent). Non-
CIS countries accounted for less than 15 per cent of permits. As noted above, 
from 1 January 2015, all foreign workers who arrive in the Russian Federation 
without a visa must acquire a patent. General work permits are granted only 
to foreign citizens who enter Russia with a visa.18 In 2015, more than 140,000 
such permits were granted (25 per cent less than in 2014), half of them to the 
citizens of China and Turkey.
Until 2015, work permits were granted to skilled specialists – representatives 
of certain professions, the list of which is approved annually by the Russian 
Federation Ministry of Labour. The first such list was drafted in 2009 and 
contained only 17 professions. By 2014, the list was expanded to include 62 
positions, mainly executives of companies, engineers and technicians, as well 
as workers of culture and art. A contingent of qualified specialists was formed 
mainly by the citizens of CIS countries. The number of permits issued 
annually for permanent work increased and in 2014 reached its peak, 
amounting to 160,000. In 2015, about 25,000 of these permits were issued, 
only for workers who had Russian visas. 
In 2010, another channel of labour migration opened up for highly qualified 
professionals. The main criterion in the definition of highly qualified specialist 
is the salary; it must not be less than two million roubles (about 66,000 USD) 
and for professors of universities and researchers – not less than one million 
17  Since the conclusion of the agreement on the creation in 1999 of ‘The Union State’, 
citizens of Russia and Belarus have equal rights to employment in both countries. From 
this year they have not been included in national statistics of external labour migration 
in both countries.
18  International students must also obtain a work permit if their place of work is outside 
their universities.
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roubles (about 33,000 USD) a year. Unlike other programmes, highly qualified 
professionals can obtain a residence permit for up to three years. In total, 
between 2010 and 2014 about 90,000 such work permits were granted, over 
90 per cent of which were issued to citizens of non-CIS countries. Between 
2014 and 2015 the number of highly qualified professionals from the 
European Union, the United States and Canada went down. However, at the 
same time, the number of work permits issued for this category of migrants 
increased due to China. At the end of 2015 there were about 36,000 highly 
qualified specialists in Russia, including over 8000 Chinese citizens, 7500 
citizens of the EU countries, 3600 citizens of CIS countries and 3000 citizens 
of Turkey.
Patents
Since 2010, foreign workers from countries with visa-free entry to Russia may 
be employed by individuals. For this purpose, it is necessary to acquire a 
patent for the ‘execution of works or services for personal, household and 
other similar purposes unrelated to business activities’ and unlike work 
permits, the number of patents is not limited. Their initial price was up to 1000 
RUB per month (about 32 USD), but by the end of 2014 it increased to 1200 
RUB (about 21 USD). Initially patent-based migration complemented the 
work-permit based one which serves the needs of the government and private 
companies. However, since the beginning of 2015 patents have become the 
main channel for the inflow of foreign workers from countries with visa-free 
entry. Currently, patents are granted for a period of one to 12 months, after 
which they may be extended by up to a year. Their prices vary and have been 
regulated by regional authorities; the most expensive ones at the end of 2015 
were in Moscow and costed 4200 RUB (about 65 USD). 
In total, between 2010 and 2014, 12.7 million patents were granted, of which 
48 per cent were bought by the citizens of Uzbekistan and 21 per cent – by 
the citizens of Tajikistan. The number of patents obtained in 2015 (1.7 million) 
was lower than in 2014 (2.1 million), partly due to the fact that citizens of 
Armenia (since January 2015) and Kyrgyzstan (second half 2015) gained the 
right to work without quotas and patents, following their countries’ accession 
to EAZS. However, their share in the total number of patents during the 
previous years did not exceed 15 per cent. Importantly, the number of patents 
granted in 2015 should be compared to the number of both patents and work 
permits granted in 2014, and for the sake of accuracy should exclude 
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.
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Table 2: Issued documents for work in Russia 
Country Document 2013 2014 2015
Azerbaijan Patent 59,300 96,800 5000
Work permission 16,900 14,700 1200
Armenia Patent 92,500 148,700 100
Work permission 42,100 34,900 100
Kazakhstan Patent 900 900  -
Work permission 800 400  -
Kyrgyzstan Patent 90,400 157,400 31,100
Work permission 107,700 88,200 3,200
Moldova Patent 48,800 180,300 96,700
Work permission 54,500 4700 2300
Tajikistan Patent 301,900 443,500 421,800
Work permission 197,200 186,300 6500
Uzbekistan Patent 720,700 848,500 869,200
Work permission 564,200 556,600 15,600
Ukraine Patent 42,200 256,300 203,200
Work permission 144,700 165,500 6500
Other Countries Patent - - -
Work permission 286,500 229,500 183,800
Total Patent 1,356,700 2,132,400 1,672,100
Work permission 1,414,600 1,323,100 219,200
Source: Database of The Federal Migration Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
If we take into account the total number of all work permits and patents 
issued, we will see (Table 2) that the inflow of migrant workers between 2014 
and 2015 from Uzbekistan Tajikistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova 
declined. Not only labour migration has decreased, but also emigration to 
Russia from CIS countries, with the exception of Ukraine. The available data 
suggest that part of labour migrants changed their temporary status to 
permanent by receiving a temporary residence permit, citizenship, becoming 
students, etc. These data answer the important question of how the volume 
and structure of migration flows in Russia changed since the beginning of the 
recession.
Free Movement of Labour Force 
The citizens of the Eurasian Economic Union’s member states (Russia, 
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Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan) now participate in a single 
labour market, which means that they do not require any permits to work in 
Russia. However, for this same reason there is a problem of statistical 
accounting of this group of foreign workers. Indirect data (registration 
statistics, information from employers) show that in 2015 the flow of labour 
migrants from these countries did not significantly decrease. This is explained 
by the accession of these countries to a common labour market of the 
Eurasian Economic Union, the expansion of opportunities for finding and 
getting work, reduction of costs associated with migration, and a new 
amnesty for formerly irregular immigrants and those who had been denied 
entry to Russia for violating immigration laws. 
Remittances
Russia is the main source of remittances for CIS countries. Between 2010 
and 2015, according to the Central Bank of Russia, the volume of personal 
remittances to these countries reached 108 million USD.19 The main recipient 
of remittances is Uzbekistan, which received 30 per cent of the above amount 
followed by Tajikistan and Ukraine (Figure 2). For a number of CIS countries, 
remittances are the most important factor of development. According to World 
Bank estimates, the ratio of the volume of cash remittances to GDP in 2014 
was 36.6 per cent in Tajikistan, 30.3 per cent in Kyrgyzstan, 26.2 per cent in 
Moldova and 17.9 per cent in Armenia.20
19  Personal remittances represent households’ income received from their members 
temporarily employed abroad and nonresident households and are mostly related to 
temporary and permanent migration of population. Remittances can be made through 
both official channels (via banks, post offices, money transfer operators – MTOs), and 
direct transfers in cash or valuables from a member of a household temporarily 
employed abroad to his household or from one household to another. See: The Central 
Bank of the Russian Federation, General Notes Relating to Personal Remittances 
http://www.cbr.ru/eng/
20  World Bank Group (2015). Migration and Remittances. Factbook 2016. Third 
Edition.
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Figure 2: Personal remittances from Russia to CIS countries, 2011-2015 
(billions of US dollars).
Source: The Central Bank of the Russian Federation http://www.cbr.ru/
statistics/?Prtid=svs 
The highest volume of remittances from Russia to CIS countries was reached 
in 2013, when their total volume amounted to 24.7 billion USD. However, in 
the second half of the following year the cash flows started to decrease. 
Personal remittances of migrants from Russia to CIS countries in 2015 were 
half as large as in 2013 (Table 4). The main reason was the fall of the rouble, 
which began in the middle of 2014. In early July, the exchange rate was 33.4 
roubles per dollar. At the end of December 2014 one dollar was sold for 56 
RUB, while at the end of December 2015 – for 72 RUB. Another reason was 
the reduction of the flow of migrant workers, both legal and undocumented.
The flow of remittances has fallen most to Uzbekistan and Moldova and least 
– to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (Table 3). Differences between countries in 
the reduction of remittances from Russia can be explained not only by the 
difference in migration flows, but also by the characteristics of their structure 
(i.e. the relationship between legal and undocumented migrants and migrant 
employment industry trade). Among the undocumented migrants, the citizens 
of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan predominated, while among the citizens of 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan who have received permission to work before the 
crisis, almost one-third worked as unskilled workers. Among Ukrainian 
citizens that professional group comprised less than ten per cent.
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Table 3: Personal Remittances from Russia to CIS countries, 2013-2015 
(billions of US dollars)
 Countries 2013 2014 2015
Decrease in flows (%)
remittances 
2013-2015
Labour migrants* 
2014-2015
CIS countries 24,786 21,400 12,403 50 35
Azerbaijan 1378 1374 948 31 54
Armenia 1747 1752 1121 36 …
Belarus 993 1000 581 41 …
Kazakhstan 377 465 351 7 …
Kyrgyzstan 2113 2239 1514 28 …
Moldova 2248 1862 908 60 56
Tajikistan 3927 3662 2088 47 32
Turkmenistan 35 30 16 54 …
Uzbekistan 7878 5828 3054 61 37
Ukraine 4090 3187 1823 55 50
*documents for work
Source: The Central Bank of the Russian Federation http://www.cbr.ru/
statistics/?PrtId=svs
Based on the data, it is reasonable to say that economic factors have 
determined a significant reduction in the number of permanent and migrant 
workers in Russia from countries that are not included in the Eurasian 
Economic Union: Azerbaijan, Moldova, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The 
military-political conflict in Ukraine also caused a stream of people who 
sought and received asylum in Russia. Many of those persons have changed 
their migration status, which was accompanied by a significant increase in the 
number of permanent migrants from Ukraine to Russia. However, the flow of 
legal labour migrants in 2015 reduced almost twice.
The fall in the inflow of migrant workers and the value of the rouble against 
the dollar and euro have led to the reduction of remittances sent to the CIS 
countries. Their volume in 2015 was twice smaller than in 2013. Such a 
significant reduction in cash flows obviously affected the well-being of the 
population in those countries where remittances comprise a large part of the 
GDP (such as Tajikistan, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia). This is 
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particularly significant considering that according to forecasts, the current 
crisis in Russia will continue until 2019–2020 (Center of Development 
Institute 2016). Thus, the reduction in population income will also continue. 
The decrease in labour demand due to the crisis in the coming years will be 
accompanied by the reduction in labour supply. According to the estimates of 
the UN Population Division, between 2015 and 2015, the number of persons 
between the ages of 15 and 60 in Russia will decrease by nine million 
(UNDESA 2015). Therefore, the need for a large number of foreign workers 
(most probably less than in 2013/2014) will continue. 
However, the resources to meet this demand in traditional sources are likely 
to go down. Moreover, the decline of working age population in all the former 
Soviet republics in the coming years is expected.21 Therefore, it is likely that 
the importance of migration from the three Central Asian countries for Russia 
will increase. Correspondingly, for Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
migration to Russia remains vital due to the financial resources that exceed 
international aid. If the inflow of transfers of migrants continues to decline due 
to the Russian economic crisis, under the absence of significant economic 
progress, the well-being of the population of Central Asian countries will 
significantly deteriorate, which will complicate the internal political situation on 
the ground.
Conclusion
This chapter has analysed the latest available statistical data to assess how 
the volume and structure of migration flows into Russia have changed since 
the beginning of the recession, and how the crisis affected the remittances 
sent to the CIS countries. The data show that while migration to Russia is 
determined by multiple and continuously changing factors, it is possible – and 
indeed important – to disaggregate the economic, policy, and geopolitical 
influences on migration and understand their relative significance. As 
discussed, whereas Uzbekistan demonstrates how significant economic 
factors are in explaining long-term migration, Ukraine underlines the 
importance of non-economic factors. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
strong migration links between Russia and other former Soviet republics 
remained. However, over time, the migration ties between Russia and the 
newly independent states have generally weakened. This is unlikely to bode 
well for either Russia or the countries in the region. 
21  According to the estimates of the UN Population Division, the population between 
the ages of 15 and 60 from 2015 to 2025 reduced: in Azerbaijan – by about five per 
cent, Armenia and Moldova – by nine per cent, in Belarus and Russia – by ten per cent, 
in Georgia and Ukraine – by 12 per cent.
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Dangerous and Unwanted: 
Policy and Everyday Discourses 
of Migrants in Russia
IRINA KUZNETSOVA
Introduction
For many years, Russia was the second greatest world recipient of migrants 
after the United States and it currently holds the third position, after Germany, 
with 12 million newcomers a year. It is the main destination country for 
various categories of migrants from South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia (SEECA), with 38.4 per cent of all immigration directed 
towards this country (Migration facts and trends… 2015, 34). Citizens from 
post-Soviet states, specifically from the 1991-founded Commonwealth of 
Independent States (which includes Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and associated 
countries – Turkmenistan and Ukraine) have comprised the biggest number of 
migrants in Russia ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Migration to Russia from these countries has been almost ten times higher 
than from other countries of the ‘far abroad’. According to official statistics in 
2013, 422,738 people arrived from the CIS and 59,503 from countries outside 
of the region. Such a mass migration from CIS states into Russia has been 
facilitated by the visa-free regime, but also by close economic, political and 
personal relations between the people – and later due to disparities in the 
economic development of CIS countries, which encouraged labour migration 
to the more developed Russia. 
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Over a span of 25 years, the character of migration, state policy and official 
rhetoric towards migrants have changed dramatically – being dependent on 
the Russian labour market and often forced to work informally, many migrants 
have suffered from the growing restrictions of migration law and the lack of 
policy to facilitate better integration. 
This chapter will address the formation of the myth of a ‘dangerous migrant’ 
through politics’ and mass-media constriction of migrants’ image as 
connected with crime, disease and illegal work. The restrictions of migration 
legislation bring a lot of complications and contribute to the ambiguous 
position of migrants in the society. One of the main problems facing migrants 
in Russian society is racism and xenophobia, which often enjoy the support of 
the state and mass-media. Due to the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine 
which began in April 2014, almost a million people have sought refuge in 
Russia, which according to the UN, is the ninth largest displaced group in the 
world. The chapter discusses the existing regulations and the main issues 
facing the refugees. 
This paper is based on several years of the author’s research on migration in 
Russia, including her Open Society Institute funded project ‘The everyday 
lives of Central Asian migrants in Moscow and Kazan in the context of 
Russia’s Migration 2025 Concept: from legislation to practice’, during which 
she conducted about 300 in-depth interviews (with Dr. John Round) between 
2013 and 2015; the 2012-2014 Russian Foundation for Humanities funded 
project titled ‘Social integration of migrants in a context of social security’ 
(with Prof. Laissan Mucharyamova), with a survey of 297 migrants, in-depth 
interviews with migrants and experts and discourse analysis; and the ongoing 
2016-2017 British Academy Small Grant funded project titled ‘Asylum seekers 
from Eastern Ukraine in Russia: identities, policies and discourse in the 
context of forced migration from the Ukraine conflict’.
The Myth of a ‘Dangerous Migrant’ and Tightening of Migration Control
Portraying migrants as dangerous because of the supposedly high crime and 
unemployment levels among them and the fact that they contribute to the 
destruction of national identities, is common across the globe (Vertovec 
2011). The rise of xenophobia and nationalism in Europe and the United 
States supported by political disourse (Wodak, Boukala 2015; Chavez 2013 
etc.), has brought tremendous changes in political agenda. In Russia the rise 
of xenophobia towards migrants goes in parallel with increasing control in 
migration policy. As Shnirelman (2007) pointed out: ‘if in the middle and 
second part of the 1990s Chechens were portrayed as the main enemy, in the 
beginning of the 2000s after announcing the new war as an ‘antiterrorist 
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operation’, the mass-media started the active cultivation of a negative image 
of migrants.’  
The changing official stance of President Putin in relation to the idea of a 
multi-ethnic society explains a lot. While in 2012 he spoke about a ‘complex 
and multidimentional’ country and argued that ‘if a multi-ethnic society is 
struck by the bacilli of nationalism, it loses its strength and stability’ (Putin 
2012)1, in 2014 his rhetoric reflected a very different view. He stated: ‘we still 
have quite a few problems here that have to do with illegal, uncontrolled 
migration. We know that this breeds crime, interethnic tensions and 
extremism. We need a greater control over compliance with regulations 
covering migrants’ stay in Russia, and we have to take practical measures to 
promote their social and cultural adaptation and protect their labour and other 
rights’ (Putin 2014).
Thus, Putin has drawn an unsubstantiated connection between migrants’ 
irregular status and crime, extremism, and ethnic tensions. The time period 
between these two statements saw an increase in xenophobic attitudes in 
Russia, the Moscow mayoral election (in which the candidates focused on 
demonising the Other), round-ups and public detention of migrants, and 
attempts to securitise migration policy. Inter-ethnic tensions have been 
exacerbated through the increase in the number of workplace raids, after 
which the ‘illegal’ migrants would be paraded through the streets. In addition, 
sweeps of the metro system in search for criminals (i.e. irregular migrants) 
have been well covered by the media. The migrants were also blamed for the 
poor health care system and rising crime levels. 
The media has portrayed migrants as bringing disease to Russia, even 
though HIV infection rates, the most commonly discussed illness, in Central 
Asia are much lower. The first deputy of the State Duma Committee for Ethnic 
Affairs, Mikhail Starshinov, stated without citing any data that a ‘huge number 
of migrants have dangerous diseases such as tuberculosis, HIV and various 
“shameful diseases”’ (Chernov 2014). HIV in Russia has been viewed as an 
imported disease with authorities and doctors blaming migrants for the 
increasing  number of infection cases (Pichugina 2012; State Duma 2013; TV 
Center 2013). Moreover, migrants are often portrayed as drug abusers 
lacking in health education, sexually promiscuous and unable to control 
themselves, thereby putting the native population in grave danger. The media 
has also focused on showing migrants accessing health care for free, 
attacking particularly Central Asian women who deliver babies in Russian 
hospitals (see Primor’e 2013). Blaming migrants accessing prenatal and 
1  In Russian: ‘если многонациональное общество поражают бациллы 
национализма, оно теряет силу и прочность’ (Putin 2012)
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antenatal care for ‘medical tourism’ does not correspond with a reality when 
woman often have to go to their countries of origin to give birth as an 
alternative to dealing with often xenophobic attitudes in hospitals (Rocheva 
2014).  
The migrant-criminal figure is another standard othering tool in all migrant 
recipient countries. In Russia it was taken to the extreme when the mayor of 
Moscow, Sergey Sobyanin, stated that the city would be the world’s safest 
capital if only migrants were not committing crimes (Sobyanin 2013). These 
constructions show migrants as a dangerous and superfluous flow towards 
what is, to employ Mbembe’s theory of necropolitics, a ‘let to die’. Our 
research demonstrates that migrants are simultaneously visible and invisible 
to the state; the legal uncertainty denies them access to welfare and a voice 
within society, but they are visible for exploitation both in terms of their labour 
and the political capital gained from their presence (Round and Kuznetsova 
2016).
While they are often portrayed as dangerous, the reality is quite different: 
migrants often become subjects of hate crime attacks. The Comitee for Civil 
Assistance supported by the Sova Centre created a map at hatecrime.ru 
website which has reported on hate crime incidents in Moscow and Moscow 
Oblast since 2010, and registered 565 attacks. According to Sova Centre’s 
data, migrants from Central Asia traditionally have constituted the largest 
group of victims (in 2014 one person was killed and 17 were injured). 11 
victims (one killed, ten injured) were of unspecified ‘non-Slavic’ appearance, 
usually described as ‘Asian’. In addition, there are five victims among 
migrants from the Caucasus (in 2014 three were killed and 13 injured) 
(Alperovich and Yudina 2016, 11).
From the beginning of 2000s, migration policy in Russia has been shifting 
towards increasing control of immigration and restriction of migrants’ labour 
rights, enabled by new laws. Human rights activists and migrant rights 
advocates worry that most of the changes in Russian migration law will have 
a negative effect on the employment and living conditions in Russia and will 
also affect the citizens of post-Soviet states who can enter the country without 
a visa (see Figure 1 for a brief outline of some important changes in migration 
policy).
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Figure 1: Some key changes in Russian migration policy from 2002
2003 Introduction of work permits and regional quotas for foreign workers
2008 Restriction of migrants’ mobility to their area of registration in the 
Russian Federation 
Introduction of the compulsory ‘free from infections’ test to be 
provided within 30 days from the start of employment
2010 Introduction of patents for labour migrants granting the right to work 
in the private sector without work permit
2012 Introduction of the ‘Concept of the State Migration Policy of the 
Russian Federation until 2025’ 
2013 Ban on entry to Russia for migrants who violated two administrative 
laws
2014 Restriction for stay in Russia for 90 days only without obtaining a 
permission
Compulsory registration in the country (work and home address)
Refugee crisis in Ukraine due to armed conflict in Donbas
2015 Introduction of a new regulation, according to which after two 
administrative law violations or one migration law violation a migrant 
has to leave the country within five days
Compulsory registration of the address of stay in the country
Abolition of quotas for work permits for foreign migrants from 
countries with free visa regimes and introduction of patents
Citizens of CIS countries not included in the Custom Union 
(Azerbaijan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) can 
come to Russia only with international passports, but do not need 
a visa. Citizens of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Ukraine can cross the border with internal passports   
2016 The closing down of the Federal Migration Service and transfer of its 
functions to the Ministry of Internal Affairs  
On 1 July 2010, patents for labour migrants were introduced, which gave 
migrants the right to work in the private sector without a work permit. 
According to Ryazantsev (2012), in the beginning this law helped to 
regularise the status of approximately half a million migrants who earlier 
preferred to work unofficially. The new measure was so popular that in the 
first six months from its introduction, the authorities received more than one 
million applications. 
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In 2013, Russia introduced an entry ban for those migrants who had 
committed two administrative law violations. In 2014, the allowed stay in the 
country without any permission document was limited to 90 days, down from 
180. The new law introduced in 2015 requires migrants who have committed 
two or more administrative or one migration law violation to leave the country 
within five days. Administrative law violations include offences such as unpaid 
penalty for driving, violations of migration law – for instance being registered 
in one apartment, but living in another. Due to these measures from 2012 to 
2014, the number of CIS citizens banned from entering Russia increased 
more than nine times (from 2013 to 2015, 1.6 million people received such a 
ban) (Troitsky 2015, 20). As a result, about four per cent of the total 
population of Tajikistan, or more than half of those who worked in Russia in 
2015, were banned from the country, according to the Ministry of Labour, 
Employment and Migration of Tajikistan (cited in Troitsky 2015, 22). Civil 
rights activists reported mass violations of human rights. In most cases 
migrants were not allowed to read their court cases, as there were no 
interpreters available. The scale of abuse was huge; the Moscow court, for 
instance, considered 42 cases in one hour for migrant deportation (Troitsky 
2015), which shows the lack of any in-depth consideration of individual 
situations.  
In 2015 Russia experienced a massive decrease in international migration 
from post-Soviet countries. The greatest reduction in migration growth was in 
the case of Tajikistan (47.8 per cent compared with 2014) and Kyrgyzstan (41 
per cent). Moreover, Russia experienced a 42.6 per cent decrease in the 
number of migrants from Uzbekistan (Social’no-jekonomicheskoe polozhenie 
Rossii 2015, 246).  
While Russian citizens pay a penalty if they live in an apartment without 
registration, foreigners who do the same face deportation. Such a practice 
can be referred to as the ‘ethnicisation’ of politics (Gulina 2015). In addition, 
the new Russian migration laws affect the citizens of some CIS countries and 
significantly restrict their freedom of movement and opportunities to work. We 
can suppose that it is partly because the articles of the Convention of the CIS 
regarding human rights and freedoms in the area of employment do not have 
any control mechanisms (Davletgildiev 2016, 37), but more importantly, 
because of Russia’s special role in the CIS and the lack of protest from 
Tajikistan and Moldova in response to these restrictions. 
2015 was a crucial year for migration policy because of the new law 
introducing compulsory tests in the Russian language and Russian history, 
and additional laws for all foreigners who plan to work in Russia (with the 
exception of citizens from the EEU countries, highly skilled migrants, and 
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several other categories). These exams not only increased the financial 
burden for labour migrants, as most of them have a salary which is lower than 
the regional average, but were immediately followed by administrative 
barriers. Respondents complained that 30 days to pass the exam was not 
enough considering the time needed to register and the waiting list. Moreover, 
certificates from exams passed on the regional level are not recognised in the 
rest of the country. At the same time, the costs of the federal exam have been 
much higher and the waiting time – much longer. The Presidential Council on 
Civil Society and Human Rights has suggested changes in the new law, such 
as getting rid of the history and law components in the exam, since such a 
knowledge is of no use to foreign citizens temporarily employed in Russia 
(Jekspertnoe zakljuchenie… 2015). 
One of the most significant changes to migration policy has been the 
shutdown of the Federal Migration Service and the transfer of its functions to 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ukaz… 5 April 2016). Even before this reform, 
analysts argued that ‘courts have become part of the chain of migration policy 
implementation, focusing on regulating the number of foreign citizens in the 
Russian territory, especially from some countries’ (Troitsky 2015, 51). The 
new change will bring an even greater turn of migration policy towards police 
control.
Refugees from Eastern Ukraine in Russia
The armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine began in April 2014, affecting an area 
with approximately 5.2 million inhabitants. An estimated 9000 people have 
died, 14,000 have been wounded, and over a million have been internally 
displaced within Ukraine as a result of fighting (UN reports 2015). In the first 
six months of the conflict over 835,000 Ukrainian citizens from the war-torn 
areas arrived in Russia to seek asylum (Svodnyj doklad 2014) and over half a 
million Ukrainian citizens received provisional asylum in 2015 and 2016 
(Chislennost’ vynuzhdennyh pereselencev… 2016). 
Centers where people displaced from Ukraine could stay were set up, usually 
in former pioneer camps, health hotels etc. Soon after, however, several 
Russian regions were assigned refugee quotas and Moscow stopped inviting 
more people to settle in those areas. It is important to mention here that the 
influx of people from Ukraine saw the rise of volunteer activities and civil 
society groups to support the refugees and provide them with food, clothes 
and sometimes a place to live. The Civil Assistance Committee and Migration 
and Law NGOs provided free advocacy services in several Russian regions 
to assist refugees.  
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However, as one of the countries with the highest number of asylum claims in 
Europe, Russia has been more inclined to grant applicants provisional asylum 
rather than refugee status; between 2014 and 2016 only 505 Ukrainian 
citizens received it (Chislennost’ vynuzhdennyh pereselencev… 2016). Data 
gathered during the author’s research show that a number of Ukrainian 
citizens from war-affected territories do not have provisional asylum and live 
in Russia as labour or undocumented migrants. Some of those people moved 
to Russia before the war and others come from regions not included in the list 
of conflict-affected territories, which has been the requirement to receive 
asylum. Overall, in 2015 there were 2.6 million registered Ukrainian citizens 
living in Russia. 
The situation of Ukrainians from war-affected territories is likely to change 
with the new law, adopted on 1 May 2016, introducing a simplified procedure 
for issuing residence permits to Ukrainians who have received a refugee 
status or provisional asylum. In addition, according to the new law, those who 
will take part in the federal programme of assistance for volunteer migration 
will be treated as compatriots living abroad. Previously, residence permits 
were issued often even a year after one moved to Russia (Federal Law ‘On 
the amendments to the Article 8 of Federal Law “On the legal status of foreign 
citizens in the Russian Federation” from 1 May 2016 № 129’).2 
Despite a large volume of applications from Ukrainian citizens, there is an 
ongoing confusion in relation to the procedure they shall follow and the 
support they are entitled to. They can remain in Russia for 180 days without a 
visa and significant resources were initially allocated to providing living 
facilities for this group. However, from pilot research it has been clear that 
Ukrainian asylum seekers experience the same problem as other migrants, 
as they become mired in bureaucracy, corruption, and the general lack of 
recognition of migrants’ human rights. Despite the allocated resources and 
administrative support to assist refugees, people have trouble finding official 
employment due to their status. Another problem is mental health. After 
dramatic events, in some cases followed by the loss of home and family, 
people need psychological support and, according to our research, there 
were not enough opportunities to receive it.
2  Assistance to Ukrainian citizens coming to Russia due to armed conflict in Donbas 
became the priority of the State Programme for Voluntary Emigration of Compatriots 
Living Abroad to Russia. In 2014 and the first quarter of 2015, 70,900 Ukrainian citizens 
registered in Russia with the programme, which makes 47.5 per cent of all compatriots 
who migrated to Russia (Monitoring… 2015, 16).
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Undocumented or ‘Illegal’? 
In both the political and media discourse migrants have been commonly 
portrayed as ‘illegal.’ Following the words of Elie Wiesel, a Holocaust survivor 
and Nobel Peace Prize winner: ‘No human being is illegal’, human rights 
activists in many countries campaign to avoid using this term. The 
International Organization for Migration and the United Nations use the term 
‘irregular migration’ and restrict the use of term ‘illegal migration’ to ‘cases of 
smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons’ (International Organization 
of Migration 2011).
However, such nuances do not exist in the Russian state and media 
discourse, which promotes an extremely narrow definition of informal work, 
assuming that the workers take up unofficial employment for tax avoidance 
purposes, and thus by default are illegal. As Williams et al. (2013) have 
shown, many ethnic Russians struggle to operate fully in the formal labour 
market due to employers’ practices, but in the case of labour migrants the 
situation is even more problematic. In Russia, various studies demonstrate 
that informal workers made up between one-fifth and one-third of the total 
employment in 2013 (Gimpelson and Kapeliushnikov 2014). It is unavoidable 
for both the labour market and for migrants as well. Labour migrants, as the 
interviews revealed, in many cases are offered either cash in hand payments, 
or extremely low formal salaries. According to our survey in Kazan in 2013, 
54.5 per cent of labour migrants had neither a patent, nor a work permit 
(Kuznetsova and Mucharyamova 2014a, 47). 
The issues surrounding employers’ practices are perhaps the most pernicious 
in the whole process, as they force labour migrants to operate informally, 
thereby reducing their security and salaries and enabling the state to view 
them as ‘illegal.’ For example, a large number of migrants from post-Soviet 
countries worked in preparation for the Sochi Olympics. Human Rights Watch 
exposed a pattern of abuse across a number of major Olympic sites which 
included non-payment of wages or excessive delays in payments, employers’ 
failure to provide written employment contracts or copies of contracts, 
excessive working hours, illegal withholding of passports and other abuses 
(Race to the Bottom… 2013). Our research showed also that migrants were 
often under attack by Cossacks and police raids, arrested and kept in 
humiliating conditions. Migrant and Law network has supported those who did 
not receive their wages by initiating court cases against the employers. 
Nevertheless, many of them have not been resolved, as it was impossible to 
track the chain of sub-contractors. 
Even when labour migrants work formally, they still occasionally face legal 
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obstacles. For instance, in November 2013 many cities in Russia experienced 
a collapse in public transportation services because of a new legislation 
which prohibited driving with licenses issued in other countries. Thus, 80 per 
cent of drivers in Yekaterinburg and 70 per cent of drivers in Petropavlovsk-
on-Kamchatka have not been able to work on 5 November 2013 (Shipilov 
2013). Neither the migration office, nor the municipal council informed bus 
companies about the new procedures. In the same year, the chief of the 
Russian Duma Committee on State Security, Irina Jarovaya, suggested to 
prohibit migrants’ work in trade, but the initiative was never implemented 
(Jarovaya 2013). 
The social construction of ‘illegality’ does not only block migrants’ possibilities 
to receive a fair wage, but makes them ‘invisible’ for the state. Our analysis of 
data gathered by the Medical Information and Analytical Centre of the 
Republic of Tatarstan found that in 2012 the majority of foreigners did not 
have medical insurance (2560 migrants out of 2584) (Mucharymova, 
Kuznetsova and Vafina 2014; Kuznetsova and Mucharymova 2014b). The 
only accessible care without an insurance policy is emergency care 
(Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva … 2013), but even this was questioned at the 
beginning of 2016 by Duma deputy Vladimir Sysoyev who requested that the 
Ministry of Health Care reconsiders providing migrants with free emergency 
assistance (Runkevich and Malay 2016). Working in Russia has become a 
challenge in terms of access to health care, especially for those employed in 
sectors such as construction and trade, due to the lack of safety regulations 
in the workplace, extremely long working hours and little time for relaxation. 
Both documented and undocumented workers have extremely limited access 
to Russia’s health care system and thus they often turn to paid services they 
can barely afford, informal care or do not undertake any treatment. 
The fear of being ‘illegal’ even among documented migrants negatively 
impacts on people’s everyday lives, limits the available options for spending 
free time, affects community building and creates a huge psychological 
pressure (Round and Kuznetsova 2016).
Conclusion
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia became one the largest migrant 
receiving countries. Most of the immigrants come from the post-Soviet states 
of Central Asia whose economies partly depend on remittances, as well as 
from Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus. Although the visa-free regime 
for citizens of the Commonwealth of Independent States made it relatively 
easy for people to work in Russia, restrictions in the migration law introduced 
in the last decade have created barriers for safe life and employment in the 
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country, and contributed to the decrease of labour migration. The Russian 
state and society have made a lot of effort to support refugees from Eastern 
Ukraine by arranging special employment conditions for this group, however, 
the refugees still face issues related to integration. When it comes to labour 
migrants, the work and living conditions for foreigners from post-Soviet 
countries have been challenging. Those with non-Slavic appearance are often 
subject to xenophobia and racist attacks. Moreover, due to the large size of 
the informal economy, migrants face issues related to access to health care 
and work safety. They live under stress, having to cope with constant 
changes in regulation and the risk of exclusion. 
*This work was supported by funding from the British Academy, Open Society 
Institute and the Russian Foundation for Humanities. The author would like to 
thank Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska and Dr Greta Uehling for their 
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Labour Migration in the 
Eurasian Economic Union
CARESS SCHENK
One of the key points of contention leading to the Ukrainian crisis was the 
debate over whether to sign the Association Agreement, aiming to increase 
Ukraine’s integration with the European Union. The controversy came as a 
result of the perception that any agreements with the EU would necessarily 
be a move away from integration with Russia. In the end, Ukraine proceeded 
with the signing of the Association Agreement in 2014, and Russia moved 
forward with its plans to create the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which 
came into being on 1 January 2015. The management of labour migration in 
the framework of the EEU offers a glimpse at the inner workings of Russia’s 
new integration project. 
The Eurasian Economic Union is an extension of various integration projects 
between the countries of the former Soviet Union beginning with the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Eurasian Economic Community, 
and Eurasian Customs Union. From the Western perspective, the EEU is 
often framed as a Russian imperial project, though in the region there are 
multiple meanings and justificatory frameworks tied to the participation of the 
non-Russian countries (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan). 
From the perspective of migration and labour market integration, the 
agreement is far more radical than anything that has existed since the fall of 
the Soviet Union. In many ways the EEU creates one of the most integrated 
labour markets in the world, clearly taking a page from the EU, though its 
provisions have been so far hardly realised in practice. Migration in the 
Eurasian region has long been dominated by informal processes that have 
little to do with the policies that aim to regulate them, and the EEU has done 
little to change the situation. In order to manage disparate goals at the 
domestic and international levels, member states do not fully implement EEU 
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commitments into domestic law, leaving migration flows in the informal sector 
outside official data, and consequently out of the public eye.
This article looks at the gap between EEU obligations set out in the treaty 
text, domestic immigration laws and procedures in Kazakhstan and Russia, 
and migrant experience with state regulations. In order to assess these gaps, 
I consider government and legal texts, interviews with officials, diaspora 
leaders, and migrant rights activists in Russia and Kazakhstan. Media reports 
and official immigration statistics are also included in the analysis. These 
gaps serve strategic goals of member states because they allow countries to 
formally agree to EEU commitments while keeping domestic policy 
underdeveloped or bureaucratically unwieldy, which serves to keep the 
numbers of migrants who are officially taking advantage of the treaty 
provisions low.
The Ukrainian Crisis and Economic Downturn in Eurasia
The EEU migration system was profoundly impacted by the economic 
downturn in Russia that resulted from the crisis in Ukraine. In response to the 
Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Western countries imposed sanctions 
that compounded the economic difficulties Russia was already facing due to 
falling oil prices, sending the country into negative GDP growth (World Bank 
2015, Dreyer and Popescu 2014). Beginning in August 2014, the rouble 
began to lose hold against the dollar and by December 2014 had fallen to half 
of its value.
At the same time, migration rates began to decline. The Russian media was 
especially keen to announce that migrants were leaving Russia as a result of 
the economic downturn. More specifically, the media reported lower numbers 
of documented labour migrants than in the immediately preceding years. For 
example, compared with 3.2 million documented labour migrants in 2014, 
2015 saw a reduction of 40 per cent to 1.9 million legal labour migrants. 
While media reports focused solely on economic explanations for the fall in 
the number of labour migrants, a major change in Russian migration policy 
also contributed significantly to the ability of migrants to achieve documented 
status. It is the combination of these factors together that contribute to a fuller 
picture of migration. While economic factors are a primary driver of migration 
flows, policies and their implementation determine how easily labour migrants 
will be able to regularise their status. While states often have little control 
over external economic shocks, their greatest point of control over 
immigration is the proportion of migrants who will be diverted to the informal 
sector through policies and their implementation. 
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Policy changes affected all migrants from the Commonwealth of Independent 
States countries who were not part of the EEU (including major sources of 
immigration: Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). New policies that took effect on 1 
January 2015 required migrants to complete a standard set of procedures 
including passing a language, history, and legal norms exam in addition to 
undergoing a number of bureaucratic procedures, all within 30 days of arrival. 
These tasks proved difficult for migrants to complete within the allotted time. 
As a result, many migrants shifted into the informal labour market, 
demonstrating a veritable law of migration, according to which when policy 
becomes more restrictive, previously temporary or circular migration flows 
become more permanent (though in this case unofficial) stocks (Hollifield, 
Martin and Orrenius 2014; Martin P. L. 2014; Massey and Pren, 2012). 
Yet, immigration trends indicate that migration policies are secondary to 
economic forces in determining migration flows. According to a migrant rights 
activist from Moscow, there was indeed an outflow of migrants as a result of 
recession in Russia, but it was temporary, lasting six months or so. Compared 
to the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, which also saw decreased 
migration flows to Russia that recovered only within a few years, the 2014 
recession had a relatively short-term impact on migration flows. In 2014, the 
rouble crisis began to affect Russia’s Central Asian neighbours to the point 
that Russia quickly returned to its place as a comparatively advantageous 
destination for work and earning potential. Despite continued recession, both 
the supply of migrants and the demand for their labour remains robust in 
Russia, even if migrants are not able to legalise their status. The same is true 
in Kazakhstan, a secondary destination for migrants from Central Asia. 
Kazakhstan experienced significant currency devaluation in 2015 (losing 
nearly half of its value) but was able to stave off recession. The comparatively 
better economic position, combined with significant state construction projects 
requiring low-skilled labour (such as EXPO 2017), has increased 
Kazakhstan’s relative importance as a migrant destination in the Eurasian 
region.
Labour Migration Trends, Policies, and Barriers to a Common Labour 
Market
In the context of economic downturn and policy change, the entry into force of 
the EEU created a number of migration-related puzzles. Both in the Russian 
case (Schenk 2013) and more widely in the experience of migration countries 
such as Spain, Japan, South Korea, the US immigrant receiving states often 
erect protectionist policies such as reduced quota, hiring bans, and ‘return 
bonuses’ or pay-to-go schemes (cash settlements to migrants who agree to 
leave the country) in response to economic crisis (Fix, et al. 2009; Martin 
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2009; Ybarra, Sanchez and Sanchez 2016; Lopez-Sala 2013). Given these 
general principles of migration policy-making, the main puzzle herein 
concerns the decision to maximally open the labour market in a time of 
recession. A further puzzle is why open labour market policies would be 
pursued at the same time as other major migration policies were becoming 
increasingly closed and securitised. 
In Russia, reforms of labour permits (called ‘patents’) beginning on 1 January 
2015 for CIS citizens are a key example of migration restrictions that run in a 
counter direction to the EEU common labour market. In both Russia and 
Kazakhstan, we see increasingly securitised migration rhetoric (framing 
migrants as a threat), which both creates and reinforces anti-migrant attitudes 
in society, as well as policies and institutional reforms that follow the rhetoric. 
For example, in April 2016, Russia transferred the responsibility of migration 
regulation and policy development from the independent Federal Migration 
Service into the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In June 2016, Kazakhstan created 
a National Bureau of Migration within the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
specifically to address security-related migration problems including 
uncontrolled migration and illegal settlements.1 
The fact that EEU migration policies run counter to the general migration 
orientation in Kazakhstan and Russia must be carefully managed by these 
countries’ governments in order to manage the dual goals of regional 
integration (to serve geopolitical aims) and protecting local labour markets (to 
satisfy domestic populations). There are two primary ways that this 
management can proceed: in data collection and reporting, and in (non-)
adherence to EEU agreement principles through implementation into 
domestic law and practice. Both of these mechanisms are instrumental in 
determining and reflecting how many migrants are able to formalise their 
labour status. 
It is difficult, though not impossible, to measure the real impact of the EEU on 
migration trends because of a number of data deficits. First of all, data is 
scarce, and in some cases completely absent or unavailable from the 
government sources that collect them. Data in Russia are the most developed 
and publically available in the region, while Kazakhstan is marked by a 
remarkable dearth of data in spite of its position as the second largest migrant 
destination in the region. Second, official government data from the statistical 
services is typically issued with a significant delay. Therefore, at the time of 
writing, data for 2015 has yet to be released (see Table 1). The only available 
data for 2015 comes from Russia’s General Directorate for Migration (the 
1  https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/mvd-rk-poyavitsya-natsionalnoe-byuro-
voprosam-migratsii-296329/
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former Federal Migration Service). These data hint at a third problem: many 
labour migrants do not appear in the official statistics. This is not only 
because of irregular migration, but also due to the potential for labour 
migrants to be counted in different migration categories. As a result, even 
prior to the EEU labour migrants were underestimated for a variety of 
reasons. 
Table 1: Documented labour migrants
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Russia
All 2,425, 
900
2,223, 
600
1,640, 
800
1,792, 
800
2,229, 
100
2,468, 
200
3,177, 
900
1,931, 
957
CIS countries2 1,773, 
800
1,642, 
700
1,245, 
700
1,620, 
400
2,048, 
400
2,303, 
500
2,997, 
800
1,768, 
758
Customs 
Union 
countries3
10,400 11,200 8300 9300 1700 1600 1400 4294
EEU 
countries5
295,1 
00
249,3 
00
185,8 
00
220,0 
00
255,8 
00
302,7 
00
410,7 
00
246,6 
496
Kazakhstan
All7 54,20 
4
30,98 
8
29,17 
8
27,13 
2
22,04 
1
-- 31,60 
08
--
CIS -- -- 3122 -- 2160 -- -- --
Source: (Rosstat, 2015; Rosstat, 2011; Sadovskaya; Sadovskaya, 2013)
2 CIS countries include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Ukrainian citizens are also extended in the 
same entry and work privileges, though they are not an official member of the CIS. 
Ukrainians are recorded in migration statistics as part of the CIS. The 2008 figure 
includes Georgia (4,200 workers), which left the CIS in 2009.
3 These figures reflect workers from Kazakhstan only, as there are no recorded labour 
migrants from Belarus during this period.
4 Includes Belarus.
5 Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia.
6 Number of contracts concluded and submitted to the migration services, plus the 
number of patents issued.
7 The figures reported for Kazakhstan are based on the number of work invitations 
that are issued under migrant quotas (a task that is coordinated by the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Protection). The data are substantially different than those of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (which houses the migration police, in charge of migrant 
registration). According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Kazakhstan hosted between 
350,000-430,000 annually from 2009-2014 (Aliev 2016).
8 As of November: http://economy.gov.kz/ru/gosudarstvennye-uslugi/detail.
php?ELEMENT_ID=68772&
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One of the primary reasons why labour migrants are underestimated is 
because there are a variety of preferable legal statuses they can pursue that 
provide more secure working conditions. These include temporary or 
permanent residence permits, or citizenship, all of which give migrants the 
right to work on the same basis as native-born Russian citizens, without 
preventing the circular movement of migrants between Russia and their home 
country. Furthermore, beginning as early as 2012, Kazakhs and Belarussians 
disappeared from labour migration statistics because they were given free 
access to the Russian labour market within the framework of the Eurasian 
Customs Union (a precursor to the EEU).  Data on border crossings helps to 
capture some of the missing labour market data by showing the volume of 
foreigners entering a particular country (see Table 2). These data include all 
foreigners crossing the border into the country for any reason (e.g. tourism, 
work, study, etc.). They indicate that in the years that show decreasing 
documented labour migration in the Customs Union, the number of border 
crossings increased, suggesting that labour movement in the region 
remained robust yet uncaptured in the official statistics.
Table 2: Entries Recorded by Border Agencies.
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
To Russia
Total 23,67 
6,140
21,33 
8,650
22,28 
1,217
24,93 
2,061
28,17 
6,502
30,79 
2,091
32,42 
1,490
CIS 15,06 
1,619
12,96 
0,167
13,90 
6,605
15,73 
0,278
17,99 
5,850
19,92 
2,378
21,62 
1,143
Customs 
Union9
2,987, 
261
2,877, 
183
3,006, 
549
3,316, 
639
4,003, 
284
4,267, 
106
4,711, 
160
EEU 3,998, 
597
3,663, 
212
4,018, 
498
4,459, 
948
5,327, 
586
5,913, 
388
6,230, 
922
To Kazakhstan
Total 4,721, 
456
4,329, 
848
4,712, 
657
5,685, 
132
6,163, 
204
6,841, 
085
6,332, 
734
CIS 4,105, 
510
3,782, 
254
4,183, 
259
5,195, 
043
5,542, 
447
6,213, 
390
5,655, 
246
EEU -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Sources: (Russian State Statistical Service, 2013; Rosstat, 2011; Rosstat, 2010; Rosstat, 
2015; Министерство национальной экономики Республики Казахстан Комитет 
по статистике, 2015; Агентство Республики Казахстан по статистике, 2013; 
Агентство Республики Казахстан по статистике, 2011).
9 Kazakhstan and Belarus.
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Once the EEU came into force, migrants from Kyrgyzstan and Armenia also 
began to disappear from labour migration statistics. Until August 2015, Kyrgyz 
citizens could not take advantage of the EEU provisions, and were thus 
counted according to previous procedures (i.e. patents). Once EEU 
procedures took over, data collection became problematic. A primary reason 
for this is that migrants did not know the proper procedures for registering 
their presence and work. For labour migrants in Russia the entry into force of 
the EEU was eclipsed by new patent regulations discussed above. The labour 
permit reform was accompanied by a major campaign by the government to 
create state-run migration centres that could consolidate the profits of issuing 
patents.10 In the wake of these activities, the regulations for EEU migrants 
were virtually neglected, and so were any efforts to inform migrants of their 
responsibilities. Several of the government-affiliated migration centres 
advised EEU migrants simply that they did not need to complete procedures 
for getting a patent or obtain permission to work. While this is technically true, 
it neglects a very important aspect of the EEU provisions for the free 
movement of labour. 
Article 96 of the EEU agreement importantly defines employment as ‘activities 
performed under an employment contract’. This short definition has proved to 
be the greatest challenge both for migrants’ ability to realise the benefits of 
the EEU common labour market, and for governments to collect data on the 
work of migrants within the framework of the EEU. Though the Russian 
migration services began to collect data on the number of contracts submitted 
(reflected in Table 1), this was a new procedure and therefore there are no 
comparative data points to date.11 In Kazakhstan, contracts are submitted to 
the migration police, but there are simply no data available from this agency.
A larger problem with employment contracts is that low-skilled labour 
migrants (which are far greater in numbers than high skilled migrants) do not 
traditionally have contracts. The primacy of contracts for migrant workers is 
an important development because of its historical disuse marked by the 
small number of migrants who have labour contracts. Because of this, linking 
a migrant’s status to a formal employment contract could put the legal status 
of EEU migrants in jeopardy. Reports from migrant advocates and activists in 
Russia indicate that many Kyrgyz workers continue to work in Russia without 
a contract, either because they do not believe (or know) it is necessary, or 
because their employers do not want to provide one. In Russia, many 
10  Numerous fees are involved in obtaining a patent (for a Russian language exam, 
medical exam, notarising and translating documents, etc.) typically totaling at least 
10,000 RUB. 
11  The Eurasian Economic Commission alternatively looks at migrants registered with 
the national pension funds to extract data on labour migration. 
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employers have been reluctant to sign contracts since it would formalise the 
working relationship thereby obligating them to pay taxes and social 
insurance (Tyuryukanova 2008, Zayonchkovskaya 2007a).  
A 2015 survey of Kyrgyz and Uzbek labour migrants in five regions of 
Kazakhstan showed that 79 per cent of Kyrgyz migrants surveyed did not 
have a labour contract.12 While these survey results reflect pre-EEU 
procedures, it indicates significant potential problems for migrants (and 
employers) who are not accustomed to signing employment contracts. 
Furthermore, only 44 per cent of migrants reported that their employers 
provided residence registration (a necessary step in confirming legal status), 
while presumably the remainder registered themselves. This indicates that a 
majority of employers offer minimal support to the migrants they hire and may 
be unwilling to sign employment contracts if it obligates them to pay additional 
taxes. 
A further issue is that in some cases national legislation does not yet provide 
the benefits promised in the EEU agreement. A case in point is the residence 
registration procedures for citizens of Kyrgyzstan in Kazakhstan. Despite 
Kyrgyzstan’s entry into the EEU in August 2015, Kazakhstan did not make 
any legal changes in support of the free movement of labour until February 
2016 when the registration period for Kyrgyz citizens coming for the purpose 
of work was extended from five to 30 days (citizens of Russia had prior been 
granted 30 days to register regardless of their purpose of stay, on the basis of 
a bilateral treaty). Only migrants who have declared their purpose of visit as 
work on their migration card are eligible for this extension.13 Family members 
of migrants who will not be working (and thus have listed their purpose of visit 
as ‘private’) must register within five days.14 This is in contravention of the 
EEU agreement, which states that ‘Nationals of the Member States entering 
the territory of another Member State for employment and their family 
members shall be exempt from the obligation to register within 30 days from 
the date of entry’. The Kyrgyz consulate in Kazakhstan indicates the issue of 
extending a longer registration period for family members is still being 
negotiated between the governments, though a representative of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs in Kyrgyzstan reported this is simply an issue of 
Kazakhstan’s compliance with its obligations and there is nothing to discuss 
between the two countries. Consequently, Kyrgyzstan has threatened to 
12  Survey deployed by the author.
13  This information is not provided by the migration police, where registration 
documents must be processed, but rather is only available at the Consulates of EEU 
countries. The migration police do not have a website, nor are there any instructions on 
any Kazakhstani government website explaining registration procedures.
14  http://tengrinews.kz/sng/kazahstan-uprostil-registratsiyu-trudovyih-
migrantov-289703/ 
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shorten the period of stay for Kazakhstani citizens in Kyrgyzstan in retaliation 
for the lack of commitment to EEU norms.15 
Both in Kazakhstan and in Russia migrants must declare their purpose of visit 
as ‘work’ on their migration card as they enter the country. Kazakhstan does 
not report the number of migrant cards received or the purpose of visit, and 
Russia only began reporting nationwide data on the category of work as 
purpose of visit in 2015. Various regions of Russia have published data on 
migrants entering with the stated purpose of work that includes several years 
of comparative data. Data from Moscow is informative, since it is the largest 
migrant recipient in Russia. Table three shows that the number of migrants 
arriving to Moscow with the declared purpose of work increased substantially. 
This is owing in part to the 1 January 2015 rule that patents could only be 
issued to CIS citizens with a migration card that specifies work as the 
purpose of visit. 
Yet, it is also clear that the number of documented migrants is more than four 
times lower than the number of migrants who specify work as their purpose of 
entry on their migration card. The data in Table 3 do not include EEU 
migrants, since Moscow does not issue the number of work contracts 
received by EEU citizens, reinforcing the idea that EEU migration has been 
neglected in comparison with other categories of migrant workers. Yet, since 
Table 1 shows that across all of Russia fewer than 250,000 EEU migrants 
legalised their working status in 2015, even if all 250,000 were in Moscow 
and added to the 550,000 other documented workers, there would only be 
around 800,000 legal migrant workers in Moscow. This number is still far 
fewer than the 2.4 million workers arriving to Moscow with the intention to 
work. We can conclude from these data that because there are many more 
migrants entering who intend to work than are recorded as documented 
labour migrants, not only do data collection procedures underestimate the 
number of labour migrants in Russia, but bureaucratic procedures act as 
barriers to realising full legal status.  
15  https://www.zakon.kz/4797186-v-kazakhstane-sokratilis-sroki.html (Accessed 30 
June 2016). 
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Table 3: Labour migrants in Moscow.
2013 2014 2015
Work permits 339,978 340,843 66,549
Patents 292,490 811,072 484,771
Total documented labour migrants 535,381 1,151,915 551,320
Purpose of entry
--study 72,000 91,500 115,400
--tourism 397,300 332,100 324,200
--private 673,900 654,700 479,400
--work 923,100 1,676,000 2,352,900
--other 182,200 169,300 114,600
Source: Moscow UFMS (Upravlenie Federal’noi Migratsionnoi Sluzhby). 2016. O 
migratsionnoi situatsii v gorode Moskve i osnovnykh resul’tatakh UFMS Rossii po 
gorodu Moskve za 12 mesiatsev 2015 goda. (О миграционной ситуации в г. Москве 
и основных результатах деятельности УФМС России по г. Москве за 12 месяцев 
2015 года.) Moscow.
Conclusion: Priorities vs Realities
In practice, the Eurasian Economic Union is a political project that has a 
primary aim of meeting symbolic geopolitical goals rather than affecting 
concrete policy change. In order to meet domestic goals, while still pursuing 
integration, member states keep from fully implementing EEU obligations at 
the domestic level. As long as the economies are relatively strong, migrants 
continue to come to Kazakhstan and Russia. Yet, when policies are 
underdeveloped or bureaucratically challenging, EEU migrants are unable to 
take advantage of treaty provisions, remain in the informal sector and are not 
captured in official data.
Kazakhstan’s reluctance to implement EEU obligations could indicate several 
things. One potential explanation is that the status quo (which includes a high 
proportion of informal migrants) is beneficial to employers and others who 
profit from migrants and their informal status, while it keeps the number of 
official migrants low. Because the immigrant flows to Kazakhstan are smaller 
than in Russia, they have not provoked a sense of crisis among the public or 
state officials, and therefore immigration is not high on the agenda of priority 
reforms.
In the Russian case, the neglect of EEU migrants can be explained by several 
factors. One is the relatively smaller number of migrants coming from EEU 
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countries, and therefore less urgent attention given to developing procedures 
and disseminating information for these migrants. This is exacerbated by the 
timing of reforms, since Russia concurrently adopted dramatically different 
procedures for non-EEU migrants that took much of the attention away from 
EEU migrants. Second, the EEU labour market reforms were controversial in 
Russia, causing the public to fear a flood of new migrants with no control 
mechanisms to protect the domestic labour market. Neglecting EEU migrants 
serves to keep official numbers low, which is more politically palatable to the 
public.
In the area of migration, policy development is further impeded by the fact 
that there are no high-level agreements on the politics of migration. Prior to 
the agreement’s entry into force, Kazakhstani President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev expressed his desire for the union to remain non-political and by 
his estimation this meant that certain issues such as migration and border 
control should not be under the purview of the EEU (Popescu 2014). In the 
hyper-politicised aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, migration issues (including 
the protection of citizens and ethnic compatriots abroad) could very well be 
seen as vital issues of sovereignty that states are unwilling to have decided 
by a supranational organisation.  Because the countries of the EEU frequently 
draw parallels between Europe and their own experience, any lessons 
learned from Britain’s referendum to leave the European Union, largely 
motivated by migration issues, could contribute to a greater reluctance on the 
part of EEU countries to further deregulate migration arrangements.
Insofar as the EEU affects the sovereignty of the states involved, it cannot 
avoid creating political conflicts within and between member states when 
sensitive issues are at stake. Despite Nazarbayev’s hopes to limit the political 
content of the union, the nature of a grand-scale integration programme will 
necessarily raise questions that can only be answered politically. The current 
situation, where migration policy is vaguely defined, leaving member states to 
rely on national legislation and practices on the ground that do not meet EEU 
obligations, is one way to avoid potential conflict at the top political levels. 
Yet, avoiding high-level conflict will inevitably create tensions in the labour 
markets, as migrant workers’ experience will not proceed according to the 
legal rights afforded them in the EEU framework. If new member states are 
being attracted to EEU membership with the promise of an open labour 
market, the realities of migrant experience on the ground is likely to be 
disappointing. In this context, sending states that are dependent on migrant 
remittances and serious about developing policies for their citizens abroad 
may find EEU membership less than what they bargained for.
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Beyond Attitudes: Russian 
Xenophobia as a Political 
Legitimation Tool
MARINA A. KINGSBURY
Introduction
The Ukrainian conflict has had a curious effect on xenophobia in Russia, 
which had reached unprecedented levels in the autumn of 2013. Xenophobia 
in Russia was artificially stimulated by the regime in order to deflect attention 
from acute societal problems such as corruption, decaying democratic 
freedoms and the economic stagflation. The Ukrainian conflict shook up 
Russian society, causing the Russian State to tone down domestic 
xenophobic rhetoric. The attention concentrated on exploiting the threats 
of Ukrainian nationalism, which would be incompatible with Russian state-
sanctioned xenophobia. This apparent paradox of supporting home-grown 
nationalism and xenophobia, but condemning Ukrainian nationalism, 
resembles the Soviet past, when the leaders argued for the benefits of ‘good 
nationalism’ for building the socialist state (Slezkine 1994).
Currently, the Levada Centre, a reputable Russian public opinion pollster, 
indicates that xenophobia has diminished somewhat, most likely due to the 
decrease in mass media attention to perceived societal problems caused by 
immigrants. Overall, in Russia xenophobia continues to be manipulated and 
sanctioned by the state as the regime steers popular discontent towards 
migrants while declaring its official intolerance to radical nationalism and 
racism. The current political climate is more conducive to sanctioning less 
aggression towards foreigners because the state deems it more in its 
interests.  Instead, attention is focused on the threat from the West – a 
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comfortable antagonist of Russian authoritarianism. 
Existing Theories of Xenophobia
Xenophobia is the anti-immigrant sentiment exhibited by host societies 
towards immigrants from other cultural, ethnic, and religious backgrounds. 
One of the prevalent explanations of xenophobia in existing literature 
attributes hostility towards immigrants to the perceived competition for local 
social and economic resources. The extant literature calls it the competition 
hypothesis (Kischelt 1995; Gorodziesky, Glikman and Maskileyson 2015). 
Fear of immigrants is most common among groups most vulnerable to the 
challenges of a globalised economy. Unskilled labour and lower-middle class 
workers, uneducated, underemployed and unemployed individuals are 
expected to express more anti-immigrant sentiment. The competitive threat 
from the influx of a younger, cheaper immigrant labour force has been found 
to significantly increase anti-immigrant sentiment in European countries 
(Gorodziesky and Semyonov 2015; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodziesky 
2006).  Recent scholarship extends the relevance of the competition 
hypothesis and argues that the negative attitude towards immigrants is 
amplified among those who also hold conservative political views and support 
radical right parties (Gorodziesky and Semyonov 2015; Wilkes, Guppy and 
Farris 2007). 
Semyonov, Gorodziesky, and Raijman (2006), using Eurobarometer survey 
data, found that anti-foreigner sentiment is significantly stronger in localities 
with higher support for radical-right parties. Their findings have been affirmed 
and extended by Wilkes, Guppy and Farris (2007), who argue that the 
strongest association between radical right party support and anti-immigrant 
sentiment is found for those radical right parties that promote cultural racism, 
which is based on the superiority of Western civilisation’s culture and ways of 
life.
The competing cultural theory of anti-immigrant sentiment argues that 
resentment towards immigrants can be explained by the fear of losing cultural 
purity and the dilution of cultural homogeneity (Castles 2010; Putnam 2007; 
Raijman and Semyonov 2004). Recent world events add to the empirical 
understanding of developments across Europe by drawing our attention to the 
ethnic component of anti-immigrant sentiment: the increasing Islamophobia 
that differentiates attitudes toward immigrants based on their national and 
religious identity (Adida, Laitin, and Volford 2016; Givens 2007; Fredette 
2014).
Much of the existing literature evaluates the merits of the competition and 
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cultural hypotheses on the set of developed western European countries with 
stable national identities. 
However, studies of countries that are still experiencing nation-building may 
offer an additional explanatory path. The statistical research of Russian anti-
foreigner sentiments using the third round of the European Social Survey 
(2006), finds low explanatory power of either the competition or cultural 
hypotheses in Russia (Gorodziesky, Glikman and Maskileyson 2015). The 
authors ponder that low explanatory value of the existing hypotheses may be 
due to the different societal dynamics within Russia, stressing the aftermath 
of enormous societal transformation that led to a crisis of national identity. 
This approach finds support among Russian scholars who place Russian anti-
foreigner attitudes into a socio-historical context. Lev Gudkov (2007) argues 
that xenophobia can be at least partially attributed to the complex feelings of 
dissatisfaction and humiliation that citizens of the former world super-power 
may experience. This inferiority complex is akin to the Weimar syndrome. 
Gudkov1 argues that xenophobia is caused by a cocktail of negative 
experiences, humiliation from the loss in the Cold War, and a growing 
instability that stems from the displacement due to the overhaul of the 
economic and political system following the collapse of the USSR (Gudkov 
2016). Vladimir Mukomel (2015) argues that the rise of Russian xenophobia 
can be explained by the changing solidarities in the society, built by 
contemporary Russian elites on the basis of the new solidarity of traditional 
Russian values and order. The underlying premise of the argument is that 
immigration is eroding the Russian identity, Russian culture, and the Russian 
way of life. Together, these studies contribute an important socio-historical 
explanation to extant theoretical base. 
Xenophobia as an Instrument of Power Legitimation 
In addition to the existing explanations of xenophobia, I propose the political 
explanation. The elites manipulate popular immigrant phobias for political 
gain. Explanations of Russian xenophobia must include the role of the state, 
a tradition partially inherited from the past. Historically, the Russian Empire 
has been a heterogeneous state, with many ethnic and religious groups 
calling it home. After the Bolshevik Revolution altered the make-up of the 
Russian Empire, one of the tasks of the new government was the formation of 
the multi-ethnic state. Soviet elites played a decisive role in supporting 
1  ‘The country, generally speaking, suffers from the strongest complex of inferiority. 
And is frustrated about it. A great country – but lives in wretchedness, arbitrariness, 
boorishness. This is a stable complex of dividedness and shame before the West’ 
(Gudkov 2016). 
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tolerance in the multinational state. The USSR created a system based on 
multinationalism and ethnic heterogeneity (Brubaker 1994; Kellas 1998). On 
personal and institutional levels, the state defined and sponsored ethnic 
tolerance and promoted inter-personal harmony, while limitations to the 
freedom of movement restricted co-mingling of different ethnic and regional 
groups. These practices created a strong institutional barrier to the spread of 
explicit xenophobia.2 At the end of the 1980s, about 20 per cent of USSR 
citizens had xenophobic views, while aggressive ethno-phobia was reported 
by six to 12 per cent of respondents. Xenophobia in Russia was significantly 
lower than the USSR average (Gudkov 2007, 49-50).  
Upon the collapse of the USSR, the state ideology, including the support for 
ethnic federalism, perished as well.3 The new Russian state opened 
opportunities for greater mobility of masses from within Russia as well as 
from abroad. In the absence of the state-enforced taboo on xenophobia and 
the rapidly increasing co-mingling of different peoples, attitudes towards 
others – immigrants from the Russian regions and abroad – started to 
change. 
Following the wild and unpredictable 1990s, when the state held a 
comparatively small role in regulating societal life, the new Putin government 
stabilised the economy, but also launched an assault on democratic 
institutions, slowly working to limit political dissent, undermine the 
transparency of elections, and to limit the accountability of governance in 
Russia. Russia in the 2000s was re-classified from a partially-free state into 
an autocratic state by the Freedom House. Russian media has been found to 
be restricted, characterised by government censorship, and persecution of 
bloggers. Elections have become unfair and not free (Freedom House 2015). 
Scholars of transition classify Russia as a competitive authoritarian regime, 
which can be characterised by the formal existence of democratic institutions 
such as multi-party elections of the executive and the legislative branches, 
but elections are neither transparent nor fair, the freedom of media and 
political competition has been stifled, and the turnover of leadership as a 
result of fair competitive elections has not happened since 2000 (Levitsky and 
Way 2002). 
Extant scholarship emphasises the importance of regime legitimation for 
authoritarian leaders. Investing in regime legitimisation allows regime leaders 
to ensure survival. Authoritarian leaders rely on the threat of violence and co-
2  However, not consistently, as anti-Semitism was quite common (SOVA Center 
2003). 
3  For a review on the establishment of Soviet policies that promoted ethnic federalism 
see Slezkine (1994). 
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optation of elites as an important source of legitimacy (Geddes 1999; Levitsky 
and Way 2012; Svolik 2009). Kailitz and Stockemer (2015) broaden our 
understanding of authoritarian legitimacy by pointing to the importance of 
legitimation of their authority with the masses as well as the political elites. 
Ulfelder (2005) finds that authoritarian leaders may increase the chances of 
regime survival to a greater degree when they can maintain legitimacy and 
thus avoid contentious collective action (riots, general strikes, or anti-
government demonstrations) rather than just relying on the threat of violence 
and elite co-optation. Dimitrov (2009) argues that competitive authoritarian 
regimes do worry about popular support and try to maintain it by exploiting 
populist rhetoric, keeping up with social welfare spending and exploiting some 
form of nationalist sentiment.
I explore the argument that the Russian political establishment mounted the 
horse of nationalist populism in the mid-2000s to maintain popular legitimacy 
by taking advantage of nationalist popular moods. Authoritarian leaders often 
invoke anti-Western populist rhetoric to support their popularity, offering a 
visible, yet intangible enemy to the populace. Using the same logical 
framework, it can be argued that immigrants, as a form of the Other, can be 
portrayed as the enemy, especially if migrants are demonised as a source of 
evil, such as crime and terrorism. I propose that the Russian regime utilises 
xenophobia as a political tool to demonstrate that it is successfully addressing 
the threat that migrants reportedly create. This is largely an exaggerated 
threat, a political construction akin to the threat of the West that is used by 
authoritarian regimes to divert citizens’ attention from internal societal 
problems, such as corruption, the lack of democratic freedoms, and economic 
stagnation. Xenophobia is utilised to maintain the regime’s legitimacy in an 
effort to prevent contentious collective action.
Xenophobia in Russia 
The active exploitation of social mobilisation around nationalist slogans (and 
the cultivation of the enemy image), as well as the growing authoritarian 
tendencies, created favourable conditions for the use of xenophobia as a 
political instrument by the end of the first decade of the 2000s. Opinion polls 
results indicate a rise in nationalism and transformation in the societal 
acceptance of others (Gudkov 2013). The old Soviet taboo on xenophobia 
eroded and was replaced by the increase of Russian ethnic nationalism, 
which can be gauged through the growing popularity of the slogan ‘Russia for 
Russians.’ Verkhovskii and Pain (2012) trace the emergence of the slogan to 
2002, when the Russian ultra-nationalist movement DPNI4 injected it into 
mainstream use. This slogan appealed to various radical-right, nationalist, 
4  Dvizenie Protiv Nezakonnoi Migratsii – Movement against Illegal Immigration.
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populist movements by focusing on the visible enemy – immigrants. In 2005, 
Russian nationalists of various flavours organised the inaugural ‘Russian 
March,’ which became a yearly affair drawing more supporters each year. 
Arguably, several factors contributed to rising migrantophobia: growing 
migration from ethnically-diverse Central Asian and South Caucasus 
countries, a rise in illegal immigration due to overly-restrictive immigration 
regulations, as well as acts of terrorism connected to the war in Chechnya. 
The change in the make-up and the growing volumes of migrant flows 
exacerbated the declining acceptance of migrants. If, in the early 1990s, the 
majority of migrants were ethnic Russians repatriating from the former Soviet 
Republics, at the turn of the 21st century, labour migration consisted of 
workers from the Central Asian republics, Southern Caucasus, Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Moldova. By 2007, Central Asian countries, especially Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan, became the leading countries of origin of migrant labour 
(Florinskaya 2013).  
Immigrants supplied an easy target for the growing number of nationalist 
groups and political factions, which had enjoyed a lack of governmental 
restrictions. During the 2003 parliamentary election campaign, several 
political parties embraced the nationalist rhetoric, including the Communist 
Party (KPRF) and the far-right Political Party LDPR. The Kremlin jumped on 
the bandwagon as well, creating the nationalist faction Rodina, which later 
became a stand-alone party known for its political extremism and 
unapologetic nationalist sentiment. In 2005 Rodina featured a xenophobic 
political TV ad, portraying migrants as the source of crime.5 The party was 
later disqualified from participation in elections for inciting inter-ethnic hate 
(Grani 2005).    
By 2007, public xenophobic rhetoric emanated from the powerful Russian 
politician, Yuri Luzhkov, the Mayor of Moscow. His reappointment was 
proposed by President Putin in June 2007. The same month, Luzhkov made 
resonating statements calling for limiting migrant quotas in Moscow.6 The 
Moscow government continued the anti-immigrant rhetoric throughout the 
summer of 2007, calling public attention to the threats of undocumented 
immigration and vowing to clean Moscow of undocumented migrants (New 
Izvestiya 2007). The 2007 Duma election campaign took place in December 
5  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PiBOg5jTJQs 
6  ‘My dolzny obespechivat ob’em kvotirovaniya, I nam luchshe govorit o tom, chto u 
kogo-to voznikla nekhvatka v trudovoi sile I reshat vopros po uvelicheniju kvot, a ne 
zagodya dat’ s izbytkom I poluchit nagruzku na meditsiny, registratsiu – i poluchit 
gulyaushikh migrantov’ (Polit.ru 2007). 
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2007 without parties publically endorsing anti-immigrant rhetoric.7 However, 
pro-Kremlin youth movements, such as ‘Mestnye’ and ‘Nashi’ became 
involved in public hunts for illegal immigrants. These ‘citizens’ patrols’ 
[druzinniki] were often co-conducted with local police units, including raids 
through open-air markets and migrant dormitories (Gazeta 2007). Among the 
slogans used were the calls to limit migrants’ presence in public 
transportation vocations [ne dadim rulit migrant] (Grani 2007). In 2008, the 
Kremlin-backed youth group ‘Molodaya Gvardia’ staged pickets of builders 
and FMS offices with slogans like ‘our money to our workers’ [nashi dengi – 
nashim lyudyam] and ‘every other one – out’ [kazdyi vtoroi – domoi] (Lenta 
2008; Vzglyad 2008). This tacit approval of the ‘citizens’ patrols’ by Kremlin-
backed groups created the overall impression in society that all immigrants 
are undocumented and that negative attitudes towards foreign workers are 
common. 
The mass media paid increased attention to migrant crime statistics, following 
press releases from the power ministries (Chudinovskikh 2009a). For 
example, after the Deputy Interior Minister Sukhodolskiy reported the 
increased incidents of crime among migrants in December 2008, several 
media outlets reported the news, including Interfax, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 
and internet portals NewsRU and RIA Novosti (Interfax 2008; 
Komsomolskaya Pravda 2008; NewsRU 2008; RIA 2008). In 2009, mass 
media focused on retranslating migrant crime statistics after a Russian 
Prosecutor’s Office Investigative Committee official argued that crime rates 
rose by 134 per cent among the undocumented immigrants, who often 
commit the most violent offences (Infox 2009; KM 2009; Rossiyskaya Gazeta 
2009). These figures were characterised as misleading by the head of the 
Federal Migration Office, Konstantin Romodanovsky (Vedomosti 2009). 
Nonetheless, the threat of heightened immigrant crime became a hot button 
topic publicised in Russian mass media, most of which is controlled by the 
state. Although crime statistics were often taken out of context, media reports 
resonated with the public, contributing to popular xenophobia. For instance, 
the media often cited data on crimes committed by migrants without 
comparing it to the total crime rates, creating a tendency to over-estimate 
crimes committed by the migrants. If taken as a proportion of total crime, 
migrant crime has stayed within two per cent of the total number of offenses 
(Chudinovskikh 2009b). 
Anti-immigrant hysteria culminated in the summer of 2013 during the Moscow 
mayoral election which featured increased attention to the topic of 
7  Although, one could argue that anti-immigrant statements made by Luzhkov could 
be taken as such, given that Luzhkov was the vice-chairman and one of the founders of 
the largest pro-government party United Russia.
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immigration (Abashin 2014; Kingsbury 2015). The elections were highly 
contested, with candidates from six Russian parties participating: the ruling 
United Russia, the Communist Party KPRF, the far-right LDPR, the liberal 
party Yabloko, centre-left Spravedlivaya Rossiya, and the new opposition 
party RPR-Parnas. Every candidate devoted space in their electoral 
programmes to discussing the ills of immigration, and the need to combat 
irregular movement, with several candidates openly calling for outright 
prohibition of migration. The campaign was dominated by the notorious 
interviews of Sergei Sobyanin, the acting Mayor, who opined that immigrants 
should not settle in Moscow, rather they should return home promptly after 
finishing their seasonal work8 (RBC 2013). Several candidates from the 
mainstream political parties expressed their support for implementing visas 
for workers from the former USSR countries, who can legally cross the 
Russian border visa-free as per provisions of the Eurasian Economic Union. 
The summer of 2013 was marked by large-scale illegal migrant raids 
organised by the police and migration officials (Vedomosti 2013). Russian 
sociologists argue that such disproportionately heavy emphasis on the issues 
of immigration contributed to the spike of xenophobia among Russians 
(Volkov 2013). 
The conflict in the Moscow district of Biryolovo illustrates the tactic of using 
xenophobia to prevent collective action against the regime. In August 2013, 
an undocumented immigrant from Azerbaijan attacked and killed a local man. 
Mass protests followed the killing. Residents took to the streets to draw 
attention to their grievances. According to media reports, citizens of the 
Biryolovo district have continuously expressed dissatisfaction with a large 
vegetable warehouse located in the district. As reported by local residents, 
the warehouse harboured illicit activity and sidestepped sanitary norms. Mass 
media, meanwhile, emphasised the ills of irregular immigration, claiming that 
it breeds crime. Riots in Biryolovo exemplified the substitution of socio-
economic grievances with a xenophobic message. Citizens were frustrated 
that the municipal government did not address their grievance that stemmed 
from the perceived corruption and mismanagement in the district. The overall 
dissatisfaction with socio-economic problems were carried by nationalist 
groups, which supplied activists to turn protests into violent riots. 
The mass media content during the 2013 electoral campaign could be 
characterised as producing a coordinated campaign to demonise labour 
8  ‘Ya protiv togo, chtoby ety ludy prosto tak ostavalis. Esli kogo-to ostavlyat, to v 
pervuyu ochered russkoyazychnykh, s adekvatnoi nashim traditsiyam kulturoi. 
Sootechestennikov – tak my ih uslovno nazyvaem. Ludyam, kotorye plokho govoryat 
po-russki, u kotorykh sovershenno drugaya kultura, luchshe zit v svoei strane. Poetomy 
my ne privetstvyem ih adaptatshiu v Moskve’ (DNI.Ru 2013).   
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migrants. The ills of irregular immigration became a constant theme in mass 
media, including reports of crime statistics taken out of context. For example, 
mass media reports in 2013 emphasised the increased frequency of grave 
crime [tiazkoe prestuplenie] such as rape or murder following the 
announcements by the Moscow’s Prosecutor Sergei Kudeneev. He reported 
that migrants commit every fifth murder, every second rape, and every third 
robbery9 (Lenta 2013a). However, these statistics reflects portions of solved 
crime, not the overall crime. When compared to the full data, there has not 
been a significant increase. Full crime statistics reflects small fluctuation in 
the levels of crime committed by migrants in Moscow; it remained at the five 
to seven per cent levels between 2010 and 2013, while the levels of solved 
crime remained between 15 and 16 per cent (Zaionchkovskaya et al. 2014). 
Even the country’s leadership broke their silence in 2013. The Russian state 
has officially positioned itself as a multi-ethnic multinational state; Russian 
territories are home to a sizable population of Muslims, representatives of 
indigenous groups, and other religious and cultural minorities. However, the 
official message of tolerance diverges with the practice of tacitly supporting 
Russian ethnic nationalism by emphasising the Russian Orthodox religion 
and funding nationalist youth groups (Gorodziesky et al 2015; Pain 2007; 
Schenk 2012). By autumn 2013, the leadership retreated from the official 
stance as the President made anti-immigrant public comments. In August 
2013, President Putin signed into law a bill that would increase the fines for 
breaking migration regulations in Moscow and Saint Petersburg. Newspaper 
headlines reported Vladimir Putin’s remarks calling on the Duma and the 
Administration to tighten migration regulations and especially prohibit 
migrants from retail occupations (Lenta 2013b). Two months later Putin 
argued that migrants must respect Russian culture and values and abide by 
Russian laws, implying that they presently respect neither.10 Putin also 
stressed the necessity to stop corruption among migrants (RIA 2013). By the 
end of 2013, xenophobia became an outlet for public frustration with socio-
economic problems, having been openly sanctioned by state officials and 
reinforced through the mass media.  
The Ukrainian Conflict and Mass Xenophobia in Russia 
Events of the autumn of 2013 and winter of 2014 in neighbouring Ukraine, 
9  ‘Migrantami v Moskve sovershaetsia kazdoe piatoe ubiistvo, kazdoe vtoroe 
iznasilovanie i kazdoe tretie – grabezi i razboi’ (Lenta 2013a).
10  ‘Чтобы мы добились от мигрантов безусловного уважения наших законов, 
обычаев, культуры регионов, куда они приезжают’ [So that we demand from 
migrants the unconditional respect of our laws, customs, culture of regions where they 
arrive] (RIA 2013). 
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where pro-EU demonstrations led to the escalation of conflict and the ouster 
of President Yanukovich, diverted public attention from the internal problems 
within Russia. The conflict in Ukraine has been positioned by the mass media 
as a conflict between the Ukrainian nationalists and the Russian-speaking 
Eastern Ukrainians. For the regime, justifying support for the Ukrainian 
separatists based on the claims of cultural discrimination appeared 
incongruent with using nationalist and xenophobia rhetoric inside Russia. As I 
showed above, throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century Russian 
authorities have appropriated anti-immigrant rhetoric to redirect public 
dissatisfaction towards immigrants. After the success of the Ukrainian 
Euromaidan revolution, the appeal of nationalism as a political tool lost its 
lustre for the Russian regime. Ukrainian nationalism was equated to fascism 
and blamed for Ukraine’s misfortunes by mainstream mass media (Levada 
Centre 2014). 
At home nationalist, xenophobic rhetoric became a powerful catalyst of mass 
protest by the end of 2013. The 2013 ‘Russian March’ featured not only the 
anti-immigrant message, but also sounded out social discontent with the 
regime, calling for fair and transparent elections and freedom of speech 
(Nezavisimaya Gazeta 2013). The ‘acceptable’ Russian patriotic nationalism11 
utilised by the regime during the previous decade became difficult to 
distinguish from the ‘bad’ Ukrainian nationalism spearheaded by the 
Euromaidan movement. So the mass media xenophobic rhetoric was toned 
down. As reported by Levada Centre’s spokesperson, federal television 
channels, which are the source of news to almost 94 per cent of Russians, 
almost eliminated xenophobic news segments about migrants (Levada Centre 
2014). Instead, Russian media wrote about accepting refugees from Eastern 
Ukraine. The State Duma passed amendments to the Citizenship Law12 that 
provided a streamlined procedure for Russian speakers [nositeli yazyka]. The 
rhetoric towards the Others – refugees, migrants, and foreigners in general, 
was somewhat toned down. Consequently, Russians’ approval of the 
nationalist movements and slogans declined, as measured by the approval of 
the slogan ‘Russia for Russians’ (Levada Centre 2015). The official message 
became one of intolerance to radical nationalism. 
This ideological shift coupled with the increased popularity of Putin following 
the take-over of Crimea made unnecessary diversionary tactics such as 
focusing on the ills of immigration. Approval ratings of the authorities and of 
Putin personally rose contributing to the de-escalation of protest attitudes, 
11  See the discussion on the Russian nationalism in Gudkov (2013) and Verkhovskii 
and Pain (2010).
12  Federal Law on Citizenship of the Russian Federation [Zakon o Grazdanstve], № 
62-ФЗ.
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according to the Levada Centre polls.13 The regime no longer felt the 
immediate threat of collective action against it. As the Ukrainian conflict 
developed and the EU and the US initiated sanctions to contain Russia, the 
regime re-focused attention towards an external enemy – the West. Media 
reports paid close attention to NATO enlargement in Eastern Europe and the 
economic and political sanctions against Russia. The woes of the Russian 
economy were blamed on Western sanctions and the conspiracy that the fall 
in oil prices was designed to suffocate the Russian economy.
Following the change in official discourse, sociologists registered the 
reduction in popular xenophobia. Levada Centre noted the drop in hostility 
towards migrants, which was immediately reported by the mass media. The 
Levada Centre polls reported a decreased anticipation of violent inter-ethnic 
conflict and reduced tensions (Levada Centre 2015). At the same time 
hostility towards the West has risen substantially. To gauge the frequency of 
mentioning the migrants in the Russian mass media, I performed a content 
analysis of headlines that appeared in 34 large Russian print newspapers 
between 2014 and 2016 (N=450). In 2014, migrants were mentioned 121 
times, gasterbeiters 11 times and [Ukrainian] refugees 18 times. In 2015, 
migrants were mentioned 128 times, gasterbeiters 11 times and refugees [to 
the EU] 50 times. In the first half of the 2016, migrants were mentioned 40 
times, gasterbeiters five times, while refugees [to the EU] were mentioned 13 
times. This content analysis indicates that the topic of migration was not 
abandoned by the Russian mass media. 
Rather, headlines broadened the focus on the burdensome provisions of 
existing migration regulations, such as the transition to the patent system, the 
problems of medical insurance for labour migrants, and Russian language 
proficiency requirements as efforts aimed at immigrant integration. Mass 
media wrote about the problems of access to secondary school education for 
migrant children. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation heard 
the case brought about by the families of migrants and refugees which 
contested the local residency registration requirements for school entry 
(Kommersant 2015). Considerable attention in 2014 was given to the 
accommodation of East Ukrainian refugees and to playing up the ills of 
radical Ukrainian nationalism: the strength of radical-right parties such as 
Svoboda or Right Sector in the Ukrainian parliament or ultra-nationalist 
marches on the streets of Ukrainian cities. 
In 2015-2016, Russian media actively exploited the topic of the imminent 
dissolution of the European Union brought about by uncontrolled migration. 
13  These are the on-going polls of the authorities [organy vlasti]. The results can be 
found at http://www.levada.ru/indikatory/odobrenie-organov-vlasti/
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The EU migration crisis, caused by the complicated security situation in the 
Middle East and North Africa, allowed Russian elites an additional 
legitimation opportunity. The unresolved migration problems within Russia 
have been fit into the world pattern – it no longer was the reflection of the 
incompetency of the Russian state, it became a universal problem with which 
even the EU countries cannot grapple successfully. After the Paris terrorist 
attacks in November 2015, Russian rhetoric intensified the theme of terrorism 
and the security threat that stems from uncontrolled migration. 
Conclusion
I have argued that the Russian regime manipulated popular xenophobia to 
divert the attention of the masses from societal problems. By demonising 
migrants, the regime re-directed public dissatisfaction to the visible and often 
powerless migrant. These diversion tactics allowed the state to maintain 
legitimacy during a period in which its popularity declined. As the extant 
studies posit, competitive authoritarian regimes thrive and survive when they 
can maintain popularity. Putin’s personal ratings continue at a high level, 
however, Russians’ feelings about the regime, measured through citizens’ 
evaluation of their lives, remain largely pessimistic, suggesting the existence 
of latent protest potential. The Levada Centre indices of family well-being, 
which reflect the subjective evaluation of families’ material well-being, and 
indices of expectations for the future, which reflect citizens’ feelings about 
their personal future as well as the future of the country, have remained 
mostly negative since 2007. The indices of family well-being and expectations 
for the future remain at a significantly lower level than the overall government 
approval rates, which combines citizens’ evaluations of the President and the 
Administration [index vlasti] (Levada Centre 2016).  
These measures of public opinion reveal the massive potential for the loss of 
popularity for the existing government which can evolve from the 
dissatisfaction with the poor personal well-being to the dissatisfaction with the 
regime. Popular xenophobia rose sharply in the fall of 2011, culminating in 
October 2013. At the same time, approval ratings of the government and the 
President fell to their lowest point in 2013, at 61 per cent. Anti-immigrant 
rhetoric resonated with the public, which had been pre-conditioned by the 
massive anti-immigrant media campaign that focused on irregular migration 
and crimes committed by foreigners. Immigrants were presented as a visible 
and common object of blame for societal ills, especially corruption, crime, 
public health hazard, and even road accidents. The elites promoted the 
negative image of an immigrant as a convenient object for public anger. Just 
as populist social-welfare programmes can dissipate public anger and the 
resolve to demand government accountability, so can shifting the blame for 
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problems from the government to the tangible enemy – the immigrant. To 
avoid mass protests akin those in 2011–2012, the state must maintain the 
visibility of a credible threat to disperse attention from vital societal problems: 
degradation of the economy, the gap between the rich cities and the poor 
provinces, growing poverty levels, and soaring corruption. 
This analysis contributes to the socio-historical explanation of Russian 
xenophobia, advanced by Russian scholars, by showing how complex 
historical, political and social events shape up patterns of xenophobia, and 
how xenophobia is used as a political legitimation tool in Russia. As the 
Russian economy suffered from economic and political sanctions invoked by 
the West in response to the Ukrainian conflict, immigrants were no longer the 
prime enemy of the state. The West became once again the source of public 
threat and the object of blame for socio-economic problems. The regime did 
not have to artificially inflate xenophobia. Anti-immigrant sentiment fell in 
2014, and continued at a lower level in 2015, while animosity towards the 
external enemy (the US and the EU countries) was on the rise. Looking 
forward, the 2016 Duma elections will show whether the use of xenophobia 
as a political weapon is the new go-to tool in the arsenal of the regime, or if 
the 2013 elections were an outlier. 
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Conclusion
GRETA UEHLING
Scholars of migration are well accustomed to probing the factors that prompt 
and inhibit human migration. The scholarship in this volume provides a 
thorough exploration of the motivations and directions, as well as the volume 
and composition of what might aptly be called ‘the other European migrant 
crisis.’ Much less often, scholars take advantage of migratory processes as a 
vantage point for understanding broader social, economic, and political 
processes. The contributions to this volume do this admirably, illuminating the 
migratory patterns emanating from conflict within Ukraine and shining light on 
how migration intersects with issues of global significance including: 
• The power of migration policy to change migratory flows (Fomina, 
Oleinikova, Denisenko, Schenk)
• Xenophobia and the propensity to demonise migrants (Bulakh, Mukomel, 
Kuznetsova and Kingsbury) 
• Citizenship and access to rights and resources (Fomina, Uehling, 
Kuznetsova, and Schenk, Ivashchenko-Stadnik) 
• The role of official propaganda disseminated through news media in 
influencing prevailing narratives (Bulakh, Gentile, Morozov, Kuznetsova, 
and Kingsbury) 
• Remittances as strategy of self-reliance in the absence of state support 
(Fomina) and economic growth (Denisenko), 
• Labour migration as a driver of development (Denisenko) 
• Supranationalism and integration (Schenk, Morozov, Kuznetsova) 
Thus, it is possible to say the topic of migration, as treated by these authors 
brings together what are conventionally seen as diverse and separate areas 
of scholarship. In addition to generating a large number of migrants, war and 
conflict in Ukraine has had an impact on the way these societies see both 
themselves and the West in addition to (more predictably) changing migration 
policy and law, and affecting the economies in the region. These issues are 
pressing in light of the erosion of the post-Cold war order in the wider Europe. 
There are three features that, particularly in combination, distinguish this 
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volume. First, the arguments are strengthened by the authors’ well-grounded 
use of mixed methods. In the chapters above, analyses of statistics are 
enhanced by ethnography, focus groups complemented by elite interviews, 
and financial data illuminated by first-person perspectives. Second, the 
volume is enriched by a decidedly international cadre of scholars, something 
worth noting considering the authors lacked a single disciplinary home or 
even conference venue in which to convene. This is to say the authors in this 
volume come from both Eastern and Western academic institutions, and carry 
out their research from the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Poland, Finland, 
Estonia, Turkey, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On a 
humorous note, the contributors have also had the good fortune not to 
replicate any of the geopolitical conflict that is the subject of their study! Third 
and perhaps most importantly, the perspectives on ‘the other migrant crisis’ 
presented here are based on primary, original and independent research. 
This brings authoritative insight to the topic at hand. 
New approaches
Each of the chapters is, in its own way, theoretically and/or methodologically 
innovative. The volume is thus in close dialogue with contemporary social 
science theorising. Gentile breaks new theoretical and methodological ground 
by bringing human geography into close articulation with political ideology 
and social memory. This ‘triangulation’ enables Gentile to identify the 
mechanisms through which conflict is generated where none previously 
existed. This author amply demonstrates the explosive potential of fault-line 
cities. Ukraine is only one example how controversy over signifiers without 
firmly established or deeply seated meaning can be used to disrupt quotidian 
existence. Using this approach may prove useful for thinking about other 
locations where conflict is likely. 
Ivashchenko-Stadnik picks up on the theme of alienation (later also explored 
by Bulakh). She questions the term ‘civil war,’ and sees the denial of external 
aggression as a factor that complicates resolution. She suggests (like Bulakh 
in the following chapter) that the treatment of IDPs as quasi-citizens does not 
bode well for the future. Only by providing IDPs with greater civil and political 
rights can social tension be avoided and human development achieved. 
Ivashchenko-Stadnik’s methodological intervention is to disaggregate not just 
the migrants (typical of most migration studies) but the hosts, in this case into 
neighbours and friends; employers and employees; and civil society. 
Bulakh brings classic anthropological theories concerned with purity and 
danger (Douglas 1966) successfully applied to the context of Africa’s Great 
Lakes crisis (Malkki 1995) into Eastern Europe to analyse the aftermath of 
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Ukrainian migration. This theoretical approach makes vivid how the 
categorisation of migrants from Donbas as unpure percolates into the way 
they are treated, not just on the street but also by state workers and policy 
makers. Importantly, this work suggests that stigma may become self-
perpetuating through mechanisms of bureaucratic marginalisation. Thus 
Ukraine’s xenophobia with respect to IDPs represents not just a temporary 
problem to be overcome, but a considerable tear in the social fabric.
If Bulakh is concerned with the reception of IDPs, Uehling focuses more on 
the IDPs themselves. This chapter seeks to uncover some of the unintended 
positive effects of the occupation of Crimea inherent in the invention of 
traditions (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) that carry the potential to hold 
Ukraine together in the future. Another consequence is a growing sense of 
political agency that manifests itself in the myriad ways the IDPs reject the 
notion they are victims and insist on their ability to act and choose for 
themselves. Given these and other distinctions, is likely that in future studies, 
IDPs from Crimea will be in a separate analytic category from IDPs from the 
Donbas region. 
This is not to say that IDPs have benefitted from their displacement. In fact, 
the irony is that even as the people displaced are suspected to have betrayed 
Ukraine, it is the Ukrainian state that has ‘betrayed’ displaced people first by 
failing to defend Crimea against Russian incursion, and second by delaying 
the provision of a full set of rights. The tropes of loyalty and betrayal used 
against the indigenous Crimean Tatars after the Great Patriotic War have 
been inverted with this conflict – it is now the Ukrainian state that has let 
down its indigenous people. 
Using elite interviews, and expanding the focus further westward, Fomina 
maps the changes in the flow of migrants from Ukraine to Poland. This author 
has used official migration and banking data to identify a striking disconnect 
between official statements and the volume of the flows. This finding is 
especially significant considering how the Polish response to migrants from 
Ukraine is directly connected to the refugee crisis in Europe: Polish officials 
claim to be unable to accept Syrian refugees on the grounds that they are 
accepting Ukrainian ones. 
Just as remittances from Russia to the three poorest Central Asian states are 
important, Fomina shows how remittances figure into Ukrainian migration to 
Poland. Fomina suggests that while it may not be highly significant macro-
economically (as they are in Central Asia), impacts are felt at the level of the 
household. Taken together we have evidence of a true financescape 
(Appadurai 1991) in which capital is being redistributed (largely unofficially) 
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from more to less wealthy countries across the region, a component of larger 
global flows of people and capital. 
Data from in-depth interviews fills out the picture obtained from financial data 
and official statements to reveal that a Ukrainian-Polish civil society has been 
strengthened by the Ukraine crisis. Mirroring dynamics observed by Uehling 
(this volume) in government-controlled Ukraine, the Ukrainian émigré 
community in Poland has been refreshed, and Poles have had an opportunity 
to correct erroneous stereotypes held about Ukrainians. 
While Fomina takes us westward to Poland, Oleinikova takes us south and 
east to Australia. Combining rich ethnographic data gathered in Australia with 
data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics and the State Statistics Service 
of Ukraine, Oleinikova analyses the structural variables influencing migration 
to Australia over a much longer time period than considered in any of the 
other chapters, beginning with dynamics around the time of the First World 
War. She also provides deep insight into the thoughts and feelings of different 
cohorts of migrants. 
Oleinikova’s intervention is to shows how the intersection of Australian 
migration policy with Ukrainian’s political and economic trajectory has shaped 
successive waves of migrants between these two countries. The latest flow is 
survival oriented and not surprisingly disillusioned by the Ukrainian dream of 
reform. Like the migrants Fomina describes in Poland, these migrants are a 
symptom that exposes political and economic disarray, urgently in need of 
further study. In these analyses, migrants are markers that provide a 
barometer of public sentiment. 
Just as the Russian patent system increased access to the Russian labour 
market (Schenk, Denisenko this volume), Australia controlled the volume and 
composition of migrants from Ukraine through the types of visas it made 
available. As seen in migration to the United States and to the European 
Union, migrants who do not fit the desired categories are using other 
channels like study, training, internships, and asylum.   
In the second half of the volume, Mukomel combines media monitoring with 
sociological studies to explore how the response to the flow of migrants from 
Ukraine to Russia became polarised. Just as Bulakh demonstrated how the 
reception of migrants cooled within Ukraine over time, Mukomel shows how 
the initial enthusiasm faded as concern about jobs, an attitude of entitlement 
on the part of the migrants, and the inability of state structures to mediate 
these concerns gradually led to tension. This is particularly poignant 
considering the tight relationship that Russia and Ukraine once enjoyed. 
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Mukomel’s exploration provides an important baseline for studies in the future 
by suggesting that if tensions between refugees and local population are not 
resolved, and low levels of integration continue, we can expect to see 
problems ahead. 
Some of the more undesirable outcomes of new migration patterns are also 
apparent in the work of Morozov. Whereas Uehling and Fomina point to 
something of a silver lining in the form of stronger civil identities and 
societies, Morozov suggests civic identity has been in retreat in the Russian 
Federation. This author intervenes in the existing literature with a valuable 
corrective to narratives about the current crisis that prevail, especially in the 
mass media. From the Russian perspective of course, the West destabilised 
important geostrategic relationships with an irresponsible and expansionist 
agenda. If Morozov is correct about how the Ukrainian revolution is perceived 
in Russia, then the United States and Western Europe cannot distance 
themselves from the Russian aggression. This is crucial to understanding the 
crisis in its larger context – and finding diplomatic solutions. 
Using the most recent statistical data (from Russian Central Bank and 
Federal Migration Service), Denisenko explores the size and demographic 
composition of migration flows to Russia. As for Fomina and Oleinikova, using 
multiple sources of data provides a productive starting point. However, the 
relative weakness of the data on migration makes disaggregating policy 
changes, economic trends, and geopolitical dynamics challenging. 
Denisenko’s intervention is to track twin dynamics: with an outflow of 
migrants, there is a corresponding influx of remittances. Without a healthy 
Russian economy, however, the attraction for Central Asians is less, and 
remittances back to the Uzbek economy in particular are affected. This 
demonstrates how migration processes are not only impacted by economic 
changes like the price of oil, but themselves have the ability to shape 
subsequent economic developments. Whereas remittances from Poland to 
Ukraine do not comprise a large share of the Ukrainian economy, Russia is a 
primary source of funds for Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan where 
remittances exceed international aid. 
Kuznetsova uses a discourse analysis of in-depth interviews to trace how the 
myth of migrants as dangerous arises. Kuznetsova’s analysis provides a 
basis for future comparisons: that dynamics in the Russian Federation bear 
resemblance to migrant receiving states further West that also seek to lower 
crime, decrease social tension, and prevent the rise of extremism. There is 
another noteworthy parallel as well. The management of migrants in the 
Russian Federation has not just been securitised at the level of discourse: as 
Kuznetsova points out, the Federal Migration Service was closed in 2016 and 
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its functions moved to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In some respects, this 
mirrors the transformation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service into 
the Department of Homeland Security after terrorist attacks in the United 
States. Kuznetsova exposes the dark shadow cast on migrants by danger 
and risk-laden discourse, even though a positive outcome (explored by 
Denisenko) is that patents successfully reduced the number of irregular 
migrants.  
Schenk’s contribution to the literature is to delve more deeply into the central 
contention that led to the Ukrainian crisis in the first place, namely the choice 
to seek greater integration with Europe through the Association Agreement. 
This was a decisive fork in the road as Russia moved in the opposite 
direction with the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). It may come as a surprise 
that the EEU, which is modeled on the European Union, has even more 
ambitious goals with regard to common labour market than the European 
Union. This chapter provides a source of comparison for anyone with interest 
in supranational governance and economic policy. 
Schenk takes an approach that is replicable and could provide insight as 
events unfold: a gap analysis that identified the disjuncture between EEU 
treaty text, domestic laws and procedures with regard to migration, and 
migrant experiences with both. She uses government and legal texts, 
interviews with officials, diaspora leaders, and official immigration statistics. 
This is a significant accomplishment considering, as also noted by 
Denisenko, data on migration are missing.
The regional expression of a global phenomenon emerges here in the lack of 
alignment between law and practice; formal policy and actual behavior 
between the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan. And as elsewhere, the 
securitisation of migration in relation to fears leads to policies that work to 
encourage patterns of irregular migration.
Kingsbury takes us deeper into theories of xenophobia to elucidate a 
fascinating shift. The Russian state had been using xenophobia to distract 
attention from internal issues. With the Ukraine conflict, this was no longer a 
viable approach and the official rhetoric shifted away from demonising these 
particular migrants to blaming something else: the West. Kingsbury’s 
intervention in the literature is to synthesise the competition hypothesis and 
the cultural hypothesis used to explain xenophobia. She formulates political 
explanation that links xenophobia to political leaders who work to construct 
negative attitudes that serve their purposes. This explanation resonates with 
chapters by Kuznetsova, Mukomel, and Morozov.
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New Questions 
The chapters in this volume open up new questions that can serve as a point 
of reference for future studies. Here are ventured some questions for future 
exploration that emerge from the arguments made here. 
In the first half of the volume, an empirical question is when and how, if at all, 
internally displaced persons will be granted the equal civil and political rights 
in Ukraine? Another is what will be the long term effect on Polish civil society 
and by extension Poland’s European neighbors as a result of the 
incorporation of Ukrainian migrants? Third, the authors seem to concur that it 
would be simplistic to take the ineptitude with which the Ukraine crisis is 
being dealt with and ascribe it to a Soviet legacy. If this is the case, what new 
theoretical frameworks will help future scholars periodise the complex political 
and economic dynamics in the country? A methodological question this half of 
the volume opens up is how geography in general and borders in particular 
can be brought into a closer analytic relationship with the fields of social 
memory and political ideology. 
The chapters in the second half of the volume also raise interesting questions 
for future explanation. While the theme of Russian propaganda is already 
quite prevalent in the literature today, the contribution of these authors is 
disaggregating propaganda effects from public opinion and official discourse 
without ontologising any one of them. A more wide-ranging question here 
concerns the European and Eastern European integration projects. When do 
official discourse and news media generate narratives that widen gaps 
(between people and countries), and exactly how much common ground is 
available? 
Policy Relevance
The contributions to this volume also contain insights that have considerable 
policy relevance. First, a theme dealt with in many of the chapters is 
integrating migrants. All of the entries that explore integration-gone-wrong are 
clear: state policies with regard to access to housing, work, and social 
support must be meticulously calibrated to local needs. 
A second theme in the volume with policy relevance is the many ways that the 
economies in the region have become interdependent through labour 
migration and remittances. It follows that a migration policy change in, or 
economic sanctions on one of these countries (namely Russia) is likely to 
affect many other (and sometimes quite distant) countries. In other words, the 
effects of Western sanctions will be felt not just in Moscow, but Dushanbe, 
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Bishkek, and Tashkent. In light of evidence that some of the countries 
affected are also politically unstable, the interconnections should be of 
interest in policy making. 
A third theme is the power of migration policy to shape human behavior. This 
volume is notable because it makes Eastern Europe visible to scholars of 
migration. Somewhat familiar will be the ways in which states manage and 
mold their citizenry through sorting and ranking by means of patents, permits, 
and migrant categories. Sorting is often legitimised by a concern for 
protecting national security. This is important because it is not simply a 
consequence of a world partitioned into territorial nation-states: these 
migratory flows are actively involved in making the world we know today.
A fourth theme that unites the contributions and has policy relevance is that 
the narratives and discourse surrounding migrants has, to a greater or lesser 
extent, a profound effect on how newcomers are received, whether by 
bureaucrats or citizens. To quote J.L. Austin (1955/1962), people ‘do things’ 
with words. Attention to the stories that are told about migrants is therefore 
not for scholars alone. 
In closing, it is interesting to reflect for a moment on the relationship between 
this crisis and the West. There are many perspectives on why this ‘other’ 
migration crisis has come about. While Western analysts often demonise 
Russian Federation as the aggressor, this volume adds the additional 
perspective that from the Russian point of view, the territorial aggression on 
the part of Russian Federation was a reaction to what was understood, by 
Russia at least, as a crisis of the international system. In other words, the 
system had already lost its balance when the territorial incursions occurred. If 
there is a path to resolving the crisis, it might be found in the common ground: 
as Morozov points out, it is in Russia’s interest, and Russians may even 
prefer to have good relations with Ukraine, the European Union, and the 
United States. It follows that even subtle policy shifts with respect to Russian 
Federation could yield traction for improvements that would be meaningful for 
the migrants described in these chapters.
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